基于双重Stackelberg博弈的供应链企业融资决策研究

发布时间：2018-06-18 01:46

本文选题：供应链金融 + 融资模式　；参考：《河北工程大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：供应链金融是以发生在供应链上的商业交易为基础，成员企业以核心企业的资信实力和商业信用为依托的融资模式，供应链金融工具的采用是一种供应链金融系统参与主体间的博弈行为。研究供应链金融系统参与主体对供应链金融工具选择的博弈决策过程，有助于从理论与实务两方面分析供应链的管理内涵。基于供应链金融的研究成果和博弈论分析知识，研究供应链成员企业针对供应链金融工具的融资决策行为。采用规范研究方法界定系统变量，对供应链金融的三种融资模式——预付账款融资、动产质押融资、应收账款融资，分别构建二级单周期的双重Stackelberg博弈模型。在银行与供应链企业的博弈中，设定银行为领导者，供应链企业整体为跟随者；在核心企业与成员企业的博弈中，设定核心企业为领导者，成员企业为跟随者。利用各参与主体的期望收益函数和博弈的均衡解分析成员企业的策略选择，博弈分析得到如下结论：在预付账款融资模式中，核心企业提供担保、银行提供贷款时，，得到成员企业融资决策的影响因素是产品批发单价和贷款利率；在动产质押融资模式中，核心企业提供担保、银行提供贷款时，得到成员企业融资决策的影响因素是存货质押率和贷款利率；在应收账款融资模式中，核心企业提供担保、银行提供贷款时，得到成员企业融资决策的影响因素是核心企业交付的保证金以及贷款利率、应收账款总额，三种模式分别给出了参与主体选择策略的条件，对分析供应链成员企业融资决策过程提供了依据。
[Abstract]:Supply chain finance is a financing model based on the commercial transactions occurring in the supply chain, and the member enterprises rely on the credit strength and commercial credit of the core enterprises. The adoption of supply chain financial instruments is a game behavior among the participants of supply chain financial system. It is helpful to analyze the connotation of supply chain management from the aspects of theory and practice by studying the game decision-making process between the participants of supply chain financial system and the choice of supply chain financial instruments. Based on the research results of supply chain finance and the knowledge of game theory, this paper studies the financing decision-making behavior of supply chain member enterprises in view of supply chain financial instruments. The system variables are defined by the normative research method, and the double Stackelberg game model of two-stage single cycle is constructed for the three financing modes of supply chain finance, namely, prepaid account financing, chattel pledge financing and receivables financing. In the game between the bank and the supply chain enterprise, the bank is the leader, the supply chain enterprise is the follower, in the game between the core enterprise and the member enterprise, the core enterprise is the leader and the member enterprise is the follower. By using the expected income function of the participants and the equilibrium solution of the game to analyze the strategic choice of the member enterprises, the game analysis draws the following conclusions: in the prepayment financing model, when the core enterprise provides guarantee, the bank provides the loan. The factors influencing the financing decision of the member enterprises are the wholesale unit price of products and the interest rate of loans. In the financing mode of chattel pledge, the core enterprise provides the guarantee, the bank provides the loan, The influencing factors of financing decision of member enterprises are inventory pledge rate and loan interest rate. In the model of accounts receivable financing, the core enterprise provides guarantee and the bank provides loan. The factors that influence the financing decision of the member enterprises are the deposit delivered by the core enterprises, the loan interest rate, the total amount of accounts receivable, and the conditions of the choice strategy of the participants are given respectively in the three models. It provides the basis for analyzing the financing decision process of supply chain member enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：河北工程大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;F406.7;F426.72

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