基于市场结构的二级供应链减排决策研究
发布时间:2018-06-18 10:30
本文选题:低碳经济 + 市场结构 ; 参考:《天津大学》2014年硕士论文
【摘要】:中国的碳排放总量限制及碳交易机制已蓄势待发,研究此情境下的企业减排决策问题将对低碳经济下的企业行为及政府的政策引导都具有一定的参考价值。且经济全球化下市场中的竞争已是供应链间的竞争,因此本文的研究对象是供应链企业,具有强烈的现实意义。 以往的低碳研究中有些将消费者低碳偏好对需求的影响加入了模型中,但却缺乏对低碳经济下的需求函数的深入分析。本文作者进行了思考,认为不同的市场结构下企业及消费者对应对低碳经济方式不同,从而产生了需求函数的变化,也就改变了利润函数。因此,本文以市场结构为框架,探讨企业的低碳决策问题。同时,研究供应链中企业的决策问题就要涉及到供应链中企业的博弈行为,所以本文采用了博弈理论研究了不同市场的博弈策略,并按相应方法进行求解。 最终本文得出了不同市场中供应链企业的最优单位产品减排量,产品产量以及产品价格。并运用解析分析和数值分析说明了模型在实际供应链生产中的应用及参数灵敏度的情况。最后,本文考虑了目前低碳经济下应运而生的新合作模式——合同能源管理,并对这种新模式下的供应链集中决策进行了初步探讨。 主要结论如下:1.供应链企业的最优减排量决策是使自身的边际减排成本稍大于从市场上购买对应数量的排放权的边际成本,提升幅度根据所处市场结构的不同而不同。2.在同一市场结构下,与双方力量对等的纳什博弈相比,当供应商主导时,其单位产品减排量更大。但在两种情况下,制造的单位产品减排量与产品产量间的关系是不变的。3.在含有竞争性质的市场中,,供应链中一方企业的减排可以带动另一方的减排。而在完全垄断市场中,供应链企业的单位产品减排量彼此独立,不存在相互影响。4.合同能源管理以及供应链集中决策均能促进供应链企业的减排力度,也会带来利润提升,同时提升了经济效益及环境效益。
[Abstract]:China's total carbon emission limitation and carbon trading mechanism are ready for development. The study of enterprise emission reduction decision-making in this context will have certain reference value for enterprise behavior and government policy guidance under the low carbon economy. The competition in the market under the economic globalization is already the competition among the supply chains, so the research object of this paper is the supply chain enterprises, which has strong practical significance. Some of the previous low-carbon studies have added the influence of consumers' low-carbon preference to demand, but they lack in-depth analysis of the demand function in a low-carbon economy. The author thinks that under different market structure, enterprises and consumers have different ways of dealing with low-carbon economy, so the change of demand function will change the profit function. Therefore, this paper takes the market structure as the framework, discusses the low-carbon decision-making problem of the enterprise. At the same time, the decision problem of the enterprise in the supply chain is related to the game behavior of the enterprise in the supply chain. Therefore, the game theory is used to study the game strategy of different markets, and the corresponding solution is given. Finally, the optimal unit product emission reduction, product output and product price of supply chain enterprises in different markets are obtained. The application of the model in the actual supply chain production and the sensitivity of the parameters are illustrated by analytic analysis and numerical analysis. Finally, this paper considers the new cooperative mode, contract energy management, which comes into being in the low carbon economy, and makes a preliminary discussion on the centralized decision of supply chain under this new mode. The main conclusions are as follows: 1. The optimal emission reduction decision of supply chain enterprises is to make their marginal emission reduction cost slightly larger than the marginal cost of purchasing corresponding emission rights from the market, and the range of enhancement varies according to the market structure. In the same market structure, compared with the Nash game, when the supplier is dominant, the emission reduction per unit product is larger. In both cases, however, the relationship between the reduction of emissions per unit of manufactured products and the output of products is unchanged. In a competitive market, the reduction of emissions by one side of the supply chain can lead to emissions reduction on the other side. In the completely monopolized market, the unit product emission reduction of supply chain enterprises is independent of each other and does not affect each other. The contract energy management and the centralized decision of the supply chain can promote the emission reduction of the supply chain enterprises, also will bring about the increase of the profit, at the same time, the economic benefit and the environmental benefit will be improved.
【学位授予单位】:天津大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:X322;F274;F224
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