收益导向下快速消费类电子产品供应链质量协调机制研究

发布时间：2018-07-10 03:47

本文选题：消费类电子产品 + 供应链管理　；参考：《浙江工业大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着我国居民经济水平的提高,电子产品逐步从消费观念中的奢侈品转变为国民生活的必需品,尤其在青少年群体中,电子产品已基本得到普及。近些年,随着我国科技水平的发展,越来越多的具有自主知识产权的本土电子品牌相继凸现,但是随着产品上市与销售,往往伴其左右的是众多的投诉与维权,各类“质量门”事件频发,严重影响了我国产品的市场竞争力。一时间,质量差、耐用度低、服务差等词语相继与我国电子产品挂钩,既影响了消费类电子产品供应链各成员企业的利益,也直接损害了我国新兴电子产品行业的发展。因此,如何提高消费类电子产品的质量,是我们亟待解决的问题。鉴于此,本文将从消费类电子产品供应链质量控制角度入手,运用博弈理论、契约设计和相关优化理论对供应链质量控制进行研究,以期得到有益结论为消费类电子产品供应链各成员企业制定相关决策提供参考性意见,并为我国相关行业管理部门提供质量控制角度的行业规制建议。本文主要研究内容概况如下：首先,本文基于零售商主导的二级供应链,结合我国现实国情,引入第三方检测来监管产品质量。运用演化博弈理论,构建了二级供应链质量安全监管模型,运用复制动态方程对其进行了稳定性分析,通过分析结果表明：供应商与零售商为获得长远利益,通过必要检测监督手段,逐步促使供应商合法生产,提高产品质量,实现整体供应链收益增长。其次,本文基于供应商与零售商组成的两级供应链系统,在随机需求供应链模型中,引入质量努力概念对随机市场需求下供应链利润和销量等方面的影响进行初步分析。分析了合作型供应链模式下质量努力提升对市场需求、供应链整体利润、订购批量及零售价格的影响。分析结果表明：质量努力不断提高,有助于供应链整理利润和订购批量的增长,并降低零售价格,拉动市场活跃度,以达到市场需求与各方利润增长的预期。最后,本文基于收益共享契约和价格补贴契约相结合的理论基础,引入供应商和零售商在供应链系统中各自的质量努力因素,研究两级供应链系统中各成员的质量控制机制。分析了供应商和零售商合作、不合作、采用单契约和采用双契约双向协调这四种情况下供应链成员间的Stackelberg均衡策略,论证了契约在质量改进上的优势、质量改进与市场需求的关系。分析结果表明：当市场需求变动对产品的质量和营销质量敏感度较高时,在可承受的成本压力范围内,双向契约协调有助于双方质量的改进和供应链的利润均衡,以达到市场需求与各方利润增长的预期。
[Abstract]:With the improvement of the economic level of Chinese residents, electronic products have gradually changed from the luxury goods in the concept of consumption to the necessities of national life, especially among the young people, the electronic products have been basically popularized. In recent years, with the development of science and technology in our country, more and more local electronic brands with independent intellectual property rights have emerged one after another. However, with the product going on the market and sales, it is often accompanied by numerous complaints and rights. Various kinds of "quality door" events occur frequently, seriously affecting the market competitiveness of our products. For a time, words such as poor quality, low durability and poor service are linked to Chinese electronic products one after another, which not only affects the interests of the enterprises in the supply chain of consumer electronic products, but also directly damages the development of the new electronic products industry in our country. Therefore, how to improve the quality of consumer electronic products, is our urgent problem. In view of this, this paper will start from the point of view of supply chain quality control of consumer electronic products, use game theory, contract design and relevant optimization theory to study supply chain quality control. In order to obtain a useful conclusion for the consumer electronics supply chain member enterprises to make relevant decisions to provide reference advice, and for the relevant industry management departments in China to provide industry regulatory advice from the perspective of quality control. The main contents of this paper are as follows: firstly, based on the retailer-led secondary supply chain and the reality of our country, we introduce the third party detection to supervise the product quality. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the quality and safety supervision model of the secondary supply chain is constructed, and the stability analysis is carried out by using the replicative dynamic equation. The results show that the suppliers and retailers obtain long-term benefits. By means of necessary inspection and supervision, the supplier can produce legally, improve the product quality and realize the increase of the whole supply chain revenue. Secondly, based on the two-level supply chain system composed of supplier and retailer, this paper introduces the concept of quality effort into the stochastic demand supply chain model and analyzes the influence of the concept of quality effort on the supply chain profit and sales under the stochastic market demand. The effects of quality improvement on market demand, overall profit of supply chain, order batch and retail price in cooperative supply chain are analyzed. The results show that the continuous improvement of quality is helpful to increase the profit and order batch of supply chain, reduce the retail price and stimulate the market activity, so as to meet the expectations of market demand and profit growth. Finally, based on the theoretical basis of the combination of revenue-sharing contract and price subsidy contract, this paper introduces the quality effort factors of suppliers and retailers in the supply chain system, and studies the quality control mechanism of each member in the two-level supply chain system. This paper analyzes the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy among the supply chain members under the conditions of cooperation between supplier and retailer, non-cooperation, single contract and double contract and two-way coordination, and proves the advantages of contract in quality improvement. Relationship between quality improvement and market demand. The results show that when the market demand changes are sensitive to the product quality and the marketing quality, the two-way contract coordination is helpful to the improvement of the quality of both parties and the profit balance of the supply chain in the range of affordable cost pressure. To meet market demand and profit growth expectations.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F426.63;F274

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