零售商占优下的库存与定价决策研究

发布时间：2018-07-17 22:11

【摘要】：在供应链管理中,传统的模型是建立在制造商占优的基础之上,但随着市场的变化,企业的决策权逐渐转移到零售商,零售商在某些情况下比制造商拥有了更强的力量。那么在零售商占优的情况下供应链成员应该怎样决策,国内外很多专家学者对此做了大量的研究和探讨。本文从逆向拍卖方式和合同关系两方面研究零售商占优下的库存与定价决策。在逆向拍卖机制下,利用缺货损失率弹性分析一般随机需求下零售商的采购与定价决策,并给出截尾正态分布需求下的数值例子,为零售商利用逆向拍卖进行采购和利用定价营销提供了重要的参考依据。对合同关系下的采购情景,在乘式需求下研究零售商占优时批发价合同和两部定价合同,并从理论和数值两方面与制造商占优的情景进行比较。最后,从逆向拍卖机制和两部定价合同两方面说明当前零售业中入场费现象的合理性。
[Abstract]:In supply chain management, the traditional model is based on the dominance of manufacturers, but with the change of market, the decision-making power of enterprises is gradually transferred to retailers, and retailers have more power than manufacturers in some cases. Many experts and scholars at home and abroad have done a lot of research and discussion on how supply chain members should make decisions when retailers are dominant. This paper studies the inventory and pricing decisions under the dominance of retailers from the aspects of reverse auction and contract relationship. Under the mechanism of reverse auction, the elasticity of stock shortage loss rate is used to analyze the purchasing and pricing decisions of retailers under general stochastic demand, and a numerical example is given under the demand of truncated normal distribution. It provides an important reference for retailers to purchase by reverse auction and to use pricing marketing. Under the demand of multiplicative demand, the wholesale price contract and two pricing contracts are studied under the contract relationship, and the theoretical and numerical results are compared with those of the manufacturer. Finally, the rationality of entry fee in retail trade is explained from two aspects: reverse auction mechanism and two pricing contracts.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F224;F274;F713.3

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