基于回购契约的供应链公平偏好类型选择
发布时间：2018-07-24 19:12
【摘要】：越来越多的人们证明公平偏好确实是存在的,并将公平偏好引入供应链中寻求供应链优化机制。于是,掀起了有关公平偏好的研究热潮。但是,现实是存在多种公平偏好类型,而现有文献关于公平偏好的研究大多数是在传统研究之上直接假设供应链成员具有某类公平偏好,并没有探讨供应链成员对供应链伙伴的选择问题,所以本文研究在此基础上将供应链成员对供应链伙伴的选择行为引入公平偏好的研究,研究供应链成员对不同公平偏好类型的供应链伙伴的选择问题。本文假设市场上存在三类不同公平偏好类型的供应商和三类不同公平偏好类型的零售商,且各自具有选择对方的权利。其中,三类不同公平偏好类型分别为:自利偏好类型、FS公平偏好类型、Nash公平偏好类型。本文的主要研究内容:第一,在回购契约下,分别讨论自利偏好供应商和自利偏好零售商对供应链伙伴公平偏好类型的选择问题。研究表明:自利的供应商在考虑自身利润最大化的前提下会更愿意选择自利偏好的零售商合作;自利的零售商同样也更希望自己的合作伙伴供应商是自利偏好的;故,自利偏好的供应商和自利偏好的零售商彼此都更愿意选择彼此作为供应链合作伙伴,“一拍即合”成功构建供应链。第二,在回购契约下,讨论FS公平偏好的供应商和FS公平偏好的零售商对供应链伙伴公平偏好类型的选择问题。研究表明:FS公平偏好的供应商更愿意自利偏好的零售商作为自己的合作伙伴;FS公平偏好的零售商愿意选择自利偏好或是FS公平偏好的供应商合作。第三,在回购契约下,讨论Nash公平偏好的供应商和Nash公平偏好的零售商对供应链伙伴公平偏好类型的选择问题。研究表明:Nash公平偏好的供应商更倾向选择自利偏好的零售商成为自己下游的合作伙伴;Nash公平偏好的零售商偏好选择自利偏好的供应商。第四,综合以上比较结果,经过选择与匹配,最终得出:供应链成员在考虑自身最大化利润的前提下寻求供应链伙伴,只有自利偏好的供应商和自利偏好的零售商愿意合作构建供应链。FS公平偏好的供应商和零售商及Nash公平偏好的供应商和零售商,他们对对方偏好类型的最优选择都不能匹配成功,即,他们寻求的供应链伙伴并不是最佳的。但是,Nash公平偏好类型的供应商和Nash公平偏好类型的零售商也可以退而求其次,作为彼此的第二选择进行合作构建供应链;FS公平偏好类型的供应商和FS公平偏好类型的零售商组成供应链成为保底选择。本文研究既考虑了供应链成员类型的多样性,又将公平偏好和供应链成员对供应链伙伴的选择行为相结合,不仅可以丰富理论的研究,也可以指导实践。因此,具有重要的理论和现实意义。
[Abstract]:More and more people prove the existence of fair preference and introduce fair preference into supply chain to seek supply chain optimization mechanism. As a result, there has been an upsurge in research on fairness preferences. However, the reality is that there are many types of fair preference, and most of the existing researches on fairness preference are based on the traditional research, which directly assumes that supply chain members have some kind of fair preference. The selection of supply chain partners by supply chain members is not discussed in this paper, so this paper introduces the selection behavior of supply chain members to supply chain partners into the research of fair preference. This paper studies the selection of supply chain partners with different fair preference types by supply chain members. In this paper, we assume that there are three kinds of suppliers with different types of fair preference and three types of retailers with different types of fair preference, and each has the right to choose each other. Among them, three different types of fair preference are self-interest preference type / FS fair preference type and Nash fair preference type. The main contents of this paper are as follows: first, under the repurchase contract, we discuss the choice of self-interest preference supplier and self-interest preference retailer to supply chain partner fair preference type respectively. The research shows that self-profit suppliers are more willing to choose self-profit preference retailers in consideration of their own profit maximization, and self-profit retailers also prefer their partner suppliers to self-interest preference. Both self-interested suppliers and self-interested retailers are more willing to choose each other as supply chain partners. Secondly, under the repurchase contract, we discuss the selection of supply chain partner fair preference type between FS fair preference supplier and FS fair preference retailer. The research shows that the supplier with the fairness preference of: FS prefers the retailer with the self-interest preference as his partner and the retailer with the fair preference of the retailer is willing to choose the supplier with the self-interest preference or the fair preference of the FS. Thirdly, under the repurchase contract, we discuss the choice of Nash fair preference supplier and Nash fair preference retailer to supply chain partner fair preference type. The research shows that the supplier with the fairness preference of: Nash is more likely to choose the retailer with self-interest preference as his downstream partner and the retailer with the fair preference of the retailer who prefers to choose the self-interest preference. Fourth, synthesizing the above comparison results, through selection and matching, it is concluded that the supply chain members seek the supply chain partners on the premise of considering their own maximization of profits. Only suppliers with self-interest preference and retailers with self-interest preference are willing to cooperate to construct supply chain. FS fair preference suppliers and retailers and Nash fair preference suppliers and retailers. They can not match the best choice of each other's preference type, that is, the supply chain partner they seek is not the best. However, suppliers with Nash fair preference type and retailers with Nash fair preference type can also take second place. As the second choice of each other, the supply chain consists of suppliers with FS fair preference type and retailers with FS fair preference type. This paper not only considers the diversity of supply chain member types, but also combines fairness preference with supply chain members' choice of supply chain partners, which can not only enrich the theoretical research, but also guide the practice. Therefore, it has important theoretical and practical significance.
【学位授予单位】：重庆交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274
本文编号：2142363
[Abstract]:More and more people prove the existence of fair preference and introduce fair preference into supply chain to seek supply chain optimization mechanism. As a result, there has been an upsurge in research on fairness preferences. However, the reality is that there are many types of fair preference, and most of the existing researches on fairness preference are based on the traditional research, which directly assumes that supply chain members have some kind of fair preference. The selection of supply chain partners by supply chain members is not discussed in this paper, so this paper introduces the selection behavior of supply chain members to supply chain partners into the research of fair preference. This paper studies the selection of supply chain partners with different fair preference types by supply chain members. In this paper, we assume that there are three kinds of suppliers with different types of fair preference and three types of retailers with different types of fair preference, and each has the right to choose each other. Among them, three different types of fair preference are self-interest preference type / FS fair preference type and Nash fair preference type. The main contents of this paper are as follows: first, under the repurchase contract, we discuss the choice of self-interest preference supplier and self-interest preference retailer to supply chain partner fair preference type respectively. The research shows that self-profit suppliers are more willing to choose self-profit preference retailers in consideration of their own profit maximization, and self-profit retailers also prefer their partner suppliers to self-interest preference. Both self-interested suppliers and self-interested retailers are more willing to choose each other as supply chain partners. Secondly, under the repurchase contract, we discuss the selection of supply chain partner fair preference type between FS fair preference supplier and FS fair preference retailer. The research shows that the supplier with the fairness preference of: FS prefers the retailer with the self-interest preference as his partner and the retailer with the fair preference of the retailer is willing to choose the supplier with the self-interest preference or the fair preference of the FS. Thirdly, under the repurchase contract, we discuss the choice of Nash fair preference supplier and Nash fair preference retailer to supply chain partner fair preference type. The research shows that the supplier with the fairness preference of: Nash is more likely to choose the retailer with self-interest preference as his downstream partner and the retailer with the fair preference of the retailer who prefers to choose the self-interest preference. Fourth, synthesizing the above comparison results, through selection and matching, it is concluded that the supply chain members seek the supply chain partners on the premise of considering their own maximization of profits. Only suppliers with self-interest preference and retailers with self-interest preference are willing to cooperate to construct supply chain. FS fair preference suppliers and retailers and Nash fair preference suppliers and retailers. They can not match the best choice of each other's preference type, that is, the supply chain partner they seek is not the best. However, suppliers with Nash fair preference type and retailers with Nash fair preference type can also take second place. As the second choice of each other, the supply chain consists of suppliers with FS fair preference type and retailers with FS fair preference type. This paper not only considers the diversity of supply chain member types, but also combines fairness preference with supply chain members' choice of supply chain partners, which can not only enrich the theoretical research, but also guide the practice. Therefore, it has important theoretical and practical significance.
【学位授予单位】：重庆交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274
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