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基于合作博弈的供应链企业之间利益分配的研究

发布时间:2018-08-01 09:22
【摘要】:随着经济和科技的迅速发展,企业要想进一步的发展,就必须拥有更多的资源、更强的竞争力,但是仅仅凭企业的一己之力是很难实现这个目标的,因此,现在的企业都越来越注重合作,接踵而来的是企业之间相互合作,形成供应链联盟。但是随着越来越多的供应链联盟的悄然兴起,又存在着许多问题困扰着供应链联盟。企业之间相互合作,形成联盟,能够降低生产成本,提高运作的效率,创造更多的利润。而对于创造的利润,只有公平、合理的分配才能保证供应链运作的高效,形成一个良性循环,从而为合作联盟创造更多的利润。 本文的主题就是用合作博弈理论解决合作企业联盟的利益分配问题,主要做了以下工作: 首先对供应链理论以及企业利益合作理论进行了一定的阐述,介绍了企业必须按照一定的原则对收益进行分配,还对风险决策和合作博弈的基本概念以及相关内容进行了一定的了解。 然后,本文介绍了供应链企业之间的合作博弈,并分析了影响整个供应链联盟利益的因素,以及利益分配的特点、方法,并对一些方法的不足之处进行概括,引出利用合作博弈理论对联盟利益进行分配,分析了合作博弈Shapley值法的优点以及存在的不足之处。正因为Shapley值法存在的问题,,考虑了包含影响利益因素的改进的Shapley值模型,并提出了一些方法计算这些影响因素的系数。 再次,建立了一个风险决策模型,对模型进行求解,得到每个企业的收益作为联盟博弈的特征函数,然后运用Shapley值法对利益进行分配,得到各个企业的一个利益分配,再计算出各种影响利益的因素的系数,考虑其对Shapley模型的影响,并进行模型求解。 最后,文章对所有情况下企业分配到的利益进行比较,分析其原因。并对全文所做的工作进行总结和概括,找出存在的不足之处,分析其出现的原因,提出未来的展望。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy and science and technology, enterprises must have more resources and stronger competitiveness if they want to further develop. However, it is very difficult to achieve this goal on their own. Nowadays, enterprises pay more and more attention to cooperation, and then they cooperate with each other to form supply chain alliance. But with more and more supply chain alliance rising quietly, there are many problems puzzling supply chain alliance. Cooperation and alliance between enterprises can reduce production cost, improve operation efficiency and create more profits. For the profit created, only fair and reasonable distribution can guarantee the efficiency of the supply chain operation and form a virtuous circle, thus creating more profits for the cooperative alliance. The theme of this paper is to use cooperative game theory to solve the benefit distribution problem of cooperative enterprise alliance. The main work is as follows: firstly, the supply chain theory and enterprise benefit cooperation theory are expounded. This paper introduces that enterprises must distribute the income according to certain principles, and also has a certain understanding of the basic concepts and related contents of risk decision and cooperative game. Then, this paper introduces the cooperative game between supply chain enterprises, and analyzes the factors that affect the benefit of the whole supply chain alliance, as well as the characteristics and methods of benefit distribution, and summarizes the shortcomings of some methods. The advantages and disadvantages of the cooperative game Shapley value method are analyzed by using the cooperative game theory to distribute the benefits of the alliance. Because of the problem of Shapley value method, the improved Shapley value model which includes the factors affecting interests is considered, and some methods are proposed to calculate the coefficients of these factors. Thirdly, we establish a risk decision model, solve the model, get the income of each enterprise as the characteristic function of the alliance game, then use the Shapley value method to distribute the benefit, and get a benefit distribution of each enterprise. The coefficients of various factors affecting interest are calculated, and the influence of the factors on Shapley model is considered, and the model is solved. Finally, the article compares the benefits of the enterprise distribution under all circumstances, and analyzes the reasons. The paper summarizes and generalizes the work done in this paper, finds out the shortcomings, analyzes the reasons for its appearance, and puts forward the future prospect.
【学位授予单位】:兰州交通大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F224.32;F274

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