服务补贴和具有共同零售商的供应链博弈研究

发布时间：2018-09-08 15:03

【摘要】：随着市场动态和竞争环境的变化,非价格因素例如服务逐渐成为影响消费者购买决策的重要因素,由以前企业间单纯的价格竞争转变为价格和服务的竞争。零售商为了实现自身利益的最大化会通过提高商品的服务质量(如实物体验、个性化定制等)来提高商品的附加值,同时提高消费者福利,而制造商为使自己的产品在可替代产品中脱颖而出,占有更大的市场份额,只有通过向零售商提供一定的服务补贴等方法,才能得到零售商进行更大的服务支持,增加自身产品在服务方面的优势,从而提高利润。服务成为产品之间竞争一个不可或缺的因素,成为近年来学术界研究的热点,其主要特点是研究基于价格和服务竞争的供应链协调问题。本文在总结国内外学者基于价格和服务的供应链协调问题的基础上,研究了由两个制造商和一个共同零售商组成的供应链中制造商的服务补贴政策对参与方最优定价和服务决策及利润的影响,本文的主要研究内容和结论如下:1)研究了制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈下制造商提供服务补贴对供应链上产品的批发价格、服务水平、零售价格、市场需求、零售商利润和制造商利润的影响。研究表明提供服务补贴总是导致制造商的利润受损,如果没有合适的利润分配机制,制造商没有动力提供服务补贴。为此采用了纳什讨价还价模型对服务补贴政策带来的额外利润进行分配使得双方的利润都得到了增加。2)研究了纳什均衡博弈下制造商提供服务补贴对供应链上产品的批发价格、服务水平、零售价格、市场需求、零售商利润和制造商利润的影响。研究表明,制造商向零售商提供服务补贴会使其产品的批发价格、服务水平、零售价格和市场需求增加,并随着服务补贴系数的增大而增大,但零售商利润和制造商利润不一定增加,只有在服务补贴系数满足一定的条件下,才能达到增加利润的目的。
[Abstract]:With the change of market dynamics and competitive environment, non-price factors, such as services, have gradually become an important factor influencing consumers' purchasing decisions, from simple price competition among enterprises to price and service competition. In order to maximize their own interests, retailers will improve the quality of services (such as physical experience, personalized customization, etc.) to improve the added value of goods, while improving consumer welfare. In order to make their products stand out in alternative products and occupy a larger market share, manufacturers can only obtain greater service support from retailers by providing certain service subsidies to retailers. Increase the advantages of their products in the service, thereby increasing profits. Service has become an indispensable factor in product competition and has become a hot topic in academic research in recent years. Its main characteristic is to study the coordination of supply chain based on price and service competition. Based on the summary of domestic and foreign scholars' supply chain coordination based on price and service, The effects of manufacturer's service subsidy policy on the optimal pricing, service decision and profit of the participants in the supply chain composed of two manufacturers and one common retailer are studied. The main contents and conclusions of this paper are as follows: 1) this paper studies the wholesale price, service level, retail price, market demand of the manufacturer's service subsidy to the products in the supply chain under the Stackelberg game dominated by the manufacturer. The influence of retailer profit and manufacturer profit. The research shows that the service subsidy always causes the manufacturer's profit to be damaged, and if there is no proper profit distribution mechanism, the manufacturer has no incentive to provide the service subsidy. For this reason, the Nash bargaining model is used to distribute the extra profit brought by the service subsidy policy so that the profit of both parties increases by .2) under Nash equilibrium game, the wholesale price of the manufacturer providing service subsidy to the products in the supply chain is studied. Effect of service level, retail price, market demand, retailer profit and manufacturer profit. The research shows that the manufacturer's service subsidy increases the wholesale price, service level, retail price and market demand of their products, and increases with the increase of service subsidy coefficient. However, the retailer profit and the manufacturer profit do not necessarily increase, only if the service subsidy coefficient meets certain conditions, can the profit increase be achieved.
【学位授予单位】：青岛大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;F724.2

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