虚拟第三方下供应链激励协调
发布时间：2018-10-05 20:20
【摘要】：为了解决供应商隐藏成本信息、销售商隐藏努力行动所引起的逆向选择和道德风险问题,文章基于委托代理理论,引入虚拟第三方为协调主体,分别站在供应商和销售商的角度,通过设计合适的契约激励销售商努力工作和供应商"说真话"。研究结果表明,当供应链中只有道德风险存在时,可以通过如(16)式的契约(其中契约参数λ∈[0,1])实现供应链的完美协调;但是,当供应链中不仅仅存在道德风险还存在逆向选择时,该契约参数不再是区间[0,1]上任意的值,而是与供应链交易量q及供应商的生产成本c相关的定值(满足(29)式),此时的供应链才能实现协调;在该契约下,为获得更多的利益,供应商更有动机降低自身生产成本,销售商也更有积极性提高努力水平,从而实现"双赢"。最后,通过数值算例对模型进行了应用分析。
[Abstract]:In order to solve the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard caused by the hidden cost information of suppliers and the hidden efforts of vendors, based on the principal-agent theory, the virtual third party is introduced as the coordinating body. From the point of view of suppliers and vendors, the vendors are encouraged to work hard and "tell the truth" by designing suitable contracts. The results show that when there is only moral hazard in the supply chain, the supply chain can be perfectly coordinated by a contract such as (16) (where the contract parameter 位 鈭，
本文编号：2254747
[Abstract]:In order to solve the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard caused by the hidden cost information of suppliers and the hidden efforts of vendors, based on the principal-agent theory, the virtual third party is introduced as the coordinating body. From the point of view of suppliers and vendors, the vendors are encouraged to work hard and "tell the truth" by designing suitable contracts. The results show that when there is only moral hazard in the supply chain, the supply chain can be perfectly coordinated by a contract such as (16) (where the contract parameter 位 鈭，
本文编号：2254747
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