总量控制与交易环境下基于供应链纵向研发联盟的收入共享合同研究
发布时间:2018-10-26 19:37
【摘要】:“CT”制度使碳排放权具备了经济资源的属性,双渠道分销模式已然成为大多数企业的选择。那么,对于碳排放依赖型企业在双渠道分销模式下应该怎样优化自己的运营决策来达到企业利润的最大化?基于“CT”环境,本文综合运用优化理论、博弈理论研究了以由一个制造商和一个零售商构成的二级供应链三种渠道结构(R、RD、RR)模式下供应链的最优运营决策及如何设计收入共享合同实现供应链的协调以保证供应链成员双赢,从而在激烈的商业竞争中保持供应链的整体竞争优势。首先,基于“CT”环境,分析、比较了传统零售渠道结构供应链分别在分散化决策和集中化决策时的最优减排策略、最优定价策略。从供应链上下游结成联盟合作减排的角度出发,设计了一个收入共享合同协调机制,研究了“CT”环境下供应链的协调问题。应用动态博弈理论证明了所设计合同的有效性,供应链成员能够实现双赢。最后,用数值模拟验证了所设计的合同具有很好的性质和效率。其次,基于“CT”环境,分析、比较了制造商开通网上直销渠道又同时向传统零售商批发销售同质产品的双渠道结构(RD)供应链在分散化决策和集中化决策时的最优减排策略、最优定价策略。从供应链上下游结成联盟合作减排和双渠道协调的角度出发,设计了一个收入共享合同的协调机制,研究了“CT”环境下RD渠道结构供应链的协调问题。运用动态博弈理论证实了所设计的合同的有效性,供应链成员能够实现双赢。最后,用数值模拟的方法验证了所设计的合同具有很好的性质和效率。最后,基于“CT”环境,分析、比较了零售商既通过传统零售渠道又开通网上直销渠道向消费者销售同质产品的双渠道结构(RR)供应链在分散化决策和集中化决策时的最优减排策略、最优定价策略。从供应链上下游结成联盟合作减排和双渠道协调的角度出发,设计了一个收入共享合同的协调机制,研究了“CT”环境下RR渠道结构供应链的协调问题。运用动态博弈理论证明了所设计的合同的有效性,可以实现供应链成员双赢。最后,用数值模拟的方法验证了所设计的合同具有很好的性质和效率。
[Abstract]:The "CT" system makes carbon emission rights have the attribute of economic resources, and the dual-channel distribution model has become the choice of most enterprises. So, how to optimize their own operation decisions in order to maximize the profits of carbon emissions-dependent enterprises in the dual-channel distribution mode? Based on the environment of "CT", this paper synthetically applies the optimization theory and game theory to study the three channel structures of a two-stage supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The optimal operation decision of supply chain under RR) mode and how to design revenue sharing contract to realize the coordination of supply chain so as to ensure the win-win situation of supply chain members so as to maintain the overall competitive advantage of supply chain in the fierce commercial competition. Firstly, based on the "CT" environment, the optimal emission reduction strategy and the optimal pricing strategy of the traditional retail channel structure supply chain in decentralized and centralized decision-making are compared. From the point of view of forming an alliance between upstream and downstream of supply chain to reduce emissions, a coordination mechanism of revenue sharing contract is designed, and the coordination of supply chain under "CT" environment is studied. The validity of the designed contract is proved by using the dynamic game theory, and the supply chain members can achieve a win-win situation. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify the good properties and efficiency of the designed contract. Second, based on the "CT" environment, the analysis, This paper compares the optimal emission reduction strategy and the optimal pricing strategy of the (RD) supply chain with the dual channel structure in which the manufacturer opens the online direct selling channel and sells the homogeneous products to the traditional retailers simultaneously. The optimal emission reduction strategy and the optimal pricing strategy are compared in the decentralized and centralized decisions of the (RD) supply chain. From the point of view of the alliance of upstream and downstream of supply chain and the coordination of two channels, a coordination mechanism of revenue sharing contract is designed, and the coordination of RD channel structure supply chain under "CT" environment is studied. The validity of the designed contract is proved by using the dynamic game theory, and the supply chain members can achieve a win-win situation. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify the good properties and efficiency of the designed contract. Finally, based on the "CT" environment, the analysis, This paper compares the optimal emission reduction strategy and the optimal pricing strategy of the (RR) supply chain with both traditional retail channels and online direct selling channels for the distribution of homogeneous products to consumers. From the point of view of the alliance of upstream and downstream of supply chain and the coordination of two channels, a coordination mechanism of revenue sharing contract is designed, and the coordination of RR channel structure supply chain under "CT" environment is studied. The validity of the designed contract is proved by using the dynamic game theory, which can realize the win-win situation of the supply chain members. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify the good properties and efficiency of the designed contract.
【学位授予单位】:深圳大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F274
本文编号:2296753
[Abstract]:The "CT" system makes carbon emission rights have the attribute of economic resources, and the dual-channel distribution model has become the choice of most enterprises. So, how to optimize their own operation decisions in order to maximize the profits of carbon emissions-dependent enterprises in the dual-channel distribution mode? Based on the environment of "CT", this paper synthetically applies the optimization theory and game theory to study the three channel structures of a two-stage supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The optimal operation decision of supply chain under RR) mode and how to design revenue sharing contract to realize the coordination of supply chain so as to ensure the win-win situation of supply chain members so as to maintain the overall competitive advantage of supply chain in the fierce commercial competition. Firstly, based on the "CT" environment, the optimal emission reduction strategy and the optimal pricing strategy of the traditional retail channel structure supply chain in decentralized and centralized decision-making are compared. From the point of view of forming an alliance between upstream and downstream of supply chain to reduce emissions, a coordination mechanism of revenue sharing contract is designed, and the coordination of supply chain under "CT" environment is studied. The validity of the designed contract is proved by using the dynamic game theory, and the supply chain members can achieve a win-win situation. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify the good properties and efficiency of the designed contract. Second, based on the "CT" environment, the analysis, This paper compares the optimal emission reduction strategy and the optimal pricing strategy of the (RD) supply chain with the dual channel structure in which the manufacturer opens the online direct selling channel and sells the homogeneous products to the traditional retailers simultaneously. The optimal emission reduction strategy and the optimal pricing strategy are compared in the decentralized and centralized decisions of the (RD) supply chain. From the point of view of the alliance of upstream and downstream of supply chain and the coordination of two channels, a coordination mechanism of revenue sharing contract is designed, and the coordination of RD channel structure supply chain under "CT" environment is studied. The validity of the designed contract is proved by using the dynamic game theory, and the supply chain members can achieve a win-win situation. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify the good properties and efficiency of the designed contract. Finally, based on the "CT" environment, the analysis, This paper compares the optimal emission reduction strategy and the optimal pricing strategy of the (RR) supply chain with both traditional retail channels and online direct selling channels for the distribution of homogeneous products to consumers. From the point of view of the alliance of upstream and downstream of supply chain and the coordination of two channels, a coordination mechanism of revenue sharing contract is designed, and the coordination of RR channel structure supply chain under "CT" environment is studied. The validity of the designed contract is proved by using the dynamic game theory, which can realize the win-win situation of the supply chain members. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify the good properties and efficiency of the designed contract.
【学位授予单位】:深圳大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F274
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 郭丽红,冯宗宪;垂直性研究与开发合作联盟的博弈模型新探[J];西安交通大学学报(社会科学版);2002年02期
2 艾凤义,侯光明;纵向研发合作中的收益分配和成本分担机制[J];中国管理科学;2004年06期
3 刘华,陈维平,康志新,NGAI Tungwai,李元元;Fuzzy Multiple Attribute Decision Making for Evaluating Aggregate Risk in Green Manufacturing[J];Tsinghua Science and Technology;2005年05期
4 王秋菲;李凯;;纵向RJVs研发成本分担机制[J];系统工程;2007年05期
5 张军果;任浩;;供应链上下游企业合作研发博弈分析[J];华中师范大学学报(自然科学版);2007年02期
6 许传永;梁j;苟清龙;;一类两层双渠道供应链的库存系统优化与协调[J];预测;2009年04期
7 杜少甫;董骏峰;梁j;张靖江;;考虑排放许可与交易的生产优化[J];中国管理科学;2009年03期
8 赵霞;吴方卫;;随机产出与需求下农产品供应链协调的收益共享合同研究[J];中国管理科学;2009年05期
9 王虹;周晶;;不同价格模式下的双渠道供应链决策研究[J];中国管理科学;2009年06期
10 吴庆;但斌;;低值易逝品的第三方物流收入共享协调合同研究[J];管理工程学报;2009年03期
,本文编号:2296753
本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/guanlilunwen/gongyinglianguanli/2296753.html