政府约束下废旧家电回收再制造闭环供应链定价决策
发布时间：2018-11-05 12:00
【摘要】：经济的高速发展，社会的不断进步，居民生活水平的显著提高，各种各样的家电产品作为生活必需品走进了千家万户，拥有数百亿的庞大的社会拥有量。每年因家电使用寿命终结而报废的和因消费者对其进行更新换代而弃之不用的家电产品高达数亿台，并呈几何级数倍增。在家电产品极大的改善生活的同时，废旧家电的随意丢弃以及处理不当却对社会资源造成了极大的浪费以及严重的环境污染。资源危机和环境危机的双重压力，以及可持续发展的理念日益深入人心，按照生产责任延伸制原则，制造商必须对废旧家电进行回收再制造，并且政府也开始参与进来。因此，研究政府约束下废旧家电回收再制造闭环供应链定价决策显得格外重要。 本文引入政府的约束函数，以博弈论为工具，对废旧家电回收再制造闭环供应链进行建模与优化。首先，以闭环供应链的相关理论成果为基础，提出由单一制造商和单一零售商构成的混合渠道回收模式，接着对废旧家电回收再制造的概念进行界定，并对其现状进行分析。然后，构建混合渠道模式下的废旧家电回收再制造决策模型，并引入政府的奖惩函数，以政府为奖惩主体，制造商为奖惩对象，应用Stackelberg博弈方法，分别构建了“单渠道销售——单渠道回收”、“单渠道销售——双渠道回收”、“双渠道销售——单渠道回收”三种情况下的制造商和零售商决策模型，运用最优化理论分别求出三种模式下的最优解。最后，结合实际进行数值仿真，比较了三种模式下的最优解，讨论不同渠道模式下政府约束对制造商和零售商决策值的影响。 本文得出以下结论：（1）三种渠道模式均需要实施政府约束，否则以利润最大化为目标的制造商和零售商没有进行废旧家电回收的动力，废旧家电回收量趋于基本最低回收量；（2）实施政府约束的情形下，，制造商和零售商的销售价格保持不变，不受其影响，但回收价格随着政府的激励力度的提高而增加，这种情况下，零售商的利润保持稳步增长，与政府的激励力度成正比，但制造商利润不仅受激励力度的影响，还受最低回收量的影响，所以利润或增或减，取决于政府规定的最低回收量；（3）实施政府约束能有效促进废旧家电回收量的提高，并且若能积极引导制造商和零售商实现合作决策，废旧家电回收量会达到分散决策下的两倍，合作效果极其明显。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy, the continuous progress of the society and the remarkable improvement of the living standard of the residents, a variety of household appliances, as necessities of life, have entered into thousands of households, with tens of billions of huge social ownership. Every year, hundreds of millions of household electrical appliances are discarded because of the end of their service life and replaced by consumers. At the same time, the discarded and improper disposal of discarded household appliances has caused a great waste of social resources and serious environmental pollution. The dual pressure of resource crisis and environmental crisis, as well as the concept of sustainable development, is increasingly popular. According to the principle of extended production responsibility, manufacturers must recycle and remanufacture used household appliances, and the government is also taking part in it. Therefore, it is very important to study the closed-loop supply chain pricing decision of recycling and remanufacturing of used household appliances under government constraints. In this paper the government constraint function is introduced and the closed-loop supply chain for recycling and remanufacturing of used household appliances is modeled and optimized by using game theory. Firstly, based on the related theoretical results of closed-loop supply chain, a hybrid channel recovery model consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer is proposed, and then the concept of recycling and remanufacturing of used household appliances is defined, and its present situation is analyzed. Then, the decision model of recycling and remanufacturing of used household appliances under the mixed channel model is constructed, and the government's reward and punishment function is introduced. The government is regarded as the subject of reward and punishment, the manufacturer is the object of reward and punishment, and the Stackelberg game method is applied. The decision models of manufacturers and retailers under the conditions of "single channel sales-single channel recovery", "single channel sales-double channel recovery", "dual channel sales-single channel recycling" are constructed, respectively. The optimal solutions of the three models are obtained by using the optimization theory. Finally, combined with the actual numerical simulation, the optimal solutions of the three modes are compared, and the influence of government constraints on the decision value of manufacturers and retailers under different channel modes is discussed. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) all three channel models need to be restricted by the government, otherwise, the manufacturers and retailers who aim to maximize profits have no incentive to recycle used household appliances. The recovery amount of waste household appliances tends to be the basic minimum recovery amount; (2) under the condition of government restraint, the sales price of manufacturers and retailers remains unchanged and unaffected, but the recovery price increases with the increase of government incentives. In this case, the profits of retailers increase steadily. It is directly proportional to the government's incentive strength, but the manufacturer's profit is not only affected by the incentive strength, but also by the lowest recovery amount, so the profit or increase or decrease depends on the minimum recovery amount stipulated by the government; (3) the implementation of government restriction can effectively promote the increase of recycling amount of used household appliances, and if manufacturers and retailers can be actively guided to realize cooperative decision-making, the amount of recycling of used and used household appliances will be twice as large as that under decentralized decision-making, and the effect of cooperation is extremely obvious.
【学位授予单位】：华东交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F713.2;F426.6
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy, the continuous progress of the society and the remarkable improvement of the living standard of the residents, a variety of household appliances, as necessities of life, have entered into thousands of households, with tens of billions of huge social ownership. Every year, hundreds of millions of household electrical appliances are discarded because of the end of their service life and replaced by consumers. At the same time, the discarded and improper disposal of discarded household appliances has caused a great waste of social resources and serious environmental pollution. The dual pressure of resource crisis and environmental crisis, as well as the concept of sustainable development, is increasingly popular. According to the principle of extended production responsibility, manufacturers must recycle and remanufacture used household appliances, and the government is also taking part in it. Therefore, it is very important to study the closed-loop supply chain pricing decision of recycling and remanufacturing of used household appliances under government constraints. In this paper the government constraint function is introduced and the closed-loop supply chain for recycling and remanufacturing of used household appliances is modeled and optimized by using game theory. Firstly, based on the related theoretical results of closed-loop supply chain, a hybrid channel recovery model consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer is proposed, and then the concept of recycling and remanufacturing of used household appliances is defined, and its present situation is analyzed. Then, the decision model of recycling and remanufacturing of used household appliances under the mixed channel model is constructed, and the government's reward and punishment function is introduced. The government is regarded as the subject of reward and punishment, the manufacturer is the object of reward and punishment, and the Stackelberg game method is applied. The decision models of manufacturers and retailers under the conditions of "single channel sales-single channel recovery", "single channel sales-double channel recovery", "dual channel sales-single channel recycling" are constructed, respectively. The optimal solutions of the three models are obtained by using the optimization theory. Finally, combined with the actual numerical simulation, the optimal solutions of the three modes are compared, and the influence of government constraints on the decision value of manufacturers and retailers under different channel modes is discussed. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) all three channel models need to be restricted by the government, otherwise, the manufacturers and retailers who aim to maximize profits have no incentive to recycle used household appliances. The recovery amount of waste household appliances tends to be the basic minimum recovery amount; (2) under the condition of government restraint, the sales price of manufacturers and retailers remains unchanged and unaffected, but the recovery price increases with the increase of government incentives. In this case, the profits of retailers increase steadily. It is directly proportional to the government's incentive strength, but the manufacturer's profit is not only affected by the incentive strength, but also by the lowest recovery amount, so the profit or increase or decrease depends on the minimum recovery amount stipulated by the government; (3) the implementation of government restriction can effectively promote the increase of recycling amount of used household appliances, and if manufacturers and retailers can be actively guided to realize cooperative decision-making, the amount of recycling of used and used household appliances will be twice as large as that under decentralized decision-making, and the effect of cooperation is extremely obvious.
【学位授予单位】：华东交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F713.2;F426.6
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相关期刊论文 前10条
1 张贵磊;刘志学;;主导型供应链的Stackelberg利润分配博弈[J];系统工程;2006年11期
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3 周Z逆
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