具有风险规避型零售商的双渠道定价决策研究

发布时间：2018-11-21 12:31

【摘要】：近年来，电子商务作为一种新的交易模式，，成为了网络经济时代最有效率且安全的交易方式，已经对各行各业产生了深远的影响。因此，为了适应时代的发展，越来越多的厂商开设了网络直销渠道，以期可以更多地接触终端客户，从而形成了双渠道或多渠道的供应链分销模式。在电子产品领域，如联想、HP、IBM等纷纷在传统渠道的基础上增加了电子直销渠道。然而增设网络渠道之后，供应链的环境变得更加复杂，不仅存在制造商与零售商间传统渠道的纵向博弈，并且传统渠道与网络渠道之间还存在横向竞争，无疑使得供应链环境的不确定性大大增加。正是由于这些不确定性带来的风险，使得传统的假设企业决策者为风险中性已经不能成立，本文将对竞争及合作情况下具有风险规避型零售商的双渠道供应链定价决策问题进行研究。本文考虑了随机需求下一个制造商和一个零售商组成的一个销售易逝品的简单双渠道供应链，采用条件风险值测量零售商的风险规避行为。在假设制造商的网络渠道和零售商的零售渠道存在价格竞争及合作两种条件下，研究了零售商具有风险规避行为时供应链的定价决策问题。假设需求不确定性服从均匀分布时，得出了竞争情况下的零售价、直销价和订货量的Nash均衡解。并指出零售价、直销价和制造商直销渠道的利润随着零售商风险规避程度的增加而减小，并指出制造商与零售商的价格竞争对制造商而言不一定有利。最后，通过建立制造商与零售商之间的Nash讨价还价博弈模型，探讨了制造商和零售商合作博弈下的最优策略。研究指出，当需求不确定性服从均匀分布时，存在批发价、零售价和订货量的Nash均衡解，且零售价随着零售商风险规避程度的增加而降低。此外，制造商直销渠道的利润随着零售商风险规避指标的增加而呈现增大、减小、先增大后减小的趋势，这与相关参数的设置有关。而零售商对供应链利润的谈判能力只有在一定范围内才会随着其风险规避程度的增加而增加，当超出这一范围时反而减小。此外，本文着重探讨了不同渠道权利结构、不同需求波动性及不同价格敏感性下，零售商的风险规避指标对供应链成员的最优决策所产生的影响，并得到了一些有趣的管理见解。
[Abstract]:In recent years, electronic commerce, as a new transaction mode, has become the most efficient and secure trading mode in the era of network economy, and has had a profound impact on various industries. Therefore, in order to adapt to the development of the times, more and more manufacturers have set up network direct selling channels, in the hope of more contact with terminal customers, thus forming a dual or multi-channel supply chain distribution model. In the field of electronic products, such as Lenovo, HP,IBM and so on have added electronic direct marketing channels on the basis of traditional channels. However, with the establishment of network channels, the supply chain environment becomes more complex. There is not only the vertical game between manufacturers and retailers, but also the horizontal competition between traditional channels and network channels. Undoubtedly, the uncertainty of supply chain environment is greatly increased. It is precisely because of the risks brought about by these uncertainties that the traditional assumption that decision makers are risk-neutral is no longer valid. In this paper, we will study the pricing decision problem of double channel supply chain with risk aversion retailer in the case of competition and cooperation. In this paper, we consider a simple double-channel supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer selling perishable goods under random demand, and use the conditional risk value to measure the risk aversion behavior of the retailer. Under the assumption that there is price competition and cooperation between the manufacturer's network channel and the retailer's retail channel, this paper studies the pricing decision of the supply chain when the retailer has risk-averse behavior. Assuming that the demand uncertainty is uniformly distributed, the Nash equilibrium solutions of retail price, direct selling price and order quantity are obtained. It is pointed out that the retail price, direct selling price and the profit of manufacturer's direct selling channel decrease with the increase of retailer's risk aversion degree, and it is pointed out that the price competition between manufacturer and retailer is not necessarily beneficial to manufacturer. Finally, by establishing the Nash bargaining game model between manufacturer and retailer, the optimal strategy under cooperative game between manufacturer and retailer is discussed. It is pointed out that when demand uncertainty is uniformly distributed, there are Nash equilibrium solutions for wholesale price, retail price and order quantity, and the retail price decreases with the increase of retailer's risk aversion. In addition, with the increase of retailer risk aversion index, the profit of manufacturer direct selling channel increases, decreases, increases first and then decreases, which is related to the setting of relevant parameters. The ability of retailers to negotiate the profit of supply chain increases with the increase of risk aversion, but decreases when it exceeds this range. In addition, this paper focuses on the influence of retailers' risk aversion index on the optimal decision of supply chain members under different channel rights structure, different demand volatility and different price sensitivity. And got some interesting management insights.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F224;F274;F713.32

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