地方政府补贴下跨区域绿色供应链协调的效率与公平研究

发布时间：2018-11-29 08:58

【摘要】：随着资源环境约束的日趋强化,绿色、低碳发展理念被广泛接受,使得绿色供应链管理理论成为全球关注的焦点。作为兼顾经济效益和环境约束的绿色供应链系统中的参与者和利益相关者,制造企业、零售商、消费者、政府四者都只有通过合作、协同、监督和制约,才能够在追求绿色供应链整体经济和社会效益最大化的基础上实现自身利益最优。绿色供应链中参与企业往往由于其地理区位的不同而隶属不同的行政管辖区域,致使其参与绿色供应链管理的决策行为受到各地政府相关政策的影响和制约。当前,绿色供应链协调中有两大需要解决的问题： (1)企业如何针对地方政府的干预政策制定产品的销售价格和绿色度以确保供应链协调的效率； (2)地方政府如何制定合理的干预政策保证跨区域绿色供应链中参与企业间的公平。针对这两个问题,本文在以往实践经验和研究成果的基础上,分别针对地方政府补贴下单阶段和多阶段绿色供应链中参与企业的效率与公平协调问题进行探讨。主要研究内容包括：(1)地方政府补贴下单阶段两企业绿色供应链协调研究。首先,考虑两企业产品对消费者的相互替代性,将产品的价格和绿色度引入产品的需求函数。其次,针对地方政府仅对绿色产品补贴的干预政策,基于Bertrand博弈构建两竞争企业的绿色供应链协调模型。最后,分析地方政府补贴与产品销售价格和绿色度的关系。(2)地方政府补贴下多阶段跨区域绿色供应链协调研究。针对不同地方政府补贴下的多阶段跨区域绿色供应链,考虑市场需求受产品销售价格和绿色度不同影响情形,基于Stackelberg博弈分别构建政企主从博弈的多阶段跨区域绿色供应链协调模型,分析不同需求情形下多阶段绿色供应链中参与企业的决策和地方政府补贴策略。(3)地方政府补贴下跨区域绿色供应链公平研究。针对跨区域绿色供应链中不同地方政府干预政策对各阶段参与企业的影响,考虑多阶段结构绿色供应链和一般网络结构绿色供应链两种情形,以泰尔指数为上层决策目标,以Stackelberg博弈的政府补贴下多阶段绿色供应链协调为下层决策目标,构建双层规划模型,以跨区域绿色供应链中参与企业不公平性最小分析绿色供应链中参与企业的决策和地方政府补贴策略。
[Abstract]:With the increasingly strengthening of resource and environmental constraints, the concept of green and low-carbon development is widely accepted, which makes the theory of green supply chain management become the focus of global attention. As the participants and stakeholders of green supply chain system, manufacturing enterprises, retailers, consumers and governments, all of them can only cooperate, supervise and restrict the green supply chain system by taking into account economic benefits and environmental constraints. Only on the basis of pursuing the maximization of economic and social benefits of green supply chain can we realize the best self-interest. The participating enterprises in green supply chain often belong to different administrative jurisdiction because of their different geographical location, so their decision-making behavior of participating green supply chain management is influenced and restricted by the relevant policies of local governments. At present, there are two problems to be solved in the coordination of green supply chain: (1) how to make the sales price and green degree of products according to the intervention policy of local government to ensure the efficiency of supply chain coordination; (2) how the local government make reasonable intervention policy to ensure the fairness of the participating enterprises in the cross-regional green supply chain. Aiming at these two problems, based on the previous experience and research results, this paper discusses the coordination of efficiency and fairness of the participating enterprises in the local government subsidy order stage and multi-stage green supply chain respectively. The main research contents are as follows: (1) the coordination of green supply chain between the two enterprises. Firstly, considering the substitution of products to consumers, the price and green degree of the products are introduced into the demand function of the products. Secondly, aiming at the intervention policy of local government only subsidizing green products, the green supply chain coordination model of two competitive enterprises is constructed based on Bertrand game. Finally, the relationship between local government subsidy and product sales price and green degree is analyzed. (2) the coordination of multi-stage cross-regional green supply chain under local government subsidy. According to the multi-stage cross-regional green supply chain with different local government subsidies, considering that the market demand is affected by different product sales price and green degree, Based on Stackelberg game, the multi-stage cross-regional green supply chain coordination model is constructed. This paper analyzes the decision making and local government subsidy strategy of participating enterprises in multi-stage green supply chain with different demand. (3) the equity of cross-regional green supply chain under local government subsidy. Aiming at the influence of different local government intervention policies on the participating enterprises in the cross-regional green supply chain, considering the multi-stage structure green supply chain and the general network structure green supply chain, taking the Thiel index as the upper level decision goal, this paper discusses the influence of different local government intervention policies on the participating enterprises in different stages in the cross-regional green supply chain. Taking the coordination of multi-stage green supply chain under the government subsidy of Stackelberg game as the lower level decision goal, a bilevel programming model is constructed. Based on the analysis of the minimum unfairness of the participating enterprises in the cross-regional green supply chain, this paper analyzes the decision making and local government subsidy strategy of the participating enterprises in the green supply chain.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F274

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