基于不对称后备供货信息下的供应链决策研究

发布时间：2018-12-10 18:37

【摘要】：本文基于最优化理论和不完全信息的动态与静态博弈模型,研究了一条由一个生产商和一个零售商构成的供应链,在市场随机需求的环境下研究供应链渠道成员的最优决策以及如何设计机制使得后备供应商的成本信息共享促使各成员获得更多利润的问题。本文假设生产商移交给零售商的产品数量存在一个分配的不确定性,除了正常的生产运行外,生产商还可以将零售商的一部分订单外包给后备供应商来满足零售商的需求,但是后备供应商的外包产品成本信息是私有的,生产商只知道产品的两种成本状态。在此情形下,考虑两种外包契约,即价格契约和信息披露契约,讨论在两种契约下供应链渠道成员的最优决策。研究发现,生产商只有在分配给零售商的产品数量足够低时,才会采用外包策略,否则,不外包任何产品。对于这两种契约,生产商都是根据自身产品分配数量和外包产品成本类型来决定外包数量和交货时间。与价格契约不同的是,信息披露契约下生产商能够真实的揭露后备供应商的产品成本信息,因此生产商可以通过降低采购成本来提高外包性能。最后我们发现,生产商并不总是在信息披露契约下获得更多的利润,信息披露机制反而可能会使分散式供应链的运作效率更差。本文共有五章。在第一章中介绍了本文的研究背景,国内外研究现状,以及研究的目的与意义。第二章简要地介绍了博弈理论的相关知识和委托代理模型。第三章中研究了两个外包契约下供应链渠道成员的最优决策问题。第四章通过一些数据实验来具体说明第三章中所得的结论以及其它的管理意义。第五章是对本文的总结,并做了展望。
[Abstract]:Based on the optimization theory and the dynamic and static game model of incomplete information, this paper studies a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. This paper studies the optimal decision of supply chain channel members in the environment of random market demand and how to design a mechanism to enable the cost information sharing of backup suppliers to make each member gain more profits. This paper assumes that there is an uncertainty of distribution in the number of products transferred from the manufacturer to the retailer. In addition to the normal production operation, the producer can also outsource some of the retailer's orders to the backup supplier to meet the retailer's demand. But the cost information of the outsourced products of the backup supplier is private, and the manufacturer only knows the two cost states of the product. In this case, considering two kinds of outsourcing contracts, that is, price contract and information disclosure contract, the optimal decision of supply chain channel members is discussed. The study found that manufacturers would only adopt outsourcing strategies if the number of products allocated to retailers was low enough, otherwise, they would not outsource any products. For both contracts, the manufacturer determines the quantity and delivery time according to the quantity assigned and the cost type of the outsourced product. Different from the price contract, under the information disclosure contract, the producer can reveal the product cost information of the backup supplier, so the manufacturer can improve the outsourcing performance by reducing the purchase cost. Finally, we find that manufacturers do not always get more profits under the disclosure contract, but the disclosure mechanism may make the decentralized supply chain more inefficient. There are five chapters in this paper. In the first chapter, it introduces the research background, the research status at home and abroad, as well as the purpose and significance of the research. The second chapter briefly introduces the game theory and the principal-agent model. In chapter 3, we study the optimal decision of supply chain channel members under two outsourcing contracts. In chapter 4, some data experiments are used to explain the conclusions and other management implications. The fifth chapter is the summary of this article, and makes the prospect.
【学位授予单位】：南京航空航天大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274

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