基于库存成本视角的供应链VMI利益分配
发布时间：2018-12-29 12:43
【摘要】：从库存成本角度开展研究,在比较实施VMI前后供应链库存模型的基础上分析供需双方利润变化,指出在VMI短期内存在责任利益不一致的情况,并应用价格契约和Stackelberg博弈模型建立了零售商强势情况下供需双方利益分配模型,体现为零售商激励采购价格,证明实施VMI后供应链协调水平越高,供应链库存成本与采购价格就越低,对解决VMI短期内供需双方责任与利益不一致的问题具有较好的理论与现实意义。
[Abstract]:From the point of view of inventory cost, this paper analyzes the change of profit between supplier and supplier on the basis of comparing the inventory model of supply chain before and after the implementation of VMI, and points out that in the short term of VMI, there is inconsistent benefit between responsibility and interest. Using price contract and Stackelberg game model, this paper establishes the profit distribution model of both supply and demand parties under the condition of retailer's strength, which is reflected in retailer's incentive purchase price, which proves that the higher the coordination level of supply chain is after the implementation of VMI, the higher supply chain coordination level is. The lower the inventory cost and purchase price of supply chain is, the better the theoretical and practical significance is to solve the problem that the responsibilities and interests of both supply and demand parties are inconsistent in the short term of VMI.
【作者单位】： 上海交通大学中美物流研究院;天津大学管理与经济学部;
【基金】：国家科技部重大科技支撑计划基金资助项目(2006BAH02A07)
【分类号】：F274;F224
[Abstract]:From the point of view of inventory cost, this paper analyzes the change of profit between supplier and supplier on the basis of comparing the inventory model of supply chain before and after the implementation of VMI, and points out that in the short term of VMI, there is inconsistent benefit between responsibility and interest. Using price contract and Stackelberg game model, this paper establishes the profit distribution model of both supply and demand parties under the condition of retailer's strength, which is reflected in retailer's incentive purchase price, which proves that the higher the coordination level of supply chain is after the implementation of VMI, the higher supply chain coordination level is. The lower the inventory cost and purchase price of supply chain is, the better the theoretical and practical significance is to solve the problem that the responsibilities and interests of both supply and demand parties are inconsistent in the short term of VMI.
【作者单位】： 上海交通大学中美物流研究院;天津大学管理与经济学部;
【基金】：国家科技部重大科技支撑计划基金资助项目(2006BAH02A07)
【分类号】：F274;F224
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