基于供应链上下游制约机制的蔬菜质量安全控制

发布时间：2018-12-31 10:13

【摘要】：分析蔬菜供应链的质量安全现状,指出蔬菜供应链上下游存在的质量安全问题,就蔬菜供应链上游与下游之间的惩罚、监督、预防等制约行为进行博弈分析。发现供应链上下游之间的制约行为受上游质量安全预防成本、上游违约后所受到的惩罚和下游的潜在损失等因素影响,在现实条件下这些制约行为的效果并不明显。结合蔬菜供应链质量安全现状及博弈分析结果,从完善上下游合作机制、建立蔬菜质量安全可追溯系统、倡导"拉式"供应链流通模式、鼓励终端消费者制约供应链上游等方面,对蔬菜供应链上下游制约机制更好地发挥作用提出相应的对策建议。
[Abstract]:This paper analyzes the present situation of vegetable supply chain quality and safety, points out the quality and safety problems existing in the upstream and downstream of vegetable supply chain, and makes a game analysis on the punishment, supervision, prevention and other restrictive behaviors between the upstream and downstream of the vegetable supply chain. It is found that the restrictive behaviors between upstream and downstream of supply chain are influenced by the cost of upstream quality and safety prevention, the punishment after upstream breach of contract and the potential loss of downstream, but the effect of these restrictive behaviors is not obvious under the actual conditions. According to the present situation of vegetable supply chain quality and safety and the result of game analysis, this paper establishes the traceability system of vegetable quality and safety from perfecting the upstream and downstream cooperation mechanism, and advocates the "pull" supply chain circulation mode. To encourage the end consumers to restrict the upstream of the supply chain, the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward for the upstream and downstream restriction mechanism of the vegetable supply chain to play a better role.
【作者单位】：北京工商大学商学院;北京工商大学中国食品安全研究中心;
【基金】：北京市哲学社会科学规划项目(编号:13JGC088) 北京市哲学社会科学重大项目(编号:14ZDB18) 北京市教委科研基地项目(编号:PXM2015_014213_000048)
【分类号】：TS255;TS201.6

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