供应中断下双源采购的供应链契约设计

发布时间：2019-01-17 12:10

【摘要】：考虑由一个制造商和两个供应商构成的两级供应链契约设计问题,将可靠性服从随机分布的供应商作为主供应商,将完全中断供应商作为次供应商,建立以利润最大化为目标的签约和执行两阶段博弈的动态规划模型,得到制造商的最优契约设计。制造商根据产品零售价格的变化灵活做出只与一个供应商签约、与两个供应商同时签约或都不签约的决定,供应商根据契约设计内容决定自己的最优生产规模。研究表明:供应商最优生产规模与产品的单位生产成本呈负相关,与单位变动支付和单位惩罚成本呈正相关;次供应商的订货量与其本身的可靠性呈正相关,与主供应商的可靠性呈负相关;供应商的固定支付与其相应的可靠性呈负相关。
[Abstract]:Considering the design of a two-level supply chain contract consisting of one manufacturer and two suppliers, the supplier with random distribution of reliability is considered as the main supplier, and the supplier with complete interruption is regarded as the secondary supplier. The dynamic programming model of signing and executing two-stage game aiming at profit maximization is established, and the optimal contract design of the manufacturer is obtained. According to the change of retail price, the manufacturer can make the decision that only one supplier will sign the contract, two suppliers will sign the contract at the same time, and the supplier will decide their optimal production scale according to the content of the contract design. The results show that the optimal production scale of suppliers is negatively related to the unit production cost of the product, positively correlated with the unit variable payment and unit penalty cost; The order quantity of the secondary supplier is positively correlated with its own reliability and negatively correlated with the reliability of the main supplier, and the fixed payment of the supplier is negatively correlated with its corresponding reliability.
【作者单位】：烟台大学;大连理工大学;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“基于供应商产能的供应应急策略与设计研究”(项目编号:12CGL042) 国家自然科学基金项目“基于行为运作的加工系统干扰管理研究”(项目编号:71271039);国家自然科学基金项目“考虑有限理性的供应链中断风险管理模型研究”(项目编号:71272122)
【分类号】：F274

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