政府奖惩下不同权力结构闭环供应链决策研究

发布时间：2019-04-15 20:04

【摘要】：随着全球环境污染和资源短缺日趋严重,各国政府越来越重视环境保护和资源的循环再利用发展问题。闭环供应链遵循循环经济理论,以最大化产品生命周期为目标的将正向供应链和逆向供应链有机结合,能够减少企业的生产成本,实现产品的循环再利用,而受到企业、政府和学术界的广泛关注。近年来,政府更是加大了对环保的关注,陆续出台了相关政策法规要求企业进行回收再制造活动,甚至对企业实施补贴进行激励。关于闭环供应链已有的研究成果主要是关于闭环供应链的定价和协调问题,关于政府干涉的研究却不多。考虑政府干涉对闭环供应链的影响更加具有现实意义。因此本文在分析和总结前人已有研究成果的基础上,通过模型构建,采用定量分析方法研究了政府奖惩下不同权力结构闭环供应链的决策问题。本文的研究工作主要有以下几个方面：首先,对选题的背景及意义进行了阐述,确定本文的具体研究方法和内容。对研究相关的逆向供应链、闭环供应链、博弈论等理论基础进行了介绍及相关文献进行了综述,并指出现研究存在的不足。其次,构建由垄断制造商和单一零售商组成的零售商回收模式的闭环供应链模型。研究政府分别对制造商和零售商实施奖惩时,对集中式决策闭环供应链,以及制造商和零售商Nash均衡博弈、制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈、零售商领导的Stackelberg博弈等三种权力结构分散式决策闭环供应链模型的决策、系统各成员利润和总利润的影响。利用最优化理论与方法对集中式决策模型进行求解,利用Stackelberg博弈理论对六种分散式决策模型进行求解,并对求得的最优产品单位零售价格、批发价格、回收率、制造商利润、零售商利润以及总利润进行了比较分析。重点研究了政府奖惩力度和最低回收率的设置对闭环供应链中产品零售价格、批发价格和回收率等决策变量以及成员利润的影响。研究表明,政府奖惩不仅能够提高闭环供应链的收益,且增加环境效益。我们的研究成果丰富了闭环供应链系统政府干涉的研究领域,为政府在闭环供应链管理方面提供了一些管理学启示。最后,对全文进行了总结,归纳了全文的主要结论以及贡献,提出本文研究中存在的不足,并对进一步的研究工作进行了展望。
[Abstract]:With the global environmental pollution and resource shortage becoming more and more serious, governments pay more and more attention to environmental protection and recycling and development of resources. The closed-loop supply chain follows the theory of circular economy and combines the forward supply chain and reverse supply chain organically in order to maximize the product life cycle, which can reduce the production cost of the enterprise, realize the recycling of the product, and be accepted by the enterprise. The widespread concern of the government and academia. In recent years, the government has paid more attention to environmental protection, and has issued relevant policies and regulations requiring enterprises to recycle and remanufacture activities, and even to encourage enterprises to implement subsidies. The existing research results on closed-loop supply chain are mainly about the pricing and coordination of closed-loop supply chain, but there are few researches on government intervention. Considering the influence of government intervention on closed-loop supply chain, it is more practical. Therefore, on the basis of analyzing and summarizing the previous research results, this paper studies the decision-making problem of closed-loop supply chain with different power structures under different government rewards and punishments by using the quantitative analysis method and constructing the model. The main research work of this paper is as follows: firstly, the background and significance of the selected topic are expounded, and the specific research methods and contents of this paper are determined. This paper introduces the theoretical basis of reverse supply chain, closed loop supply chain, game theory and so on, and summarizes the related literatures, and points out the deficiency of the research. Secondly, the closed-loop supply chain model of retailer recovery model composed of monopoly manufacturer and single retailer is constructed. This paper studies the closed-loop supply chain with centralized decision-making, the Nash equilibrium game between manufacturer and retailer, and the Stackelberg game led by manufacturer when the government carries out rewards and punishments on manufacturers and retailers respectively. The decision-making of three decentralized power structure decision-making closed-loop supply chain models, such as retailer-led Stackelberg game, and the influence of each member's profit and total profit of the system. The optimization theory and method are used to solve the centralized decision-making model, the Stackelberg game theory is used to solve the six decentralized decision-making models, and the optimal product unit retail price, wholesale price, recovery rate and manufacturer's profit are obtained. The retailer's profit and total profit are compared and analyzed. The effects of government rewards and penalties and minimum recovery rate on the decision variables such as retail price wholesale price and recovery rate of products in closed-loop supply chain as well as the profit of members are studied. The research shows that government rewards and punishments can not only improve the return of closed-loop supply chain, but also increase the environmental benefit. Our research results enrich the research field of government intervention in closed-loop supply chain system and provide some management enlightenment for government in closed-loop supply chain management. Finally, the thesis is summarized, the main conclusions and contributions of this paper are summarized, and the shortcomings in this paper are put forward, and the future research work is prospected.
【学位授予单位】：大连理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274

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