双边市场视角下我国搜索引擎市场的定价行为分析

发布时间：2018-03-20 18:29

本文选题：双边市场　切入点：定价行为　出处：《东北财经大学》2011年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：进入21世纪,双边市场理论才开始引起国际经济学界的广泛关注,目前双边市场已是产业组织研究的一大热点,它是依托于网络外部性理论发展起来的新兴前沿理论。与传统的单边市场相比,双边市场涉及三个参与主体,平台企业和两方不同的参与者,并且平台企业通过交叉网络外部性将双方参与者吸引到平台上进行交易。在现实生活中,具有这种双边市场特征的行业是普遍可见的,如购物中心联结着商户和消费者,展览中心联结着参加者和展览商,淘宝网联结着买方和卖方等。从产业组织的角度看,搜索引擎市场具有鲜明的双边市场特点,搜索引擎企业作为平台连接着双方参与者,一方参与者是个体用户,一方参与者是广告商,广告商和个体用户之间存在负的交叉网络外部性：平台上的广告商做的广告越多,该平台对个体用户的吸引力就越小；反之,个体用户的访问量越大,广告商就更愿意在这个搜索引擎平台上做广告。本文就是依托于搜索引擎市场的双边市场特征对搜索引擎平台的定价行为进行了分析研究。在以前的研究中,国内鲜有学者将双边市场理论应用于搜索引擎的定价研究,本文的创新点就是在双边市场的理论基础上,通过严谨的模型分析我国搜索引擎的定价行为,并结合百度和谷歌在我国具体的情况分情形讨论。本文首先界定了搜索引擎市场,包括搜索引擎的定义、搜索引擎的检索服务、搜索引擎市场的参与者利益关系、搜索引擎市场的供给分析和需求分析,阐述了搜索引擎市场的双边市场特征,然后分析了搜索引擎市场的定价行为这一热点问题,包括定价理论基础、定价策略和定价方式,进而通过建立数学模型研究了纵向联盟和横向联盟情况时搜索引擎平台的定价行为,最后从理论上分析了搜索引擎市场的定价规制问题。在搜索引擎这样的双边市场中,定价问题是一个热点的研究方向。本文始终围绕着搜索引擎平台的定价行为这一核心问题,首先分析了搜索引擎平台的倾斜式定价策略,通过建立一个双寡头垄断模型来考察相关参数对搜索引擎平台定价的影响,分析研究模型得出了随着个体用户对广告厌恶程度的加大,随着个体用户对广告商带来的交叉网络效应程度的加大,搜索引擎平台对广告商收取的广告费随之增加,即搜索引擎平台在定价时的倾斜度加大。在定价方式的分析中,根据选择定价方式需要考虑的因素确定了我国搜索引擎平台采用两部收费制的定价方式,并通过建立模型分析了相关参数对搜索引擎平台两部收费的影响,分析研究模型得出了搜索引擎平台的匹配程度的提高会减少广告商的注册费用。然后通过建立数学模型对比分析了搜索引擎平台纵向分离和纵向联盟时的定价行为,考察了纵向联盟下个体用户、广告商和搜索引擎平台有何变化,得出了搜索引擎平台和广告商形成纵向联盟时的利润会提高,在现实中搜索引擎平台有组成纵向联盟的激励。最后考虑了导致我国搜索引擎市场完全垄断的两种情形,通过建立完全垄断模型分析得出了在完全垄断情形时的搜索引擎市场中,搜索引擎平台相对制定更低的广告费和拥有更多的广告量,搜索引擎平台和广告商相对都获得更高的利润。在分析了我国搜索引擎市场中搜索引擎平台在各种情况下的定价行为后,接着讨论了搜索引擎市场中搜索引擎平台的倾斜式定价策略规制问题,得出了在搜索引擎这种双边市场中,几乎所有的搜索引擎平台都采取了交叉补贴的倾斜定价策略,广告商对个体用户的交叉补贴行为是发生在两个相互依赖的群体之间的,目的是将个体用户和广告商吸引到搜索引擎平台上,最大程度促成为双方的交易,这是基于搜索引擎市场的双边市场特点所采取的一种吸引双方参与者的理性定价行为。也就是说,搜索引擎平台的倾斜式定价策略是为了解决广告商和个体用户需求的“鸡蛋相生”问题,这种定价策略是一个长期稳定的行为,不同于单边市场中的交叉补贴行为,不属于掠夺性定价,故反垄断规制部门不能从传统反垄断规制角度对搜索引擎平台的倾斜式定价进行规制。在本文的最后,首先归纳了本文的研究内容和研究不足,然后依据本文的研究不足拓展了我国搜索引擎市场的未来研究方向。
[Abstract]:In twenty-first Century, the bilateral market theory began to attract the attention of international economic circles, the bilateral market is a hot research topic of industrial organization, it is relying on the frontier theory with network externality theory. Compared with the traditional one-sided market, bilateral market involves three participants, the platform of enterprise and the two party different participants, and the platform of enterprise through the cross network externalities will attract participants on both sides of trading platform. In real life, has the characteristics of this bilateral market industry is generally visible, such as shopping malls connected with businesses and consumers, the exhibition center join visitors and exhibitors, taobao.com connected with the buyer and the seller.
From the perspective of industrial organization, the search engine market with bilateral market characteristics, the search engine business as a platform to connect with both participants, one participant is individual users, a participant is advertiser, there is negative network externalities between advertisers and individual users, advertisers make more advertisements, attractive the platform for individual users is smaller; on the other hand, the greater the amount of access to individual users, advertisers prefer to advertise in the search engine platform. This paper is based on the pricing behavior of the search engine market in the bilateral market characteristics of the search engine platform is studied.
In a previous study, few scholars have applied research on pricing theory of two-sided market in search engine, the innovation of this paper is the theoretical foundation of the bilateral market, through the rigorous model analysis of China's search engine pricing behavior, and the combination of Baidu and Google in China's specific situation of the case discussion.
This paper first defines the search engine market, including the definition of search engine, search engine service, search engine market participants interests, analysis of supply and demand analysis of the search engine market, expounds the features of the two-sided market search engine market, and then analyzes the hot issue of the pricing behavior of the search engine Market, including pricing the theoretical basis, pricing strategy and pricing, the pricing behavior of search engine platform and by establishing the mathematical model of longitudinal and transverse alliance alliance, the pricing regulation of the search engine market from the theoretical analysis.
In the search engine in such a bilateral market, the pricing problem is a hot research direction. This paper revolves around the core issue of the pricing behavior of search engine platform, firstly analyzes the skewed pricing strategy of search engine platform, to examine the effects of related parameters on the search engine platform pricing through the establishment of a duopoly model analysis of the model with individual users for advertising aversion increase with the increase of the degree of cross network effect brought by individual users to advertisers, search engine platform to increase advertisers advertising Fei Suizhi, the inclination of the search engine platform increase in pricing. In the analysis of pricing, according to the choice of pricing the way to consider the Chinese search engine platform using two part tariff pricing methods, and establish a model to analyze the phase The parameters influence on the search engine platform two charges, analysis of the model of the registration fee, improve the degree of the search engine platform will reduce the advertisers. Then the pricing behavior of the search engine platform longitudinal separation and vertical alliance and analyses the contrast through the establishment of mathematical model, the influence of a longitudinal Alliance of individual users, advertisers and search what is the change of engine platform, the search engine platform and advertisers formed vertical alliances when the profit will increase, in reality the search engine platform is composed of vertical alliance incentive. Finally we consider two things result of our search engine market monopoly, by establishing the complete monopoly model analyzed the monopoly situation the search engine market, search engine platform is relatively lower making advertising and have more advertising, search engine platform and Advertisers have relatively high profits.
In the analysis of China's search engine market pricing behavior in the search engine platform in a variety of situations, and then discusses the skewed pricing strategies for regulation of the search engine market, the search engine in this bilateral market, almost all of the search engine platform have taken inclined cross subsidy pricing strategy the cross subsidy behavior advertisers on individual users were between two mutually dependent groups, to individual users and advertisers to search engine platform, the greatest degree of promoting become parties to the transaction, which is a kind of rational pricing behavior to attract both participants take bilateral market characteristics of the search engine market based on. That is to say, the skewed pricing strategy is to solve the users and advertisers of the "chicken and egg" problem, This pricing strategy is a long-term stable behavior. Unlike cross market subsidies in unilateral markets, it is not a predatory pricing. Therefore, antitrust regulation departments cannot regulate the tilt pricing of search engine from the perspective of traditional antitrust regulation.
At the end of this paper, we first summarize the research contents and research limitations of this paper, and then expand the future research direction of China's search engine market based on the deficiency of this research.

【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：F49;F274

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