高管控制权、自由现金流与过度投资

发布时间：2017-12-30 20:08

本文关键词：高管控制权、自由现金流与过度投资　出处：《华东师范大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近年来,随着中国经济的迅速发展,国内投资过热现象日趋明显,由此产生的上市公司过度投资现象严重。根据代理理论,公司中所有权和经营权的分离造成了经理人和公司利益不完全一致,这就使得经理人利用其控制权将企业自由现金流量进行过度投资,而这些投资能够给经理人带来私人收益,却损害公司的价值。而企业的自由现金流越多,就越可能导致更严重的过度投资行为。本文根据代理理论和Jenson的自由现金流量假说,在对过度投资概念界定的基础上进行相关文献梳理后以我国沪深股市2008—2010年度的制造业上市公司为样本,通过研究高管控制权、自由现金流量和过度投资三者之间的关系,从而验证股东和经理人之间的代理问题是否导致了企业的过度投资问题。本文首先验证上市公司的管理层是否会将企业的自由现金流量投入到损害企业价值的项目上进行过度投资。通过建立上市公司投资预期模型,估计残差值得到公司的过度投资支出,然后建立线性回归模型检验上市公司的自由现金流是否会导致过度投资,更多的自由现金流是否会引发更严重的过度投资行为,结果发现上市公司的自由现金流量和过度投资显著正相关。本文进一步选择高管控制权作为切入点,建立了五个子模型,分别检验高管综合控制权、两职合一、股权分散度、任职年限与来自控股股东单位五个变量与过度投资的关系。结果证实这五个变量均与过度投资存在正相关性,从而证实在自由现金流下,上市公司高管控制权是影响过度投资的原因之一。最后根据实证分析得到的结论提出相应的政策建议。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of Chinese economy, domestic investment overheating phenomenon has become increasingly evident, resulting in excessive investment of listed company is serious. According to the agency theory, the separation of ownership and operation of the company resulted in the managers and the interests of the company are not exactly the same, which makes the manager to use its control over investment of free cash flow, and these investments bring private benefits to the manager, but the damage the company's value. More free cash flow of the enterprise, the more likely lead to more serious over investment behavior.
According to the agency theory and Jenson's free cash flow hypothesis, related literature review based on defining the concept of over investment in the manufacturing industry of our country stock market 2008 - year 2010 listed companies as samples, through the control of executive, the relationship between free cash flow and over investment of the three, in order to verify the agent the problem between shareholders and managers will lead to excessive investment of the enterprise.
This paper first verifies the management of listed companies will be the company's free cash flow into the enterprise value damage on projects. Over investment of listed companies through the establishment of the expected investment model, the estimated residuals worth to the company's over investment spending, and then establish a linear regression model to test the free cash flow of listed companies will lead to excessive investment. The more free cash flow will lead to more serious over investment behavior, the free cash flow is positively related to the listed companies and over investment. This paper further selection of executive control rights as a starting point, the establishment of five sub models were tested for comprehensive control of executives, two duty syncretic, equity dispersion relations office life and from the controlling shareholder of unit five variables and over investment. The results confirm that these five variables are positively correlated with excessive investment Therefore, under the real free cash flow, the controlling power of listed company executives is one of the reasons that influence over investment. Finally, based on the conclusions obtained from empirical analysis, the corresponding policy recommendations are put forward.

【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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