我国证券投资基金管理人信赖义务的理论分析

发布时间：2018-01-09 14:05

本文关键词：我国证券投资基金管理人信赖义务的理论分析　出处：《上海金融》2010年10期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：证券投资基金管理人与持有人之间存在信息不对称的,基金管理人为追求个人利益会出现道德风险、逆向选择等问题。为了强化基金治理,消除基金管理人和持有人之间的利益冲突,必须加强我国基金管理人信赖义务理论的研究,构建以信赖义务为核心的基金管理人监管制度。基金管理人信赖义务在内涵上,信赖义务是信托义务在基金制度中的应用与体现;在内容上,基金管理人信赖义务分为注意义务与忠实义务,两者既相互独立,又相辅相成;在性质上,信赖义务是区别于物权说和债权说的一种新的义务形态,是基于安全、效率价值平衡而创设的;在法律规制方面,建议保留诚信原则的规定,同时引入信赖义务来规范基金管理人的行为,从而实现基金当事人的权利义务平衡。
[Abstract]:If there is information asymmetry between the managers and the holders of the securities investment funds, the fund managers will face moral hazard and adverse selection in order to pursue their personal interests. In order to strengthen the governance of the funds. In order to eliminate the conflict of interest between the fund manager and the holder, we must strengthen the research of the trust obligation theory of the fund manager in our country. Construct the supervision system of fund manager with trust obligation as the core. Trust obligation is the application and embodiment of trust obligation in fund system. In content, the trust obligation of fund manager is divided into duty of care and obligation of loyalty, both of which are independent and complement each other. In nature, the obligation of trust is a new form of obligation, which is different from the theory of real right and the theory of creditor's rights, and is based on the balance of security and efficiency. In the aspect of legal regulation, it is suggested that the provisions of the principle of good faith should be retained, and the trust obligation should be introduced to regulate the behavior of the fund manager so as to achieve the balance of the rights and obligations of the fund parties.
【作者单位】：江苏大学法学院;
【分类号】：F832.51
【正文快照】： 作为当今世界经济中一种重要的投资理财金融工具和金融制度安排基金组织架构的理论基础是信托原理,基金管理人与持有人之间信息严重不对称,在财产所有权与受益权相分离的情况下,基金管理人为追求个人利益会出现道德风险、逆向选择等问题。在我国基金的实际运作中,基金评价体

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