可转换债券对并购双边道德风险防范的实验研究

发布时间：2018-01-13 23:06

本文关键词：可转换债券对并购双边道德风险防范的实验研究　出处：《管理科学》2010年03期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：以往对可转换债券与双边道德风险防范的研究仅限于风险资本投资过程中,较少有研究对其在并购中作为支付契约所发挥的作用进行分析。通过借鉴经济学实验室方法,研究在私有利益存在的情况下,可转换债券支付契约对于防范并购中双边道德风险所发挥的作用。实验设计依据双边道德风险模型中公认的参数表示方法,用并购双方所投入的努力水平测度道德风险,以现金支付契约、股票支付契约和现金加股票的混合支付契约作为控制组,以可转换债券支付契约作为观察组。研究结果表明,可转换债券和股票对目标方的激励效果显著优于现金,可转换债券对并购方的激励效果显著优于其他契约,可转换债券契约的并购协同效应显著高于其他契约,且随着并购方投入水平的增加,目标方执行转换期权的可能性越大。
[Abstract]:In the past, the research on convertible bonds and bilateral moral hazard prevention is limited to the process of venture capital investment. There are few studies on its role as a payment contract in M & A. by using the economics laboratory method to study the existence of private interests. The role of convertible bond payment contract in preventing the bilateral moral hazard in M & A. the experimental design is based on the accepted parameter representation method in the bilateral moral hazard model. The moral hazard is measured by the level of effort invested by both sides of the merger and acquisition. The cash payment contract, the stock payment contract and the mixed payment contract of cash plus stock are used as the control group. Using convertible bond payment contract as the observation group, the results show that the incentive effect of convertible bonds and stocks to the target party is significantly better than that of cash, and the incentive effect of convertible bonds to M & A parties is significantly better than that of other contracts. The synergetic effect of convertible bond contract is significantly higher than that of other contracts, and with the increase of investment level, the more likely the target party is to execute the conversion option.
【作者单位】：西安交通大学管理学院;
【基金】：西安交通大学“985”工程二期项目(07200701)~~
【分类号】：F830.9;F224
【正文快照】： 1引言国际金融危机环境下,新一轮的并购浪潮暗涌,许多企业将并购作为应对金融危机的手段。作为并购过程中的必要环节,恰当的支付工具选择对并购能否成功完成至关重要[1],主要包括现金、股票、有价证券(如信用债券、可转换债券、认股权证等)以及这几种工具混合的金融契约安排

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