国有控股上市公司股权激励的市场反应研究
发布时间:2018-03-03 10:22
本文选题:国有控股上市公司 切入点:股权激励 出处:《安徽财经大学》2012年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:股权激励制度最早起源于美国,20世纪80年代以来,世界上众多公司纷纷采用股权激励作为对管理者的激励,并被认为是解决委托--代理问题的有效手段。国外的实践证明,股权激励极大地提高了企业的业绩。我国上市公司1993年引入了股权激励机制,但较规范的发展开始于2006年1月,中国证监会颁布《上市公司股权激励管理办法(试行)》。 本文在我国股权激励相关管理文件正式出台、市场环境不断完善的背景下,首先对相关理论进行阐述,并对国有控股上市公司的特殊性质进行了分析,然后选取2007年到2010年间,沪深两市公告股权激励方案的国有控股上市公司为研究样本,运用事件研究法的累计超常报酬率法(CAR)对公告股权激励的短期市场反应进行实证检验,并运用购买并持有超常报酬率法(BHAR)对实施股权激励的长期市场反应进行实证研究。研究结果表明,短期内市场对公告股权激励的国有控股上市公司具有显著为正的市场反应,但存在股权激励相关信息提前泄露的情况;多数国有控股上市公司实施的股权激励从长期看是失败的,并没有达到预期的效果。 在此基础上,文章对影响短期及长期市场反应的因素进行回归,研究结果表明,短期内偿债能力越强、成长性越好的公司公告股权激励方案越能够获得较高的累计超常报酬率;但长期看来,公司的盈利能力、偿债能力越弱、采用股票期权激励方式的公司其激励效果越不理想。 在实证分析的基础上,文章提出了相关的建议:一,提高证券市场有效性;二,建立科学合理的绩效考核体系;三,制定合理的股权激励方案;四,提高市场投资者的素质。
[Abstract]:The stock right incentive system originated from the 80s of the 20th century in the United States. Many companies around the world have adopted equity incentive as incentive to managers, and it is considered to be an effective means to solve the principal-agent problem. Equity incentive has greatly improved the performance of enterprises. In 1993, China's listed companies introduced equity incentive mechanism, but the more standardized development began in January 2006, China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the "listed companies equity incentive management measures (trial)". Under the background of the formal publication of the relevant management documents and the continuous improvement of the market environment, this paper first expounds the relevant theories, and analyzes the special properties of the state-owned listed companies. Then, from 2007 to 2010, the state-owned holding listed companies which announced the stock incentive scheme in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets are selected as the research samples, and the short-term market reaction of the announcement equity incentive is empirically tested by the cumulative extraordinary rate of return (CAR) of the event study method. An empirical study on the long-term market response to equity incentive is carried out by using the method of purchasing and holding abnormal return. The results show that the market has a significantly positive market response to the publicly held listed companies with publicly announced equity incentives in the short term. However, there is a situation where the relevant information of equity incentive is leaked in advance; the majority of state-owned listed companies have failed in the long run and failed to achieve the expected results. On this basis, the paper regresses the factors that affect the short-term and long-term market reaction. The results show that the stronger the short-term solvency, The better the growth, the higher the cumulative abnormal return rate, but in the long run, the weaker the earning ability and repayment ability of the company, the less the incentive effect of the company adopting stock option incentive mode. On the basis of empirical analysis, the paper puts forward some suggestions: first, to improve the effectiveness of the securities market; second, to establish a scientific and reasonable performance appraisal system; third, to formulate a reasonable equity incentive scheme; fourth, to improve the quality of market investors.
【学位授予单位】:安徽财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F275;F832.51
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