我国上市公司股权激励实施效果的实证研究

发布时间：2018-03-14 04:07

本文选题：股权激励　切入点：要素设计　出处：《郑州大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：当前,股权激励机制正在受到理论界、政府、企业、机构投资者等多方面的关注。股权激励在欧美等发达资本主义市场已经广泛运用并得到了良好的效果。在我国股权激励起步较晚,目前并没有完全得到充分的运用。但是近3年来已经有越来越多的企业开始尝试这一新的激励机制,特别是进入到2010年以后,公布股权激励计划草案的上市公司大量涌现,这说明股权激励正在逐渐受到我国企业的重视。可以说,股权激励在我国的发展正处在一个关键时期,今后的几年内,上市公司推行高管股权激励计划必将成为一个趋势。本文正是在这一宏观环境下研究我国上市公司经理人股权激励的效应,以期能为股权激励在我国的发展提供一些参考价值。本文从股权激励的要素设计和企业股权特征两个方面共同研究经理人股权激励的实施效果这一课题。文章主要分为五大部分：第一部分对前人的相关文献进行了梳理和总结。第二部分阐述了股权激励的理论基础,原理机制和相关概念。第三部分对从2006年到2010年所有实施股权激励的144家上市公司的激励方案进行数据统计和处理,在此基础上分析了股权激励在我国上市公司的实施现状；分析了实施股权激励的上市公司的特点。第四部分运用上述数据采用实证分析的方法验证了各个因素与上市公司股权激励之间的内在联系,并检验了上市公司股权激励的效果。第五部分在前几章节的研究基础上得出结论。本文的结论主要有：1.要素设计方面：(1)企业绩效和激励比例是一种倒U型关系；代理成本则会随着激励比例的增加而减少。(2)股权激励设计中有效期的设计会对企业绩效产生影响,企业绩效随着有效期的增加是先下降后上升而后又下降,两者呈现三次方对应关系。(3)股权激励的行权价格的设计会对企业绩效产生影响,但是这一因素需要通过上市企业的股票价值共同体现。(4)不同的股权激励模式对激励效果的影响不同。2.企业股权特征方面：(1)股权集中度对激励效果的影响是显著的,越高的股权集中度越能降低企业的代理成本,提高企业的绩效。(2)民营企业实施股权激励比国有企业的效果更佳。针对上述结论,本文认为要使股权激励在我国充分发挥其作用,就应该有针对性的合理设置股权激励要素,完善公司治理结构,从而使股权激励在我国的上市企业中更好的发挥其应有的作用。
[Abstract]:At present, the equity incentive mechanism is being received by the theorists, the government, the enterprises, Institutional investors and other aspects of concern. Equity incentive has been widely used in developed capitalist markets, such as Europe and the United States, and has achieved good results. But in the past three years, more and more enterprises have begun to try this new incentive mechanism, especially after 2010, a large number of listed companies published the draft equity incentive plan emerged. This shows that equity incentives are gradually being valued by Chinese enterprises. It can be said that the development of equity incentives in China is in a critical period, in the next few years, It will be a trend for listed companies to carry out executive equity incentive plan. This paper studies the effect of manager equity incentive in this macro environment in order to provide some reference value for the development of equity incentive in our country. This paper studies the effect of executive equity incentive from two aspects: the design of the elements of equity incentive and the characteristics of enterprise equity. The article is divided into five parts: the first part is related to the previous literature. The second part expounds the theoretical basis of equity incentive. The third part makes statistics and processing of the incentive schemes of 144 listed companies from 2006 to 2010, and then analyzes the actualization of equity incentive in Chinese listed companies. This paper analyzes the characteristics of listed companies that implement equity incentive. Part 4th uses the above data to verify the internal relationship between the various factors and equity incentive of listed companies. The effect of equity incentive of listed companies is tested. Part 5th draws a conclusion on the basis of the previous chapters. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) the relationship between enterprise performance and incentive ratio is an inverted U type. Agency cost will decrease with the increase of incentive ratio.) the design of validity period in equity incentive design will have an impact on enterprise performance. With the increase of validity period, enterprise performance will first decrease and then rise and then decline. The design of the exercise price of the equity incentive will have an impact on the performance of the enterprise. However, this factor needs to reflect the stock value of listed enterprises. (4) different equity incentive models have different effects on the incentive effect. 2.The influence of ownership concentration on the incentive effect is significant in the aspect of enterprise equity characteristics. The higher the degree of ownership concentration is, the lower the agency cost is, and the better the performance is. 2) the effect of equity incentive in private enterprises is better than that in state-owned enterprises. In view of the above conclusions, this paper thinks that in order to give full play to the role of equity incentive in our country, we should set up the equity incentive elements reasonably and perfect the corporate governance structure. So that equity incentive in China's listed enterprises better play its due role.
【学位授予单位】：郑州大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

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