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上市公司非公开发行资产注入行为的股东利益研究

发布时间:2018-03-21 02:20

  本文选题:资产注入 切入点:非公开发行 出处:《管理评论》2010年07期  论文类型:期刊论文


【摘要】:本文首先对上市公司非公开发行资产注入行为的股东利益均衡问题进行了数理分析,数学推导得出,上市公司股东利益均衡的条件是非公开发行的增发价等于上市公司每股内在价值。本文继而选取中国股市49家通过非公开发行完成资产注入的上市公司作为样本进行实证考察。实证检验发现,中国上市公司通过非公开发行进行资产注入的新股定价普遍偏低,显著低于股票内在价值;同时,注入的资产大多为非优质资产。进一步研究发现,新股定价和注入资产的质量均与上市公司资产规模有一定联系:定价偏高的公司普遍资产规模较小,定价偏低的公司则资产规模较大;注入优质资产的公司规模一般较大,注入劣质资产的公司规模明显较小;而成本较高的资产注入行为,都是资产规模比较小的公司在该轮牛市中指数上涨最快的时期实施的,投机动机很强。实证结果表明,非公开发行资产注入中上市公司股东利益并不均衡,存在着众多大股东侵占小股东利益的现象。
[Abstract]:In this paper, first of all, the problem of shareholder interest balance in the behavior of non-public asset injection of listed companies is analyzed, and the mathematical derivation is obtained. The equilibrium of shareholders' interests of listed companies is that the additional price of non-public offering is equal to the intrinsic value of each share of the listed company. This paper then selects 49 listed companies in Chinese stock market that have completed the injection of assets through non-public offering as a sample. Empirical investigation. Empirical test found that, The pricing of new shares injected by Chinese listed companies through private issuance is generally on the low side, which is significantly lower than the intrinsic value of the stock; meanwhile, most of the assets injected are non-quality assets. Both the pricing of new shares and the quality of injected assets are related to the scale of assets of listed companies: the companies with high pricing are generally smaller, those with low pricing are larger, and those with high quality assets are generally larger. The companies that inject inferior assets are obviously smaller in size, and the relatively high cost of asset injection is carried out by the smaller companies in the period of the fastest index increase in the bull market. The results show that there is a strong incentive to speculate. The interests of shareholders of listed companies are not balanced in the injection of non-public issuance assets, and many large shareholders encroach on the interests of minority shareholders.
【作者单位】: 长沙理工大学经济与管理学院;长沙理工大学金融工程与金融管理研究中心;中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院;
【基金】:教育部人文社科青年项目(09YJC90231) 国家自然科学基金项目(70701035) 湖南省杰出青年基金项目(09JJ1010) 湖南省教育厅创新平台项目(09K065)
【分类号】:F832.51

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相关期刊论文 前6条

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