管制环境、公司治理与商业银行风险承担

发布时间：2018-03-23 02:27

本文选题：资本监管　切入点：公司治理　出处：《浙江工商大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：经济全球化发展到现阶段,金融业与日俱增的风险使得银行业金融体系的风险管理研究集中了大量的目光,其中一个视角是从银行治理的角度发掘影响商业银行风险状况的因素和银行风险承担行为模式。新颖的切入点和视角,对于我国银行业治理改革的理论和实践都有不小的借鉴和助益。经过三十多年系统的努力,我国金融体系改革整体上取得了巨大的进步,但是同样遗留下一连串严重的问题需要进一步去解决。虽然国内诸多学者都对银行治理改革的路径提出了许多建议和主张,但是由于缺乏一个针对银行业公司治理特殊性而建立的统一理论框架,大多数研究只能从一般企业公司治理理论出发去研究银行治理机制导致研究的结果与我国实际情况不符。相比较而言国外的学者在银行业治理理论方面的研究更为成功,也更有针对性,但是考虑到我国商业银行有着不同于西方国家银行的特殊性,如隐性存款保险等等,单纯的引入外国的理论成果而不做一些必要的本土化加工是行不通的。有鉴于此,本文依据JeitschkoJeung(2005)的理论模型,考虑我国特有的银行业从业环境,综合外部监管、投资者法律保护以及公司治理等多方面影响因素,建立一个一般性的多因素理论分析模型来探究管制环境和银行治理对商业银行风险承担的影响。本文将银行关联主体细分为股东,管理者以及外部监管三部分,分析股东与管理者在外部监管约束下各自的最优化选择,银行最终的风险承担行为取决于各个主体之间的相互博弈。理论模型的研究表明：在有隐性存款保险的隐含前提下,无论资本金监管存在与否,股东在银行的经营行为中有很强的冒险激励和倾向,严格偏好高风险的资产。杠杆率约束则可以相对有效的抑制股东的冒险倾向；管理者的风险偏好,要视投资者法律保护程度而言。只有投资者法律保护的程度在临界点以上,才能降低管理者的风险偏好。商业银行整体的风险承担水平取决于外部监管与内部公司治理的共同作用。在此理论基础上本文采用14家上市银行与12家非上市银行6年的年度数据,对相关假设进行检验。实证结果大部分支持了理论模型的结论。
[Abstract]:At the present stage of economic globalization, the increasing risks in the financial industry make the research on risk management in the banking financial system focus on a large number of eyes. One angle of view is to explore the factors that affect the risk situation of commercial banks and the behavior patterns of banks' risk-taking from the perspective of bank governance. After more than 30 years of systematic efforts, China's financial system reform as a whole has made great progress. But there are also a series of serious problems that need to be solved further. Although many domestic scholars have put forward many suggestions and opinions on the path of bank governance reform, However, due to the lack of a unified theoretical framework for the particularity of corporate governance in the banking sector, Most studies can only proceed from the general corporate governance theory to study the mechanism of bank governance. The results of the study are not consistent with the actual situation in China. Compared with the foreign scholars, the research on the theory of banking governance is more successful. Also more targeted, but considering that our commercial banks are different from western banks, such as recessive deposit insurance and so on, simply introducing foreign theoretical results without doing some necessary localization processing is not feasible. In view of this, according to the theory model of Jeitschko Jeungxi 2005), this paper considers the unique banking industry environment, comprehensive external supervision, investor legal protection and corporate governance, and so on. A general multi-factor theoretical analysis model is established to explore the impact of regulatory environment and bank governance on the risk assumption of commercial banks. By analyzing the optimal choices of shareholders and managers under the external supervision constraints, the ultimate risk-bearing behavior of banks depends on the mutual game between each other. The theoretical model shows that under the implicit premise of implicit deposit insurance, shareholders have a strong incentive and tendency to risk in the operation of banks, regardless of whether the capital supervision exists or not. Strict preference for high-risk assets. Leverage constraints can be relatively effective in restraining the risk appetite of shareholders. Managers' risk preference depends on the degree of legal protection of investors. Only the degree of legal protection of investors is above the critical point. The overall risk-taking level of commercial banks depends on the joint effect of external supervision and internal corporate governance. On the basis of this theory, this paper uses the annual data of 14 listed banks and 12 unlisted banks to test the relevant hypotheses. The empirical results support the conclusions of the theoretical model.
【学位授予单位】：浙江工商大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.33

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