中国中央银行独立性与金融监管

发布时间：2018-03-23 14:42

本文选题：中央银行独立性　切入点：金融监管　出处：《复旦大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文选取中央银行的独立性和金融监管这两个方面,对中国中央银行即中国人民银行的情况进行考察。本文希望在考察当中,不仅能够厘清中国人民银行在独立性和金融监管两个方面的情况,同时还能够发现中国人民银行存在的更深层次的结构性问题,并提供一些相应的改进意见以供参考。这些是本文进行此次研究的基本目的和对成果的设想。本文在对现有理论,特别是对中央银行独立性和中央银行金融监管职能的最新研究进行梳理的过程中发现,中央银行的独立性和金融监管两项职能看似没有太多的联系,实际上却存在着隐含的逻辑关系。各国的中央银行在最初建立的时刻可能更多地承担了“政府的银行”的职能。然而随着时代的发展,中央银行逐渐成为“政府的银行”、“发行的银行”和“银行的银行”的结合,分别对应着具体的政策职能和相应的政策工具。其中,中央银行作为金融市场的“最后贷款人”的职能逐渐成为其核心职能,货币政策、独立性和金融监管职能实质上成为“最后贷款人”的延伸。而独立性和金融监管的本质是分别防范政府和商业银行由于中央银行作为“最后贷款人”的存在而存在道德风险,致使金融市场的系统性风险上升。因此,这两种职能是出于保护“最后贷款人”职能合理有效地履行而出现的,在逻辑上应该同时存在。这是本文在研究中采用的基本分析框架。本文通过对中国人民银行在中央银行独立性和金融监管两方面的考察,认为中国人民银行在这两个职能上都处于比较低的水平。由此导致政府和商业银行有更大的可能采取风险较高的行为,使得金融市场的稳定性难以保障。本文的结论是中国人民银行的中央银行独立性与金融监管职能都处于比较低的水平,与其“最后贷款人”职能并不匹配。这个问题可能会导致中国人民银行的“最后贷款人”职能被滥用,同时也提高了金融市场的系统性风险,造成更多的问题。本文建议提高中国人民银行的独立性,同时恢复其金融监管职能,使其能够更好地运用货币政策,履行金融市场“最后贷款人”的核心职能。
[Abstract]:This paper selects the independence of the central bank and financial supervision to investigate the situation of the central bank of China, the people's Bank of China. It can not only clarify the two aspects of the people's Bank of China in terms of independence and financial supervision, but also discover the deeper structural problems of the people's Bank of China. It also provides some suggestions for reference. These are the basic purpose of this study and the assumption of the results. In the course of combing the existing theories, especially the latest research on the independence of the central bank and the function of the financial supervision of the central bank, this paper finds that the independence of the central bank and the financial supervision function do not seem to be closely related. In fact, there is an implicit logical relationship. The central banks of various countries may have assumed more of the functions of "government banks" at the time of their initial establishment. However, with the development of the times, The central bank has gradually become a combination of "government banks", "issuing banks" and "banks of banks", corresponding to specific policy functions and corresponding policy instruments, respectively. The central bank's function as the "lender of last resort" of the financial market has gradually become its core function, monetary policy, Independence and financial supervision function actually become the extension of "lender of last resort". The essence of independence and financial supervision is to prevent moral hazard of government and commercial bank because of the existence of central bank as "lender of last resort". Thus, these two functions arise out of the reasonable and effective performance of the "lender of last resort" function. Logically, it should exist simultaneously. This is the basic analytical framework used in this study. This paper examines the independence of the central bank and financial supervision of the people's Bank of China. It is believed that the people's Bank of China is at a relatively low level in these two functions. As a result, the government and commercial banks are more likely to take risky actions, which makes the stability of the financial market difficult to guarantee. The conclusion of this paper is that the independence of the central bank and the function of financial supervision of the people's Bank of China are at a relatively low level. It does not match its "lender of last resort" function. The problem could lead to abuse of the people's Bank of China's "lender of last resort" function and raise systemic risk in financial markets. This paper proposes to improve the independence of the people's Bank of China and to restore its function of financial supervision so that it can better use monetary policy and fulfill the core function of "lender of last resort" in the financial market.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.31;F832.1

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