以政府信用为信号——改革后温台地区民营存款类金融机构的信息机制

发布时间：2018-03-28 12:42

本文选题：民营存款类金融机构　切入点：管制　出处：《社会学研究》2010年06期

【摘要】：本文试图从"政府信用信号发送"机制的角度去理解中国改革后民营存款类金融机构发展的兴衰。存款类金融产品的高考核成本、存款类金融机构的高负债率以及"说坏话"机制的局限性等使声誉机制特别重要。声誉机制依赖于良好的产权保护。中央政府对私人进入和经营银行业严格的管制政策使得民营银行家们更不愿意或更难对自身声誉做投资。他们把地方政府对他们的支持作为信号来吸引存款,建立声誉。本文称之为"政府信用信号发送"机制。这一机制下,民营银行家和储户都对政府的相关政策高度敏感。这使得中国民营存款类金融机构的发展更容易因为管制政策的变化而出现波折。改革后温州和台州地区民营存款类金融机构的发展历史为上述解释提供了初步证据。
[Abstract]:This paper attempts to understand the rise and fall of private deposit financial institutions after China's reform from the perspective of "government credit signal transmission" mechanism. The high debt ratio of deposit-type financial institutions and the limitations of the "bad words" mechanism make the reputation mechanism particularly important. The reputation mechanism depends on good property rights protection. The central government has strict control over the private entry and operation of the banking industry. Private bankers are less willing or less able to invest in their reputations. They signal the support of local governments to attract deposits. Establishing reputation. This paper calls it "government credit signal sending" mechanism. Under this mechanism, Private bankers and depositors are highly sensitive to government policies. This makes the development of private deposit financial institutions in China more vulnerable to changes in regulatory policies. After the reform of Wenzhou and Taizhou private savings. The history of financial institutions provides prima facie evidence for this explanation.
【作者单位】：浙江大学公共管理学院社会保障与风险管理系;
【基金】：浙江大学紫金计划上海市教委E-研究院建设计划项目国家社科基金一般项目(09BJL013) 国家留学基金委的经费支持
【分类号】：F832.3

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