基于委托—代理理论的供应链金融运行模式的激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-03-28 19:39

本文选题：供应链金融　切入点：委托代理　出处：《东北大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：长久以来,供应链管理主要针对供应链中物流与信息流的管理。直到上世纪末,全球经济一体化进程的加快,使得供应链管理理念逐渐向财务供应链管理转变,供应链金融概念应运而生。供应链金融从整个产业链的角度出发,将金融机构、物流企业以及供应链中上下游企业有机组合,在一定程度上缓解了中小企业融资难的问题,维护了核心企业和中小企业的合作关系,带动了金融机构和物流企业的发展,提高了整个供应链的效率,增强了竞争力。但是供应链企业作为独立的经济体,在合作中,以追求自身利益最大化为目标,加剧了信息不对称现象的产生,进而出现各种委托代理关系,为了提高供应链的绩效,防范道德风险的产生,设计有效的激励机制显得尤为重要。供应链金融三种基本的运行模式为：应收账款融资模式,存货质押融资模式、预付账款融资模式。本文在研究这三种基本运行模式的前提下,引入委托—代理理论,通过把供应链金融中各参与方(包括银行、核心企业、中小企业、第三方物流等)之间的合约归结为委托代理激励合约,分别建立委托代理模型,研究信息对称条件下和非信息对称条件下的激励机制,弱化道德风险,以利益激励代理人选择最优努力水平,从而使得委托人的收益效用达到最大化。
[Abstract]:For a long time, supply chain management has mainly focused on the management of logistics and information flow in the supply chain. Until the end of last century, with the acceleration of the process of global economic integration, the concept of supply chain management gradually changed to financial supply chain management. The concept of supply chain finance emerges as the times require. From the point of view of the whole industry chain, supply chain finance organically combines financial institutions, logistics enterprises and upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain. It maintains the cooperative relationship between core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises, promotes the development of financial institutions and logistics enterprises, enhances the efficiency and competitiveness of the entire supply chain. In order to improve the performance of supply chain and guard against moral hazard, the goal of pursuing the maximization of self-interest intensifies the phenomenon of asymmetric information, which leads to the emergence of various principal-agent relationships, in order to improve the performance of the supply chain and prevent the emergence of moral hazard. It is very important to design an effective incentive mechanism. The three basic operating modes of supply chain finance are: accounts receivable financing mode, inventory pledge financing mode, inventory pledge financing mode, Based on the research of these three basic operating modes, this paper introduces the principal-agent theory, through the supply chain finance participants (including banks, core enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, including banks, core enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises), The contract between the third party logistics (TPL) is reduced to the principal-agent incentive contract. The principal-agent model is established, the incentive mechanism under the condition of information symmetry and the condition of non-information symmetry is studied, and the moral hazard is weakened. The interest motivates the agent to choose the optimal level of effort, thus maximizing the profit utility of the principal.
【学位授予单位】：东北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F274;F832.4

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