基于公司治理视角的上市公司大股东支持行为研究
本文选题:大股东 切入点:支持行为 出处:《扬州大学》2012年硕士论文
【摘要】:近年来,大股东行为已成为公司治理领域研究的热门问题,“掏空”和“支持”概念则是对公司治理问题的经典描述。针对大股东掏空行为,国内外学者利用关联交易进行了大量的理论和实证研究,为理解公司治理和投资者保护提供了丰富的视角和证据;而已有文献对大股东支持行为的研究却较少。已有国内学者研究证明:关联交易也是大股东支持上市公司的重要方式。由于我国资本市场和上市公司股权结构特殊的制度背景,国外的研究文献有一定的参考价值,但不能揭示我国大股东行为的内在动因和行为模式产生的机理。随着股权分置改革的完成,率先股改的公司股票限售期开始陆续解禁,我国深沪A股市场加速进入全流通状态。全流通进程下的大小股东有着一致的利益基础和共同的价值判断标准,基于市值最大化考虑的大股东会显著减少对上市公司的“掏空”行为,增加对上市公司的利益支持。 本文在我国证券市场逐步实现全流通这一大背景下,从公司治理角度回顾大股东控制理论、利益趋同效应与壕沟防守效应等相关公司治理理论,在此基础上对上市公司大股东“支持行为”进行研究。理论分析上市公司大股东采取支持行为的方式、动机、影响因素和经济后果等,实证考察关联交易下大股东支持行为的影响因素以及大股东支持行为对公司业绩的影响。本文以全流通进程中的深沪制造业上市公司2008——2010年的数据为样本,从关联方往来账户中的资金支持角度进行多元回归分析,并得出结论:关联交易下大股东支持行为与第一大股东持股比例、股权集中度、股权制衡度、独立董事比例等公司治理因素显著正相关,与全流通进程中引起的当年解禁股比例等因素正相关,并验证了关联交易可以用来支持上市公司,提高上市公司的经营业绩。在实证研究的基础上,本文对制造业上市公司的大股东支持行为和经营业绩情况进行统计分析,进一步验证前文的结论。 最后,笔者对本文的研究结论进行概括并针对性地提出了相关建议,希望为上市公司的管理者、中小投资者和监管部门等提供有益的借鉴。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the behavior of large shareholders has become a hot issue in the field of corporate governance, and the concepts of "tunneling" and "support" are classic descriptions of corporate governance.Aiming at the tunneling behavior of large shareholders, scholars at home and abroad have carried out a large number of theoretical and empirical studies using related party transactions, which provide a rich perspective and evidence for understanding corporate governance and investor protection.However, there is little research on the supporting behavior of large shareholders in the literature.Domestic scholars have proved that affiliated transactions are also an important way for large shareholders to support listed companies.Because of the special institutional background of Chinese capital market and listed company's equity structure, the foreign research literature has some reference value, but it can not reveal the internal motivation and the mechanism of the behavior pattern of the large shareholders in our country.With the completion of the reform of the split share structure, the restricted selling period of the first share reform companies began to be lifted one after another, and the Shenzhen-Shanghai A-share market accelerated into the full circulation state.Large and small shareholders in the process of full circulation have a consistent interest basis and common value judgment standard. The large shareholders based on market value's maximization will significantly reduce the "tunneling" behavior to the listed companies and increase the interest support to the listed companies.Under the background of the gradual realization of full circulation in China's securities market, this paper reviews the theory of corporate governance from the perspective of corporate governance, including the theory of controlling large shareholders, the effect of convergence of interests and the effect of trench defense, and so on.On this basis, the major shareholders of listed companies "support behavior" is studied.This paper theoretically analyzes the ways, motives, influencing factors and economic consequences of large shareholders' supporting behavior in listed companies, and empirically investigates the influencing factors of large shareholders' supporting behavior and the influence of large shareholders' supporting behavior on the company's performance under the related party transactions.Based on the data of Shenzhen-Shanghai manufacturing listed companies in the process of full circulation from 2008 to 2010, this paper carries out multivariate regression analysis from the angle of capital support in the current accounts of related parties.It is concluded that the supporting behavior of large shareholders is significantly positively related to the proportion of the largest shareholders, the degree of equity concentration, the degree of equity checks and balances, the proportion of independent directors, and so on.It is positively related to the proportion of stocks released during the whole circulation process, and proves that related party transactions can be used to support listed companies and improve the operating performance of listed companies.On the basis of empirical research, this paper makes a statistical analysis of the large shareholder support behavior and operating performance of listed manufacturing companies, and further verifies the previous conclusions.Finally, the author summarizes the conclusions of this paper and puts forward relevant suggestions, hoping to provide useful reference for the managers of listed companies, small and medium-sized investors and regulatory authorities.
【学位授予单位】:扬州大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F832.51;F276.6
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