中国信用评级行业监管研究

发布时间：2018-04-11 05:16

本文选题：信用评级行业 + 官方监管　；参考：《湖南大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：一直以来被冠以投资者利益守护者和金融市场看门人称号的信用评级机构，在解决市场信息不对称方面的作用得到了市场和监管机构的普遍认可。但信用评级质量却在显著下降，无论是1997年的东南亚金融危机，还是2001年的安然丑闻都引发了公众对信用评级信息价值的担忧。2007年美国爆发的次贷危机又一次把信用评级机构推到了批判的风口浪尖。鉴于信用评级行业的重要地位和其不断遭人诟病的负面表现，加强对信用评级行业的监管就显得尤为重要。本文把信用评级行业的监管界定为官方监管和声誉约束两部分，按照官方监管和声誉约束两条主线，对我国信用评级行业监管展开研究。官方监管能够纠正市场失灵，克服其自身不能解决的缺陷。声誉约束是市场内生的机制，是信用评级行业有效运行的重要保障。两者各有其不可替代的功能优势，因此需要“看得见的手”和“看不见的手”有机结合，共同推动信用评级行业健康有序的发展。信用评级行业存在的负外部性、自然垄断、信息不对称和利益冲突造成了市场失灵，因此需要官方监管来矫正。信用评级行业健康有序的运行还需要声誉约束的有效发挥。信用评级行业声誉约束的重要性不仅源于信用评级行业自身的特性，还源于声誉约束是官方监管的重要补充。通过构建声誉约束模型，分析了信用评级机构在追逐声誉租金过程中的行为以及投资者和发行方的反应。此外声誉约束作用的发挥需要一定的外部条件和环境，主要包括交易必须反复进行、适度的竞争机制、失信行为的惩罚机制和对声誉形成长期的预期。美国信用评级行业监管最初完全是靠声誉约束，后来逐渐过渡到声誉约束为主，官方监管为辅的模式。2006年《美国信用评级机构改革法案》明确了美国证监会对NRSROs的直接监管，，次贷危机的爆发和演变促成了“多德法案”的出台，进一步完善了对信用评级行业的监管。因此有必要对美国信用评级行业及其监管的历史和现状进行梳理、分析和反思，从而为我国信用评级行业监管提供借鉴和启示。不同于美国，我国信用评级行业监管一直以官方监管为主导，忽略声誉约束。从单一主体监管阶段转变为目前多主体多层次监管阶段。通过深入考察我国评级行业官方监管的实施现状，发现主要存在着资质认证不合理、利益冲突监管不完善和信息披露监管不健全三个方面的问题。对我国信用评级行业声誉约束运行的客观条件进行分析，发现存在四个方面的障碍，包括甄别机制不通畅、控制机制不健全、竞争格局不合理和利益导向不正确。基于我国信用评级行业官方监管的分析，以问题为导向，采用博弈分析方法，对官方监管机制的构架进行了研究。以信用评级机构、官方监管当局为参与人，按照静态博弈、有限理性演化博弈和完全理性动态博弈的逻辑顺序展开。并针对我国信用评级行业多头监管的现实情况，对我国信用评级官方监管机构的最优监管水平以及高效率监管纳什均衡的条件进行了分析。鉴于声誉约束在信用评级行业监管中的重要地位，本文从理论和实证两个方面对我国信用评级行业的声誉约束进行了分析。由于我国信用评级行业的产生与发展属于政府驱动型，有别于西方的市场驱动型，因此考察我国信用评级行业的声誉约束时，需要确定声誉约束的可行性，即声誉约束实施基础是否存在，并以此为基础通过模型分析对声誉约束的机理进行了阐述。实证研究方面，则以2008-2011年发行的中期票据为研究样本，对我国信用评级行业的声誉约束进行了实证分析。结果显示出我国信用评级行业尽管存在着声誉约束，但力度不强。在以上分析的基础上，从加强官方监管和声誉约束两个方面提出了对策建议。加强官方监管的具体措施包括建立统一协调的监管主体、优化行业资格认证制度、强化利益冲突管理以及引入非请求评级制度。加强声誉约束作用的具体措施包括促进信息披露的有效性、充分发挥信用评级行业协会的作用、弱化监管对信用评级结果的依赖以及建立和完善市场退出机制。
[Abstract]:Has been dubbed the interests of investors and credit rating agencies to protect the financial market the title, in solving the problem of market information asymmetry effect has been widely recognized by the market and regulatory agencies. But credit rating quality is significantly decreased, both the South East Asian financial crisis in 1997 or 2001, the Enron scandal sparked public concern.2007 years of credit rating information value of the United States subprime crisis once again to the credit rating agencies to criticism. In the teeth of the storm because of the importance of the credit rating industry and constantly criticized the negative performance, it is important to strengthen the supervision of credit rating industry.
The credit rating industry regulation is defined as the two part of the official supervision and restraint, according to official supervision and restraint of the two main line, research on the regulation of credit rating industry in China. The official regulation can correct the market failure, to overcome the defect of its own can not solve the reputation mechanism of the market. The constraint is endogenous, is an important guarantee the effective operation of the credit rating industry. Each one has its irreplaceable function advantage, so we need the "visible hand" and "invisible hand" of the organic combination of the credit rating industry to jointly promote the healthy and orderly development.
The negative externality exists, the credit rating industry of natural monopoly, asymmetric information and conflict of interest caused by market failure, so the official regulation is needed to correct. The healthy and orderly operation of credit rating industry also need to effectively play the reputation constraints. The characteristics and importance of credit rating industry reputation restriction not only from the credit rating industry itself, but also from the reputation mechanism is an important supplement to official regulation. Through building a reputation model, analyzes the behavior of credit rating agencies in the pursuit of reputation rents process as well as the investor and issuer's response. In addition to play the role of reputation constraint requires a certain external conditions and environment, including transaction must be repeated, appropriate competition, punishment the mechanism of dishonest behavior and the formation of long-term expectations for reputation.
Regulation of the credit rating industry initially depends entirely on the reputation constraints, then gradually transition to the reputation constraint based, supplemented by the official supervision mode of.2006 years. American credit rating agency reform act > defines the Commission under the direct supervision of the NRSROs, and the outbreak of the subprime crisis led to the evolution of "Dodd act" introduced to further improve the the credit rating industry regulation. It is necessary to sort out the history and current situation of the credit rating industry and its supervision, analysis and reflection, so as to provide reference and inspiration for China's credit rating industry regulation.
Unlike the United States, China's credit rating industry regulation has been to official regulation as the leading factor, ignore the reputation constraints. The transition from single phase current multi subject supervision subject multi-level regulatory phase. Through in-depth investigation of the status of implementation of official supervision of our rating industry, found mainly in the qualification certification is not reasonable, the conflict of interests regulation is not perfect and the information disclosure regulation is not perfect three aspects. The objective conditions of China's credit rating industry reputation constrained operation is analyzed, it is found that there are four obstacles, including the screening mechanism is not smooth, the control mechanism is not perfect, the competition pattern is not reasonable and interest orientation is not correct.
The analysis of credit rating industry in China based on the official supervision, problem oriented, by using the method of game analysis, framework of official supervision mechanism is studied. By credit rating agencies, the official regulatory authorities for participants, according to the logical order of the static game, evolutionary game and dynamic game. And the reason for the reality the situation of credit rating industry in China long supervision, the optimal level of supervision for China's credit rating regulatory conditions and high efficiency supervision of Nash equilibrium is analyzed.
Because of the importance of reputation constraints in the regulation of credit ratings in the industry, this paper analyzes the reputation constraints on the credit rating industry in China from two aspects of theory and empirical. The emergence and development of credit rating industry in China is government driven, market driven type different from the west, so the study of credit reputation constraint the rating industry in China, the need to determine the feasibility of reputation restriction, namely the implementation of basic reputation constraint exists, then through the model analysis of the mechanism of reputation restriction are discussed. The empirical research, is issued to the 2008-2011 years of the medium-term notes for the study sample, the reputation constraints of the credit rating industry in China an empirical analysis. The results show that China's credit rating industry despite the reputation constraints, but the intensity is not strong.
On the basis of the above analysis, put forward countermeasures and suggestions from two aspects to strengthen the official regulation and reputation constraint. Specific measures to strengthen the coordination of official supervision including the establishment of a unified regulatory body, to optimize the industry certification system, strengthen the management of conflict of interest and introduce unsolicited rating system. Specific measures to strengthen the effectiveness of reputation constraints including promotion information disclosure, credit rating and give full play to the role of industry associations, weakening the regulatory reliance on credit rating results and establish and improve the market exit mechanism.

【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F203;F832

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