我国上市银行高管薪酬与公司绩效的相关性研究

发布时间：2018-04-13 23:28

本文选题：银行 + 高管薪酬　；参考：《中央民族大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：现代企业制度下,所有权和控制权的分离导致了委托代理问题。高管薪酬作为公司治理的重要环节,是解决委托代理问题的一种有效手段,一直是学术研究的热点问题。然而在金融危机期间,国外银行高管仍领取天价薪酬,与业绩严重脱钩,更是引发人们的强烈质疑和讨论。我国银行高管薪酬也屡创新高,引起了相当的关注。中国银行正处于改革时期,如何进行银行高管薪酬制度改革是一项重要课题。因此本文对银行高管薪酬与绩效的相关性进行研究,具有一定的理论与现实意义。本文回顾了相关研究文献,从公司治理的角度,以委托代理理论为基础进行理论分析。对于我国银行高管薪酬的现状进行了研究,并与国外银行高管薪酬做了比较。研究发现我国商业银行高管薪酬水平差异较大,结构上初步建立了基本薪酬加绩效薪酬的薪酬激励制度,薪酬基本与其短期经营业绩联系,缺乏中长期激励机制。实证部分以2006—2010年沪深两市16家上市银行数据为研究样本,考虑了盈利和风险因素,选取总资产利润率、每股收益、净利润、资本充足率等综合绩效指标,建立多元模型,对银行高管薪酬与公司绩效的相关性进行了检验分析。通过实证分析我们发现,目前我国银行高管薪酬与总资产利润率的相关性较强,但方程的线性相关性不显著,反而成倒U形；按照股权性质分类考察发现国有银行高管薪酬与绩效的正相关显著,且体现了风险控制；非国有银行高管薪酬对绩效的变化更加敏感,体现了盈利能力和风险控制的关系,但线性关系不显著,二次方程回归结果较好,农明当超过某一值后,绩效与高管薪酬反方向变化。本文针对中国上市银行高管薪酬存在的问题提出以下建议：我国银行高管薪酬激励制度仍需完善,建立多元化综合绩效考核体系,增强高管薪酬与绩效的相关性；进步探索高管薪酬的长期激励；要有合理适度的薪酬监管制度；增强投资者和社会公众的监督；培育经理人市场。本文创新点在于：认为股权结构对银行绩效与高管薪酬关系有很大影响,因此将国有控股银行和非国有控股银行分别讨论；为避免绩效指标选取相对单一的缺陷,建立了盈利能力、运营风险和资金安全的综合评价体系；鉴于早期的研究没有统一结论,本文首先利用多元线性模型进行检验,发现回归结果不显著,又建立了多元非线性回归进行检验。
[Abstract]:Under the modern enterprise system, the separation of ownership and control leads to the principal-agent problem.As an important part of corporate governance, executive compensation is an effective means to solve the principal-agent problem, and has always been a hot issue in academic research.However, during the financial crisis, foreign bank executives still receive sky-high compensation, which is seriously decoupled from the performance, which has aroused strong doubt and discussion.Our country bank executive compensation also repeatedly sets new records, has caused considerable concern.Bank of China is in the period of reform, how to reform the bank executive compensation system is an important subject.Therefore, this paper studies the correlation between executive compensation and performance, which has certain theoretical and practical significance.This paper reviews the relevant research literature, from the perspective of corporate governance, on the basis of principal-agent theory for theoretical analysis.This paper studies the current situation of bank executive compensation in China and compares it with that of foreign banks.The study found that the level of executive compensation of commercial banks in China is quite different, and the structure of the system has established the basic salary plus performance compensation incentive system, the compensation is basically related to its short-term operating performance, and lack of medium and long term incentive mechanism.The empirical part takes the data of 16 listed banks in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2006 to 2010 as the research sample, considers the profit and risk factors, selects the comprehensive performance indicators, such as total asset profit rate, earnings per share, net profit, capital adequacy ratio and so on, and establishes multiple models.The correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance is tested and analyzed.Through the empirical analysis, we find that the correlation between executive compensation and total asset profit margin is strong, but the linear correlation of the equation is not significant, but become inverted U shape;According to the classification of equity nature, it is found that executive compensation of state-owned banks is positively correlated with performance and reflects risk control. Non-state-owned bank executive compensation is more sensitive to the change of performance and reflects the relationship between profitability and risk control.However, the linear relationship is not significant, quadratic equation regression results are better, when Nong Ming exceeds a certain value, performance and executive compensation change in the opposite direction.This paper puts forward the following suggestions in view of the problems existing in the executive compensation of listed banks in China: the incentive system of executive compensation of Chinese banks still needs to be perfected, and a diversified comprehensive performance appraisal system should be established to enhance the correlation between executive compensation and performance;It is necessary to have a reasonable and appropriate salary supervision system, strengthen the supervision of investors and the public, and cultivate the manager market.The innovation of this paper lies in the fact that the equity structure has a great influence on the relationship between bank performance and executive compensation, so the state-owned holding banks and non-state-owned holding banks are discussed separately.A comprehensive evaluation system of profitability, operational risk and capital safety is established. In view of the lack of a unified conclusion in the early studies, this paper first uses multiple linear models to test, and finds that the regression results are not significant.The multivariate nonlinear regression is also established to test it.
【学位授予单位】：中央民族大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

【参考文献】