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我国上市金融机构公司治理研究

发布时间:2018-04-20 05:12

  本文选题:上市金融机构 + 公司治理 ; 参考:《中南民族大学》2012年硕士论文


【摘要】:截止到目前,我国上市金融机构共有41家,其中银行类16家、证券类18家、保险类4家、信托类3家。我国金融市场化的进程还不算很久,金融机构对公司治理结构还未达到足够重视的程度,我国上市金融机构中还不同程度的存在公司治理缺陷。近年来,,上市金融机构数量的快速增多加大了金融业板块在整个上市公司的比重,也彰显了专门研究上市金融机构公司治理的重要性。而由于金融行业具有不同于其他一般行业的高风险、高杠杆与关联性的特点,其公司治理更特殊。如果金融机构治理风险累积到一定程度,一旦释放,对整个行业甚至整个资本市场带来的灾难性将无法想象。稳健的公司治理结构,对于维持金融行业持续经营和整个金融体系安全与稳定非常重要。因此,对我国上市金融机构公司治理进行研究十分必要。 本文正文分为四个部分,第一部分为导论,主要从控股股东与小股东之间的利益冲突、股权结构与公司治理效率、董事会治理问题、高层管理人员的激励研究、国家控制与公司治理等五个方面对国内外的研究进行综述,但是学界尚未形成统一的、让人满意的结论。 文章的第二部分为我国上市金融机构概况和上市金融机构相对于上市非金融机构治理的特殊性。从总股本、总市值、已流通比例、第一大股东及持股比例等几方面介绍了我国上市金融机构的基本情况。上市金融机构公司治理不同于上市非金融机构,主要体现在对债权人等利益相关者利益的保护、内部控制和风险管理、治理结构和财务信息的透明度要求程度、治理目标、监管治理等几方面。 文章的第三部分重点分析了我国上市金融机构治理的情况及其面临的问题。本文根据我国41家上市金融机构发布的年报和披露的相关数据,从股权结构、董事会、监事会及高管薪酬激励四个方面着手分析。股权机构方面,通过对41家上市金融机构第一大股东的持股情况以及公司股权制衡情况分析得出,其他股东无法对第一大股东形成实质性制约。董事会方面,通过总结对比分析董事会的构成、人数分布、会议次数分布、各专门委员会和独立董事的情况,得出董事会的情况总的来说要好于往年,但仍存在一些不足。监事会方面,通过对比分析得出结论,我国上市金融机构的监事会正在朝着独立于公司内部人员的方向发展演变,但是独立性和其监督功能有待进一步增强。薪酬激励方面,主要以短期激励效应的现金为主,很少有机构存在股票奖励和股票期权奖励等薪酬方式。在2010年度金融行业高管的薪酬平均值在所有行业中最高,达到人均280.82万元,但是差距比较明显。在上述分析的基础上,针对分析的结果提出问题。 文章的第四部分主要针对文章第三部分分析的问题提出改善建议,认为应该从以下几点进行改善:相对集中的股权结构是最优的股权结构、健全独立董事制度、加强监事会监督功能、健全经营管理层长期激励约束机制和改革金融机构监管体制。
[Abstract]:Up to now, there are 41 listed financial institutions in China, including 16 banks, 18 securities, 4 Insurance and 3 trust. The process of financial marketization of our country has not been long, the financial institutions have not enough attention to the corporate governance structure, and the listed financial institutions of our country have different degree of corporate governance defects. In recent years, the rapid increase in the number of listed financial institutions has increased the proportion of the financial sector in the whole listed company, and also highlighted the importance of the study of the governance of the listed financial Institutional Firms. The risk of governance in financial institutions is accumulated to a certain extent. Once released, the disastrous effect on the whole industry and the whole capital market will not be imagined. A robust corporate governance structure is very important for maintaining the sustainable management of the financial industry and the security and stability of the financial system as a whole. Therefore, the governance of the listed financial Institutional Firms in China is taken into account. It is necessary to do research.
The text of this article is divided into four parts. The first part is an introduction, which is mainly from five aspects, such as the conflict of interests between the controlling shareholders and the small shareholders, the ownership structure and the efficiency of the corporate governance, the governance of the board of directors, the incentive research of the senior managers, the state control and the corporate governance, but the academic circles have not yet formed. A unified, satisfactory conclusion.
The second part of the article is the general situation of the listed financial institutions in China and the particularity of the listed financial institutions' governance relative to the listed non-financial institutions. The basic situation of the listed financial institutions is introduced from the total share capital, the total market value, the circulation ratio, the first big shareholders and the share proportion. The listed financial Institutional Firms governance is different from the listed financial institutions. Non financial institutions are mainly reflected in the protection of the interests of the creditors and other stakeholders, the internal control and risk management, the transparency requirements of the governance structure and financial information, the objectives of governance, and supervision and governance.
The third part of the article focuses on the analysis of the governance of the listed financial institutions in China and the problems facing them. According to the annual reports issued by 41 listed financial institutions in China and the relevant data disclosed, this paper analyzes the ownership structure, the board of directors, the board of supervisors and the Executive compensation incentive in four aspects. The equity institutions, through the listing of 41 listed companies, are listed. It is concluded that the other shareholders are unable to form substantial restrictions on the first major shareholders. The board of directors, through a summary and comparison of the composition of the board of directors, the distribution of the number of people, the distribution of the number of meetings, the situation of the special committees and independent directors, draws the situation of the board of directors. The general situation is better than that in the past, but there are still some shortcomings. On the supervisory board, through comparative analysis, it is concluded that the board of supervisors of the listed financial institutions of our country is developing towards the independent of the internal personnel of the company, but the independence and its supervisory function need to be enhanced. The salary incentive is mainly short-term incentive effect. In 2010, the average salary of executives in the financial industry is the highest in all industries, reaching 2 million 808 thousand and 200 yuan per person, but the gap is obvious. On the basis of the above analysis, a question is raised on the basis of the analysis.
The fourth part of the article puts forward some suggestions on improving the analysis of the third part of the article. It is believed that the following points should be improved: the relatively centralized ownership structure is the best ownership structure, the independent director system, the supervision function of the supervisory board, the long-term incentive and constraint mechanism of management and the reform of financial institutions. The supervision system.

【学位授予单位】:中南民族大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F832.3

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