公司自愿性信息披露的治理效应研究

发布时间：2018-05-19 21:09

本文选题：信息披露制度 + 自愿性披露　；参考：《西南财经大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：我国的证券市场自上世纪90年代初期建立,至今已经经过了近20年的历程。相较于西方发达国家,我国在极短的时间内实现了证券市场的飞速发展,截止2008年末沪深两市的上市公司已超过1600多家,制度建设不断完善,市场效率不断提高,上市公司的治理结构也日趋合理。在肯定成绩的同时,我们不能漠视存在的问题,其中自愿性披露水平不高就是一个重要方面。从某种意义上说,证券市场本质上是一个信息市场,其核心问题是证券价格能否及时、准确的反映公司经营的基本面信息。然而,证券市场信息的非对称性却是常态,信息风险成为系统风险的重要组成部分,妨碍了经济资源配置效率。强化上市公司信息披露制度,是解决这一问题的关键手段之一。信息披露包括了强制性披露与自愿性披露,其中前者是上市公司对法律法规的遵循,后者则是出于管理层的一种自利性行为。那么,上市公司的自愿性披露行为对包括中小股东、机构投资者、债权人这些外部投资者的利益是否有影响,以及这种行为的动机和影响因素又是什么,是重要的理论与实际问题。本文正是针对自愿性披露的公司治理效应问题进行的理论与实证研究,其主要内容和观点如下：第1章：绪论。本章主要介绍了选题背景与研究意义,论文的研究方法、研究逻辑与内容结构,论文的创新与不足、基本概念界定等。第2章：自愿性披露与公司治理。本章首先阐释了自愿性披露的内涵,并结合国内外相关研究,对其外延进行归结,即自愿性披露的信息包括了上市公司背景、业绩、核心产品与技术、内部控制、人力资源、未确认无形资产、社会责任履行和衍生金融工具等八个方面的信息。其次对公司治理的内涵、公司治理的相关问题、公司治理机制、公司治理模式进行了分析研究,其中与公司治理相关的问题包括了资本结构、投资政策、股权结构、产权结构四个方面,而公司治理机制有内部治理与外部治理之分,公司治理模式亦有英美模式、德日模式和家族模式的差异。最后分析了自愿性披露与公司治理的关系,借鉴OECD关于信息披露和透明度作为改善公司治理的重要原则之一的表述,笔者认为,自愿性信息披露具有公司治理效应。准确的说,包括强制性信息与自愿性信息在内的信息披露机制,是公司治理机制的重要组成部分,而其目标是提高上市公司的透明度,而这一目标是改善公司治理的重要原则之一。第3章：自愿性披露的理论与实践的发展与现状分析。本章首先介绍了自愿性披露理论基础,即有效市场假说、企业契约性质理论、信息经济学理论。其次对国内外关于自愿性披露的相关研究进行了评述,在披露的动机、衡量标准、影响因素、经济后果四个方面进行梳理,并指出其中的不足之处。最后将自愿性与强制性披露相结合,从整体上阐释信息披露制度的历史演进,比较当今世界各国与自愿性披露相关的规定,总结其实践发展的内在逻辑。第4章：自愿性披露与外部股东利益保护的实证研究。外部投资者,包括外部股东和债权人,是自愿性披露信息的主要需求者,本章主要关注了外部股东收益利益保护与自愿性披露水平的关系问题。首先,通过对国内外文献的梳理,笔者认为外部股东有中小投资者和机构投资者之分,二者的信息来源与拥有量不同,所以自愿性披露包括了非针对性信息与有针对性信息,在此基础上提出了本章实证研究的相关假设。在研究设计中,笔者以2008年上海证券交易所上市的A股公司为研究对象,以2008年度股票累积报酬率作为外部股东收益的观测变量,分别以临时公告数量和机构持股比例作为衡量非针对性自愿性披露水平和有针对性自愿性披露水平的代理变量,在控制公司规模、盈利能力、行业等因素的基础上,回归结果表明自愿性披露水平与外部股东收益有明显的正相关关系。第5章：自愿性披露与债权人利益保护的实证研究。上市公司债权人包括银行和公司债券的持有人,其利益保护涉及投资风险与投资收益。笔者在理论分析的基础上,提出了研究假设,在研究设计中,以2008年上海证券交易所上市的A股公司为研究对象,以利息保障倍数和上市公司债务资本利息率分别作为债权人投资风险与收益的观察变量,在控制公司规模和资产负债率两个因素的基础上,得出的回归结果表明,自愿性披露水平与债权人的利益无显著的相关关系,并分析了产生这一结果的现实原因。第6章：政策与建议。本章首先在前文分析的基础上,对自愿性披露的公司治理效应进行了归结。其次从理论与实证的层面分析了自愿性披露行为的影响因素。笔者认为,理论上来讲,我国上市公司自愿性披露的影响因素主要有：经理层主观因素、公司内部治理机制和公司外部治理机制三大类,结合我国的实际情况,经理层主观因素主要是公司的经营业绩,与公司内部治理相关的因素有股权集中度、董事会的独立性特征,以及董事长和总经理两职是否相分离,而与公司外部治理相关的因素有公司规模、债权人与机构投资者的参与程度,在此基础上,提出了相关的研究假设。在实证分析中,笔者沿袭前文方法,以临时公告数量作为衡量自愿性披露水平的代理变量,分别考察了经营业绩、股权集中度、董事会独立性、董事长与总经理的职务分工、公司规模、财务杠杆、机构持股比例七个变量对自愿性披露水平的影响。实证检验表明,除与公司内部治理相关的三个因素外,其他四个变量对自愿性披露水平都存在着显著的正相关关系。最后,在理论分析与实证检验的基础上,笔者提出了规范上市公司自愿性披露行为,实现自愿性披露治理效应的政策建议。本文的创新之处,主要表现在以下三个方面：第一,关于自愿性披露的经济后果,国内外文献已经取得了不少研究成果,但是其立足点基本上是披露行为对上市公司资本成本和股票价值的影响,却极少考虑外部投资者的利益保护问题。本文正是站在外部投资者保护的立场上,并将外部投资者细分为中小投资者、机构投资者和债权人,从实证的角度验证了自愿性披露水平与其三者利益保护的相关关系。第二,在分析信息披露渠道的基础上,将自愿性信息分为非针对性信息与有针对性信息两类,认为前者是中小投资者的主要信息来源,而后者是机构投资者所独占。通过选择适合的代理变量,分别验证了两类披露行为对外部股东收益的正向影响。第三,关于机构投资者与自愿性披露水平(主要是非针对性方面)的关系的问题,相关的研究都是在相关的政策建议中,空泛的提出通过大力发展机构投资者以促进上市公司自愿性披露水平,而未做经验的证明。笔者通过构建有关自愿性披露行为影响因素的实证研究模型,首次证明了机构投资者对上市公司持股比例的增加,对自愿性披露水平的增加具有显著的正向影响。本文的不足之处：由于作者水平有限,论文中也存在着诸多不足。如对一些问题的理论的整体性把握不够,虽然对自愿性披露与外部投资者的利益保护关系问题进行了系统阐述,也提出了相应的解决方案,但是这些方案可能是一种理论的推演,是否实际可行,可能存在些许问题。这也促使我在以后的工作和学习中不断探索,努力进一步提高。
[Abstract]:China's securities market has been established in the early 90s of last century and has gone through the course of nearly 20 years. Compared with developed countries in the west, China has realized the rapid development of the securities market in a very short time. By the end of 2008, the listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen two cities have exceeded more than 1600, the system construction has been perfected and the market efficiency has been continuously improved. The governance structure of the listed companies is becoming more and more reasonable. At the same time, we can not ignore the existing problems, and the low level of voluntary disclosure is an important aspect. In a sense, the securities market is essentially an information market, and the core problem is whether the certificate price can be timely and accurately reflect the company's operation. However, the asymmetric information of the securities market is normal, and the information risk becomes an important part of the system risk, which hinders the efficiency of the allocation of economic resources. Strengthening the information disclosure system of the listed companies is one of the key means to solve this problem. It is important for a listed company to follow the laws and regulations, and the latter is a self-interest of the management. Then, what is the importance of the voluntary disclosure of the listed companies on the interests of the small shareholders, institutional investors, creditors, and the motives and influencing factors of such behavior Theoretical and practical problems. This paper is a theoretical and Empirical Study on the effect of voluntary disclosure on corporate governance. Its main contents and viewpoints are as follows:
The first chapter is introduction. This chapter mainly introduces the background and significance of the topic, the research method of the thesis, the research logic and content structure, the innovation and deficiency of the thesis, the definition of basic concepts and so on.
The second chapter: voluntary disclosure and corporate governance. This chapter first explains the connotation of voluntary disclosure, and combines related research at home and abroad to sum up its extension. That is, voluntary disclosure of information includes the background of the listed company, performance, core products and technology, internal control, human resources, unrecognized intangible assets, social responsibility performance and evolution. Secondly, the information of eight aspects of financial instruments. Secondly, the connotation of corporate governance, related problems of corporate governance, corporate governance mechanism, and corporate governance model are analyzed. The problems related to corporate governance include capital structure, investment policy, equity structure and property right structure in four aspects, and the corporate governance mechanism is internal. The corporate governance model also has the difference between the Anglo American model, the German Japanese model and the family model. Finally, it analyzes the relationship between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance, and draws on the statement that OECD is one of the important principles of information disclosure and transparency as one of the important principles to improve corporate governance. The author believes that voluntary disclosure has a company. The mechanism of information disclosure, including mandatory information and voluntary information, is an important part of the corporate governance mechanism, and its goal is to improve the transparency of the listed companies, which is one of the important principles to improve corporate governance.
The third chapter: the development and present situation analysis of voluntary disclosure theory and practice. This chapter first introduces the theoretical basis of voluntary disclosure, namely the effective market hypothesis, the nature of enterprise contract, and the theory of information economics. Secondly, it commented on the related research on voluntary disclosure at home and abroad, and the motivation, measurement standards and influence factors in the disclosure. The four aspects of economic consequences are combed, and the shortcomings are pointed out. Finally, we combine voluntary and mandatory disclosure to explain the historical evolution of the information disclosure system as a whole, compare the relevant provisions of the world and voluntary disclosure in the world, and summarize the internal logic of the development of its practice.
The fourth chapter: An Empirical Study of voluntary disclosure and the protection of the interests of external shareholders. External investors, including external shareholders and creditors, is the main demand for voluntary disclosure of information. This chapter mainly focuses on the relationship between the benefits protection of external shareholders and the level of voluntary disclosure. For the external shareholders, there are small and medium investors and institutional investors, and the two sources are different from the ownership. Therefore, voluntary disclosure includes non targeted information and pertinent information. On this basis, we put forward the relevant hypotheses of the empirical study in this chapter. In the research and design, the author listed the A shares of the stock exchange on the Shanghai Stock Exchange on 2008. As an object of study, the company takes the annual stock return of 2008 as an observation variable for the earnings of the external shareholders, taking the number of temporary announcements and the proportion of institutional shareholding as an agent variable to measure the level of untargeted voluntary disclosure and the level of targeted voluntary disclosure, which is the basis for controlling the scale, profitability and industry of the company. The regression results show that voluntary disclosure is positively correlated with external shareholders' earnings.
The fifth chapter: An Empirical Study of voluntary disclosure and the protection of the interests of the creditors. The creditor of the listed company, including the holders of the bank and the corporate bond, involves the investment risk and the return of the investment. On the basis of the theoretical analysis, the author puts forward the research hypothesis, in the research and design, the A shares listed on the Shanghai stock exchange in 2008. On the basis of the two factors that control the size of the company and the rate of assets and liabilities, the results of the regression results show that there is no significant correlation between the voluntary disclosure level and the interests of the creditors, and the relationship between the interest rate and the interest rate of the debt capital of the listed companies as the observation variables of the investment risk and the income of the creditor respectively. The actual cause of the result is analyzed.
The sixth chapter: policy and suggestion. First, on the basis of the previous analysis, this chapter sums up the corporate governance effect of voluntary disclosure. Secondly, it analyzes the influencing factors of voluntary disclosure from the theoretical and empirical level. In theory, the main factors affecting the voluntary disclosure of Listed Companies in China are: the manager level The subjective factors, the internal governance mechanism of the company and the external governance mechanism of the company are three major categories. In combination with the actual situation of our country, the subjective factors of the manager are mainly the performance of the company. The factors related to the internal governance of the company are ownership concentration, the independence of the board of directors, and the separation of the chairman and the general manager of the two office, and the company with the company. The factors related to external governance include the size of the company, the degree of participation of the creditors and institutional investors, and on this basis, the relevant research assumptions are put forward. In the empirical analysis, the author follows the previous method and takes the number of temporary announcements as a proxy for the voluntary disclosure level, and examines the operating performance, the equity concentration, and the directors. The effect of seven variables on voluntary disclosure level, namely, independence, job division of chairman and general manager, company size, financial leverage and institutional shareholding ratio. The empirical test shows that there are significant positive correlation between the other four variables except the three factors related to corporate governance. On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical test, the author puts forward some policy suggestions to standardize voluntary disclosure behavior of listed companies and achieve voluntary disclosure governance effect.
The innovation of this paper is mainly manifested in the following three aspects:
First, on the economic consequences of voluntary disclosure, a lot of research results have been achieved in the literature at home and abroad, but its foothold is basically the impact of disclosure behavior on the capital cost and stock value of listed companies, but little consideration is given to the protection of external investors. The external investors are subdivided into small and medium investors, institutional investors and creditors to verify the relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure and the protection of the three parties from an empirical point of view.
Second, on the basis of the analysis of information disclosure channels, the voluntary information is divided into two categories of non targeted information and targeted information. The former is the main source of information for small and medium investors, and the latter is monopolized by institutional investors. By choosing the appropriate proxy variables, the two types of disclosure behavior of foreign shareholders are verified. Positive impact.
Third, on the relationship between institutional investors and voluntary disclosure level (mainly non pertinence), the relevant research is in the relevant policy proposals, and it is not a proof that the institutional investors can promote the voluntary disclosure level of the listed companies by vigorously developing the institutional investors, but not the proof of the experience. The empirical research model of the influencing factors of disclosure behavior has proved the increase of institutional investors' shareholding ratio to listed companies for the first time, and has a significant positive impact on the increase of voluntary disclosure level.
The shortcomings of this article are as follows:
Because of the limited level of the author, there are also many shortcomings in the thesis. For example, the overall grasp of the theory of some problems is not enough. Although the relationship between voluntary disclosure and external investors' interests protection is systematically expounded and the corresponding solutions are put forward, this scheme may be a theoretical deduction, and it is practical. Feasible, there may be some problems. This has prompted me to continue to explore in the future work and study, and strive to further improve.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

【参考文献】