引导基金对私人资本、创业投资企业和创业投资家的激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-05-28 02:34

本文选题：创业投资 + 引导基金　；参考：《重庆大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：我国从1985年开始探索运用财政资金扶持创业投资发展。过去20多年的主要做法是通过财政出资设立国有创业投资公司，直接从事创业投资。在运作过程中不可避免地遇到了难以建立收益激励机制和风险约束机制，以及难以发挥财政资金杠杆放大作用的问题。2005年后，我国政府开始尝试设立创业投资引导基金，即通过扶持商业性创业投资企业的设立与发展，引导社会资金进入创业投资领域，自身不直接从事创业投资，并且不以营利为目的。引导基金的设立避免了政府过分干预市场运作的缺陷，又可以充分发挥财政资金的杠杆效应，以吸引更多的创业资本投向处于种子期及初创期的科技创新企业，解决单纯通过市场配置创业资本的缺陷。引导基金的出现标志着政府促进创业投资发展方式的转变，是中国创业投资事业发展的重要里程碑。本文从政府引导创业投资发展的视角出发，以私人创业资本、创业投资企业、创业投资家作为研究对象，在广泛搜集国内外相关研究文献与政策法规的基础上，参考国外引导基金的运作模式，结合我国资本市场的客观条件和政策背景，针对目前我国引导基金激励机制不足的主要问题，探讨了参与各方在创业投资各阶段的利益博弈及相应的激励机制设计，以期为改进和提高我国创业引导基金的运作效率提供理论支持和政策建议。论文的主要研究内容包括： 1、吸引私人资本进入创业投资的补偿机制研究。公共资本介入创业投资活动的目的之一是为了增加对早期阶段创新项目的投资，而基于风险/收益的权衡，这一目标通常与利润最大化目标相冲突。因此，为吸引更多私人资本进入创业投资领域，公共资本必须对其进行补偿。各国政府目前对私人资本的补偿机制多种多样，这些补偿机制的特征是什么，对私人资本的激励强度如何，对社会福利有何不同的影响，如何针对各地不同的情况选择合适的补偿机制？对这些问题的回答是本部分所研究的主要问题。 2、多目标环境下对创业投资企业的激励机制研究。对商业性创业投资的理论研究表明，签订按可观察的产出（利润）为基准的分成制契约可以有效解决出资人和创投企业之间的代理问题。而在引导基金运作中，创投企业通常同时兼顾政府特定项目和自选项目的投资，因此固定比例的分成制契约可能会扭曲创投企业的激励：投资处于后期阶段的项目风险更小，平均收益可能更高，创投企业没有激励实现政府希望增加对早期阶段创新项目或特定行业（领域）投资的目标。而强制规定创投企业必须以一定比例投资于政府指定项目的做法通常不能满足其激励相容约束。因此如何设计适当的激励契约，使创投企业在投资项目的选择上能够自愿兼顾自身收益和政府目标是本部分所探讨的主要问题。 3、基于代理人私利的创业投资家激励机制研究。已有研究通常都假定创业投资家以追求项目收益最大化为目标，除此之外没有其它私人目标，因此对创业投资家的激励主要限定在如何刺激其努力投入和防范合谋上。本部分则将创业投资家从事创业投资活动的收益划分为：内部私人收益和外部私人收益两个部分，在实物期权框架下分析了最优激励合约的设计，讨论了不同代理人私利对最优投资时刻、激励效率和激励成本的影响。本论文的创新之处在于： 1、将实践中对私人资本的多种不同补偿方式按其特征明确划分为亏损保底、亏损补偿、收益补偿、风险/收益独享4种方式，在私人投资者风险规避假设下证明了事前承诺对亏损进行补偿的机制可以最有效地激励私人资本的进入，而当前实践中通常采用的收益补偿的方式是一种双输机制。从而为现行补偿机制的改进提供了理论依据。 2、将创业投资企业的激励问题模型化为一个多任务环境下的激励合约设计问题，通过引入不同任务间产出的关联性和任务的相对重要性，本文首先从理论上证明，如果任务间的产出分布正相关，或任务间的重要性存在差异，则最优的激励合约可以是对抗性，即在提高一种任务激励强度的同时必须降低另一任务的激励强度。这就从理论上拓展了Holmstrom和Milgrom（1991）关于不同任务间的激励强度必须互补的经典结论；从实践上本文还证明，对政府指定项目和创业投资家自选项目应实施差别激励，特别地，如果指定项目对政府而言非常重要，那么其激励强度应该严格高于自选项目；若政府组建不同类型的创业投资基金，分别从事政府指定项目和自选项目的投资，则政府能够从这种专业化分工模式中获得更高的净剩余；而在专业化分工模式中，对创业投资家实行相对业绩比较的激励政策可以进一步提高政府效用。 3、通过引入代理人私利因素拓展了前人对创业投资家激励机制的研究，，从如何激励创业投资家选择最优投资时刻这一新的视角出发探讨了代理人不同类型的私利对激励合约的影响，发现了创业投资家的外部私人收益与因掌握信息优势而获得的内部私人收益对最优投资时机选择正反两方面的作用及其影响机制。
[Abstract]:Since 1985, China began to explore the use of financial funds to support the development of venture capital. The main practice of the past 20 years is to set up state-owned venture capital companies through financial investment, and directly engage in venture capital. In the process of operation, it is inevitable that it is difficult to establish income incentive mechanism and risk constraint mechanism, and it is difficult to play financial capital. After.2005 years, our government began to try to set up a venture capital guidance fund, that is, by supporting the establishment and development of commercial venture capital enterprises, leading social funds into the field of venture capital, not directly engaged in venture capital, and not for profit making purposes. The establishment of guidance fund has avoided the government. The overintervention of the defects in the market operation can also give full play to the leverage effect of financial funds, in order to attract more venture capital to the technological innovation enterprises in the seed period and initial stage, and to solve the defects of the simple market allocation of venture capital. The emergence of the guide fund marks the transformation of the government to promote the development of venture capital. An important milestone in the development of China's venture capital.
From the perspective of government guidance on the development of venture capital, this paper takes private venture capital, venture capital enterprises and venture capitalists as the research object. On the basis of extensive collection of relevant domestic and foreign relevant research documents and policies and regulations, and referring to the operation mode of foreign guidance fund, the objective conditions and policy background of China's capital market are combined. In order to improve and improve the operational efficiency of the Venture guidance fund in China, the main problems of the lack of incentive mechanism in China's guidance fund are discussed, and the theoretical support and policy suggestions are provided to improve and improve the operational efficiency of the Venture guidance fund in China.
1, a study of the compensation mechanism for attracting private capital into venture capital. One of the aims of public capital involvement in venture capital is to increase investment in early stage innovation projects, and this goal is usually in conflict with the goal of profit maximization. Therefore, to attract more private capital into venture capital, it is to attract more private capital to venture capital. In the field, public capital must be compensated. The current compensation mechanisms for private capital are varied. What are the characteristics of these compensation mechanisms, what is the incentive intensity to private capital, the difference in social welfare and how to choose the appropriate compensation mechanism for different situations in different places? The answer is the main problem in this section.
2, research on the incentive mechanism of venture capital enterprises under multi objective environment. The theoretical research on commercial venture investment shows that the signing of the divided contract based on the observable output (profit) can effectively solve the agency problem between the investors and the venture capital enterprises. In the operation of the guidance fund, the venture capital enterprises usually take into account the government at the same time. The investment of specific projects and selected projects, so a fixed proportion of the contract may distort the incentive of the venture capital enterprise: the project risk is smaller in the later stage, the average income may be higher, and the venture capital enterprise does not encourage the government to achieve the goal of increasing the investment of new or specific industry (field) at the early stage. However, it is the main problem that how to design an appropriate incentive contract so that the venture capital enterprises can give consideration to their own income and government goals voluntarily in the choice of investment projects.
3, research on the incentive mechanism of venture capitalists based on the agent's private interest. The existing research usually assumes that the venture investor aims to maximize the benefit of the project. In addition, there are no other private goals. Therefore, the incentive to the venture capitalist is mainly limited to how to stimulate its effort and guard the conspiracy. The income of the entrepreneurs engaged in venture capital activities is divided into two parts: internal private income and external private income. In the framework of real options, the design of the optimal incentive contract is analyzed. The effects of different agents' private interest on the optimal investment time, incentive efficiency and incentive cost are discussed.
The innovation of this paper lies in:
1, according to its characteristics, the different compensation methods of private capital are clearly divided into 4 ways: loss guarantee, loss compensation, income compensation and risk / income alone. Under the assumption of risk aversion of private investors, the mechanism of pre undertaking commitment to loss is proved to be the most effective incentive for private capital to enter. In practice, the way of income compensation is usually a double lose mechanism, which provides a theoretical basis for the improvement of the current compensation mechanism.
2, the incentive model of the venture capital enterprise is modeled as an incentive contract design in a multi task environment. By introducing the relevance of the output of different tasks and the relative importance of the task, this paper first proves that the optimal excitation is optimal if the output distribution between tasks is positive or the importance of the task is different. The incentive contract can be antagonistic, that is, to reduce the incentive intensity of another task while improving the intensity of a task incentive. This extends the classical conclusion of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) on the complementary incentive intensity between different tasks. In practice, this paper also proves that the government designated the project and the venture capitalist. Self selected projects should implement differential incentives, especially if the designated project is very important to the government, then its incentive intensity should be strictly higher than the self selected project. If the government sets up different types of venture capital funds to invest in the government designated and selected projects respectively, the government can get from this specialized division of labor model. In the mode of specialized division of labor, the incentive policy of relative performance comparison for venture capitalists can further improve the effectiveness of government.
3, through the introduction of agents' private interest factors, this paper expands the former research on the incentive mechanism of the venture capitalists. From the new perspective of how to motivate the entrepreneur to choose the best investment time, this paper explores the influence of the agent's different types of private interest on the incentive contract, and finds out the external private income of the venture capitalist and the advantage of mastering the information. The internal private benefits obtained by the potential have two positive and negative effects on the optimal investment timing and their influencing mechanisms.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.48

【参考文献】