商业银行公司治理对风险承担影响的实证分析

发布时间：2018-06-01 20:59

本文选题：商业银行 + 公司治理　；参考：《山东大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着经济全球化趋势的加速发展,金融机构面临的风险也不断加剧。良好的公司治理是完善银行风险管理、促进金融体系健康发展和保证整个经济体系稳健运行的关键所在。通过2007年爆发的金融危机我们可以看到,不健全的银行公司治理容易使银行过度承担风险导致破产,进而对整个经济体系造成潜在影响,比如产生风险传染或影响支付体系等,从而产生巨大的公共成本和严重后果。本文拟借鉴国内外的研究成果,进一步探讨我国商业银行公司治理对风险承担的影响,并针对发现的问题提出相应的对策建议。本文综合利用了逻辑推理和实证检验的办法进行分析。首先简要介绍了银行公司治理与银行风险承担的相关理论,并理论分析了股权结构、内部制衡机制、激励机制、监管机制等公司治理机制对银行风险承担的影响。然后以2003-2010年国内五家上市银行的数据为研究样本,以大股东控制力、董事会规模、监事会规模、独立董事比例和资本充足率等五个因素作为公司治理机制的解释变量来实证分析公司治理对我国商业银行风险承担的影响。为了全面考察银行公司治理情况,又选取资产规模和财务杠杆两个银行自身经营指标作为补充的解释变量展开分析。实证结果显示：一是在公司治理机制中,大股东控制力越强,银行风险越大；董事会规模越大、银行资本充足率越高,相应的银行的风险越小；独立董事和监事会规模对银行风险的影响不明显；二是在自身经营方面,资产规模越大,银行风险越小；财务杠杆越高,银行风险也越高。最后,本文在以上分析结果的基础上,结合我国商业银行发展现状,从股权结构、制衡监督机制、激励约束机制等多个角度出发,提出了一些完善我国商业银行公司治理,控制银行风险承担的政策建议。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economic globalization, financial institutions are facing more and more risks. Good corporate governance is the key to perfect the bank risk management, promote the healthy development of the financial system and ensure the steady operation of the whole economic system. Through the financial crisis that broke out in 2007, we can see that unsound corporate governance of banks tends to make banks take excessive risks and lead to bankruptcy, which in turn has a potential impact on the entire economic system, such as risk contagion or impact on the payment system, and so on. This has huge public costs and serious consequences. This paper intends to draw lessons from domestic and foreign research results, further explore the impact of corporate governance on the risk bearing of commercial banks in China, and put forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions for the problems found. This paper makes use of the methods of logical reasoning and empirical test to analyze. Firstly, it briefly introduces the relevant theories of bank corporate governance and bank risk-taking, and analyzes the influence of corporate governance mechanism such as equity structure, internal check and balance mechanism, incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism on the risk assumption of banks. Then taking the data of the five listed banks in China from 2003 to 2010 as the research sample, taking the controlling power of large shareholders, the size of the board of directors and the scale of the board of supervisors as the research samples, The proportion of independent directors and capital adequacy ratio are taken as the explanatory variables of corporate governance mechanism to empirically analyze the impact of corporate governance on the risk assumption of commercial banks in China. In order to investigate the corporate governance of banks, the paper selects the asset size and financial leverage as the supplementary explanatory variables. The empirical results show that: first, in the corporate governance mechanism, the stronger the controlling power of the major shareholders, the greater the risk of the bank, the larger the size of the board of directors, the higher the capital adequacy ratio of the bank, and the smaller the risk of the corresponding bank; The scale of independent director and board of supervisors has no obvious influence on bank risk; second, the bigger the assets scale, the smaller the bank risk; the higher the financial leverage, the higher the bank risk. Finally, on the basis of the above analysis results, combined with the current situation of the development of commercial banks in China, from the equity structure, checks and balances supervision mechanism, incentive and restraint mechanism and other angles, this paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the corporate governance of commercial banks in China. Policy recommendations for controlling the risk taking of banks.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.33;F224

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