中国民营上市公司高管的政府背景与盈余质量研究
发布时间:2018-06-06 04:34
本文选题:高管的政府背景 + 盈余质量 ; 参考:《复旦大学》2012年硕士论文
【摘要】:近10多年来国外文献研究中一大热点便是“政治联系”,而以高管的特征为基础的研究方法被广泛运用于此领域。现存的文献主要从代理成本和公司治理视角研究盈余质量问题,关于高管的政府背景对盈余质量的影响研究还相当不充分。本文认为,在中国这一特定的经济与政治制度背景下,研究高管的政府背景对公司会计信息质量,特别是盈余质量的影响显得尤为重要。 在国内,较少研究关注公司高管政府背景对公司会计信息质量,特别是盈余质量的影响。本文从董事长和总经理这两个对公司盈余质量起着关键影响作用的特殊职位出发,选取了两种度量盈余质量的视角,来研究董事长或总经理的政府背景对我国民营上市公司盈余质量的影响。通过对2008-2010年的我国A股民营上市公司样本的研究,本文发现董事长或总经理具有政府背景的民营上市公司的盈余质量比这两个关键职位没有政府背景的民营上市公司的盈余质量要差。 在此基础上,本文借鉴吴文锋等(2008)和杜兴强等(2009)的研究方法将高管的政府背景作了两种分类,来分别考察不同类别的政府背景对我国民营上市公司盈余质量的影响差异。研究表明,将政府背景区分为中央政府背景与地方政府背景之后,有地方政府背景的民营上市公司要比有中央政府背景的民营上市公司盈余质量差;同时,将政府背景(广义的政府概念)区分为政府官员类背景与代表委员类背景之后,董事长或总经理有代表委员类背景的民营上市公司要比没有任何政府背景的民营上市公司有更差的盈余质量;而董事长或总经理有政府官员类背景的民营上市公司与其没有任何政府背景的民营上市公司相比盈余质量并没有显著差异。 最后,本文还发现,地区的市场化程度显著调节董事长或总经理的地方政府背景与其所在民营上市公司的盈余质量之间的关系:一个地区的市场化程度越低,董事长或总经理具有地方政府背景的民营上市公司的盈余质量越差。 本文的研究丰富和拓展了民营企业政治联系的相关研究,而且通过开拓高管的政府背景这一新的研究领域丰富了盈余质量的相关研究。本文从高管政府背景影响公司盈余质量,进而影响公司价值这一路径为前人研究中政治联系不一定能改善公司绩效和提升公司价值,甚至给公司价值带来负面影响的结论提供了一个合理的解释。
[Abstract]:In recent 10 years, a hot topic in foreign literature research is "political connection", and the research method based on the characteristics of executives has been widely used in this field. The existing literature mainly studies earnings quality from the perspective of agency cost and corporate governance. This paper argues that under the background of China's specific economic and political system, it is particularly important to study the influence of executive government background on the quality of corporate accounting information, especially the quality of earnings. In China, few studies focus on the influence of government background on the quality of corporate accounting information, especially earnings quality. Based on two special positions, chairman and general manager, which play a key role in earnings quality, this paper selects two kinds of perspectives to measure earnings quality. To study the impact of the government background of chairman or general manager on the earnings quality of private listed companies. Through the study of the sample of China's A-share private listed companies from 2008 to 2010, This paper finds that the earnings quality of private listed companies with government background is worse than that of private listed companies with no government background in these two key positions. On this basis, this paper uses the research methods of Wu Wenfeng et al. (2008) and du Xingqiang et al. (2009) to classify the government background of senior executives into two categories to examine the influence of different government backgrounds on the earnings quality of private listed companies in China. The research shows that after the government background is divided into the central government background and the local government background, the private listed companies with the local government background have worse earnings quality than the private listed companies with the central government background. After dividing the government background (the broad concept of government) into the background of government officials and the background of representative committee, Private listed companies with representative committee background of chairman or general manager have worse earnings quality than private listed companies with no government background; However, there is no significant difference in earnings quality between the private listed companies with the background of chairman or general manager and the private listed companies with no government background. Finally, the paper also finds that the degree of regional marketization significantly regulates the relationship between the local government background of the chairman or general manager and the earnings quality of the private listed companies in which they belong: the lower the degree of marketization in a region, the lower the degree of marketization. The worse the earnings quality of private listed companies with local government background, the chairman or general manager. The research in this paper enriches and expands the relevant research on the political relationship of private enterprises, and enriches the relevant research on earnings quality by exploring the government background of executives. This paper, from the perspective of executive government background, influences the quality of corporate earnings and then the value of the company. In previous studies, political connections do not necessarily improve corporate performance and enhance corporate value. It even provides a reasonable explanation for the conclusion of negative impact on the value of the company.
【学位授予单位】:复旦大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:F276.5;F832.51;F224
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