中国上市银行公司治理结构与治理绩效关系研究

发布时间：2018-06-07 12:52

本文选题：上市银行 + 公司治理　；参考：《重庆大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：中国银行业改革是中国经济体制改革的重要组成部分，商业银行的改革将对未来经济和金融发展产生全局性影响，对国家经济和金融安全具有决定性作用。近年来国际金融业处于剧烈的动荡与分化之中，各国金融机构都在进行重组融合，国际金融竞争出现了新的格局。国内外的这些因素都对中国金融业提出了严峻的挑战，特别是我国金融市场完全对外开放后，国内外银行之间的竞争加剧。这场竞争，实质上是现代银行制度的竞争，，而现代银行制度的核心就是现代银行公司治理机制。因此，治理结构的优化是提高我国商业银行竞争力的必由之路。商业银行作为一类特殊的公司，既有一般公司的普遍性，也有其特殊性。在当前对公司治理结构问题的研究成果中，国内外学术界更为关注的是企业，特别是上市公司的治理结构，而对商业银行治理的论述相对较少。有鉴于此，本文在对银行公司治理进行理论分析的基础上，对我国上市银行公司治理问题进行了研究。本文在充分考虑银行业特殊性的基础上，通过建立一组包括单方程和联立方程在内的模型，实证分析了股权结构与经营绩效间的关系。研究结果显示，较大的第一大股东的持股比例、控制能力以及较高的股权集中度阻碍了银行绩效的提高，而境外战略投资者和实际控制人性质是银行绩效的促进剂。此外，研究还发现，董事会规模对绩效有一定的负面影响，而独立董事占董事会的比例以及银行两职分离情况对绩效有促进作用。中国上市银行越来越多地通过引入战略投资者特别是境外战略投资者来完善公司治理机制，提高银行绩效。本文以我国上市银行为样本，采用面板数据（Panel Data）计量方法从上市银行治理指标、安全性、盈利性、成长性四个方面，对上市银行引进境外战略投资者前后的效果进行比较分析和定量研究。研究结果表明，引入境外战略投资者能有效完善中国上市银行的公司治理机制。上市银行绩效的改善说明引入境外战略投资者的银行在一定程度上复制了境外战略投资者较为成熟的公司治理结构,先进的经营理念和风险控制技术，基本达到了引进境外战略投资者的最初目的。本文通过收集我国上市的国有大型股份制商业银行及其他已上市银行的数据，实证分析了银行信息披露与公司治理绩效之间的关系。实证研究表明，一般公司治理的研究结论不适用于银行业。中国上市银行内部控制机制对会计信息披露质量的影响较小，仅发现两职分离的领导权结构以及分散的股权结构能够提高会计信息披露质量，没有发现董事会、债权人以及经理人激励合约等治理机制对会计信息披露质量的影响。在产品市场的强烈竞争对公司治理控制机制形成约束之后的统计结果显示，对于内部治理结构不完善的中国上市银行，产品市场的强烈竞争会进一步降低内部控制机制对会计信息披露质量的提高。本文还采用了上市股份制商业银行数据，实证分析了董事会独立性与银行经营绩效之间的关系。研究结果发现，董事会独立性对银行绩效的促进作用并不明显。银行绩效的提升除了改善治理结构、完善银行内部控制机制等外，增加网点数量，扩大市场份额也有重要作用。最后，论文提出了引进战略投资者、完善银行内部控制机制等政策性建议。
[Abstract]:The reform of China's banking industry is an important part of the reform of China's economic system. The reform of the commercial banks will have a global impact on the future economic and financial development, and will play a decisive role in the economic and financial security of the country. In recent years, the international financial industry is in a violent turmoil and division, and the financial institutions of all countries are being reorganized and melted. In addition, the international financial competition has emerged a new pattern. These factors both at home and abroad have put forward a severe challenge to the Chinese financial industry. Especially, after the financial market is completely open to the outside world, the competition between domestic and foreign banks is intensifying. This competition is essentially the competition of modern banking system, and the core of modern banking system is modern silver. Therefore, the optimization of governance structure is the only way to improve the competitiveness of China's commercial banks.
As a special kind of company, commercial banks have the universality and particularity of the general company. In the current research results of the corporate governance structure, the domestic and foreign academics pay more attention to the enterprises, especially the governance structure of the listed companies, and the discussion on the governance of commercial banks is relatively small. Based on the theoretical analysis of corporate governance, this paper studies the corporate governance of listed banks in China.
On the basis of considering the particularity of the banking industry, this paper empirically analyses the relationship between stock ownership structure and performance by establishing a set of models including single equation and simultaneous equation. The results show that the proportion of the larger first largest shareholders, the control ability and the higher equity concentration have hindered the performance of the bank. In addition, the size of the board of directors has a negative impact on performance, and the proportion of independent directors to the board of directors and the separation of the two position of the bank can promote the performance.
More and more Chinese listed banks improve the corporate governance mechanism by introducing strategic investors, especially foreign strategic investors, to improve the performance of banks. This paper takes China listed banks as samples and uses panel data (Panel Data) measurement method from four aspects of listed bank governance indicators, security, profitability and growth. The results show that the introduction of foreign strategic investors can effectively improve the corporate governance mechanism of Chinese listed banks. The improvement of the performance of listed banks shows that the banks that introduce overseas strategic investors have replicated overseas strategic investors to a certain extent. More mature corporate governance structure, advanced business philosophy and risk control technology have basically reached the initial purpose of introducing foreign strategic investors.
This paper empirically analyses the relationship between bank information disclosure and corporate governance performance by collecting the data of large state-owned commercial banks and other listed banks listed in China. The empirical study shows that the research conclusions of general corporate governance are not applicable to the banking industry. The effect of the exposure quality is small. Only the two separation of the leadership structure and the decentralized ownership structure can improve the quality of accounting information disclosure. There is no impact on the quality of accounting information disclosure by the governing mechanism of the board of directors, creditors and managers incentive contracts. The strong competition in the product market has the shape of corporate governance control mechanism. The statistical results after the constraint show that the strong competition in the product market will further reduce the improvement of the quality of accounting information disclosure by the strong competition in the product market for the listed Chinese banks with imperfect internal governance structure.
This paper also uses the data of listed joint-stock commercial banks to analyze the relationship between the independence of the board of directors and the performance of bank management. The results show that the role of board independence in promoting the performance of banks is not obvious. The promotion of bank performance is to improve the governance structure and improve the internal control mechanism of the bank and increase the network. Quantity and expanding market share also play an important role. Finally, the paper puts forward some policy recommendations such as introducing strategic investors and perfecting the internal control mechanism of banks.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.33;F224

【引证文献】