我国银行监管的市场约束研究

发布时间：2018-06-24 14:53

本文选题：商业银行 + 市场约束　；参考：《华东师范大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：近年来,世界多国爆发的金融危机让人们逐渐意识到传统金融监管的许多局限性。为此,市场约束在银行监管中的作用开始引人关注。在新巴塞尔协议中,市场约束与最低资本要求、官方监管一起,为银行监管体系的三大支柱之一。基于多方面的因素,我国投资者的市场约束力较弱。在此情况下,银行管理层往往只考虑收益性而忽视安全性。银行风险水平的高企不仅加重了监管当局的负担,也使得整个银行体系面临系统性风险。随着我国银行业的对外开放,如何提高对银行的市场约束力,降低银行风险,是我国监管当局面临的一个重要问题。这也是写作这篇论文的现实意义所在。本文共分为七章。第一章是对银行公司治理、信息披露、存款人和次级债市场约束等方面的文献综述。第二章首先在分析有关强制信息披露争论的基础上,引出了关于信息披露的各种理论观点；然后通过分析银行内部治理和外部治理对信息披露的影响,阐明公司治理和信息披露密不可分、相互作用的关系；最后分析信息披露的评价指标和市场约束效应,即评判何种信息披露才是有效和充分的,以及其所能产生的市场约束作用。第三章在概述了市场约束的定义、研究范围、条件等之后,分别并实证研究剖析存款人的市场约束“监控”机制、次级债的市场约束“监控”机制、理财客户的市场约束“监控”机制。第四章分别从宏观视角和微观视角实证研究市场约束“影响”机制,并通过理财客户市场约束“影响”机制实证检验,以判断银行对市场约束的实际反应程度。第五章分别分析市场约束和官方监管的局限性和必要性,并通过两者关系的对比分析,得出两者应互相配合,作为银行监管的组成部分,发挥各自优势和作用的结论。同时,本章分析了官方监管的范围和力度的选择,以期确立市场约束和官方监管的最优边界。第六章主要结合我国银行监管的实际,分析当前在公司治理、信息披露、市场约束等方面存在的问题,并提出相应的对策和政策建议。第七章总结全文的主要研究结论,并提出本文研究中的不足之处,以及对未来研究方向的展望。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the financial crisis broke out in many countries in the world makes people gradually realize the limitation of traditional financial supervision. To this end, the role of market constraints in banking supervision began to attract attention. In Basel II, market constraints and minimum capital requirements, together with official regulation, are one of the three pillars of the banking regulatory system. Based on various factors, the market binding force of Chinese investors is weak. In this case, bank management often only consider profitability and neglect security. High levels of banking risk not only burden regulators, but also expose the entire banking system to systemic risk. With the opening of China's banking sector, how to improve the market binding force on banks and reduce bank risks is an important issue facing our country's regulatory authorities. This is also the practical significance of writing this paper. This paper is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter is a literature review on bank corporate governance, information disclosure, depositors and subprime bond market constraints. In the second chapter, on the basis of analyzing the controversy about compulsory information disclosure, it leads to various theoretical viewpoints on information disclosure, and then analyzes the impact of internal and external governance on information disclosure. The relationship between corporate governance and information disclosure is explained. Finally, the evaluation index and market constraint effect of information disclosure are analyzed, which is to judge which information disclosure is effective and sufficient. And its ability to produce market constraints. After summarizing the definition, scope and condition of market constraint, the third chapter analyzes the market constraint "monitoring" mechanism of depositors and the market constraint "monitoring" mechanism of subprime debt, respectively. Financial management customer's market restraint "monitoring" mechanism. The fourth chapter empirically studies the market constraint "influence" mechanism from the macro and micro perspectives, and judges the actual reaction degree of the bank to the market constraint through the empirical test of the financial management customer market constraint "influence" mechanism. The fifth chapter analyzes the limitation and necessity of market restraint and official supervision, and draws the conclusion that they should cooperate with each other and play their respective advantages and functions as part of bank supervision. At the same time, this chapter analyzes the choice of the scope and intensity of official supervision in order to establish the optimal boundary between market constraint and official supervision. The sixth chapter analyzes the problems existing in the aspects of corporate governance, information disclosure and market constraints, and puts forward corresponding countermeasures and policy suggestions. Chapter seven summarizes the main conclusions of this paper, and puts forward the shortcomings of this study, as well as the prospects for future research.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.2

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