后股权分置时期大股东资产注入行为

发布时间：2018-08-06 10:00

【摘要】：运用经济学优化方法及折现现金流方法,分析了大股东资产注入的内在激励.假设大股东注资后仍然发生掏空上市公司行为,通过求解大股东掏空超额收益及相关影响因素,分析了大股东资产注入动机.模型分析结果显示:①大股东资产注入收益与其持股比例、注资规模、公司股票的市盈率成正比.②上市公司营运效率高,注入资产若能产生协同效应,大股东将越有激励进行资产注入.③考虑到持股市值因素,大股东对上市公司掏空的边际收益下降,掏空激励减弱.④大股东掏空的超额收益与注资规模成反比,说明注资越多,大股东越不容易发生掏空行为.大股东优质资产注入体现了大股东对上市公司的支持,有利于上市公司绩效改善.
[Abstract]:Using the economic optimization method and the discounted cash flow method, this paper analyzes the internal incentive of the large shareholder's assets injection. Assuming that the large shareholder still has the behavior of tunneling the listed company after injecting capital, this paper analyzes the motive of the large shareholder's asset injection by solving the excess return of the large shareholder's tunneling and the related influencing factors. The results of model analysis show that the ratio of equity injection income to its shareholding, the scale of equity injection, the price-earnings ratio of the company's stock are proportional to the operating efficiency of listed companies, and if the injected assets can produce synergistic effects, The larger the shareholder, the more incentive he has to inject assets. 3. Considering the market value of the stock, the marginal income of the large shareholder tunneling to the listed company decreases, and the cut incentive weakens the excess return of the largest shareholder to be inversely proportional to the scale of the capital injection. The more capital injection, the more difficult for major shareholders to empty. High-quality asset injection of large shareholders reflects the support of large shareholders to listed companies, which is beneficial to the performance improvement of listed companies.
【作者单位】：上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院;上海交通大学财务处;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872073) 上海市哲学社会科学基金资助项目(2008BJB017)
【分类号】：F832.51

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