股权激励、银行债务约束、控制权私利与国有控股上市公司经营者过度投资行为

发布时间：2018-08-06 11:23

【摘要】：中国作为世界上最大的新兴经济体，市场经济起步较晚，资本市场发展不成熟，与国外成熟的市场经济相比存在很大差别。而作为我国国民经济的支柱和经济参与主体——国有控股上市公司，存在许多不同于发达国家的公司治理问题。一方面，公司内部治理结构有缺陷。国有控股上市公司大多经国企或政府部门改制而成，国有股“一股独大”，国有股东“所有者缺位”，且行政气息浓厚，使公司内部治理结构与现代公司制度相比“形似神不似”；另一方面，公司外部治理不健全。我国市场经济由计划经济转变而来，市场经济起步较晚，股票市场、证券市场等资本市场不健全。而这两方面的公司治理问题最终将反映在经济运行效率上，因此研究我国国有控股上市公司投资行为对于保证国家经济社会投资效率，节约资源能源和提高资金利用率，保障国家经济健康稳定发展，具有极其重要的理论和现实意义。本文的研究工作主要有以下几个方面：本文以2008年以来我国国有控股上市公司及其投资的相关数据为基础，首先对我国国有控股上市公司过度投资背景及因素进行分析；其次，建立理论分析模型，并对模型进行构建和推导，，对模型的经济意义进行分析；最后，在以上基础上，建立实证研究模型，对其进行实证分析，并对实证模型的经济意义进行分析。本文的创新性主要体现在以下方面：本文在现有相关研究成果的基础上,以我国国有控股上市公司为背景,在假设公司经营者存在股权激励和控制权私利、且在项目融资决策中存在股权融资和银行债务融资选择的条件下，建立数学模型和实证研究模型，从理论上和实证上，研究股权激励、银行债务约束和控制权私利对我国国有上市公司经营者过度投资行为的影响机理。本文的理论研究结果表明，公司的过度投资行为随着公司经营者控制权私利的增加而趋于严重，随着经营者持股比例的增加和银行债务的增加而减弱。实证研究结果表明，公司经营者拥有的控制权影响公司经营者的过度投资行为；股权激励对公司经营者过度投资行为有抑制作用，但不显著；而银行债务加剧了公司经营者的过度投资行为。
[Abstract]:As the largest emerging economy in the world, China's market economy starts late and the capital market is immature, which is quite different from that of foreign mature market economy. However, as the mainstay of our national economy and the main body of economic participation, there are many problems in corporate governance which are different from those in developed countries. On the one hand, the company's internal governance structure has defects. Most of the state-controlled listed companies have been restructured by state-owned enterprises or government departments. The state-owned shares are "dominant in one share", and the state-owned shareholders "owners are absent," and there is a strong administrative atmosphere. Compared with the modern corporate system, the internal corporate governance structure is similar to God, on the other hand, the external governance of the company is not perfect. The market economy of our country changes from planned economy, market economy starts late, the capital market such as stock market, stock market is not perfect. These two aspects of corporate governance will ultimately be reflected in the efficiency of economic operation. Therefore, the study of the investment behavior of state-owned holding listed companies will ensure the efficiency of national economic and social investment, save resources and energy, and improve the utilization of funds. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to ensure the healthy and stable development of national economy. The research work of this paper mainly includes the following aspects: this paper is based on the relevant data of state-owned holding listed companies and their investments since 2008. Firstly, the background and factors of excessive investment of state-owned holding listed companies in China are analyzed; secondly, the theoretical analysis model is established, and the model is constructed and deduced, and the economic significance of the model is analyzed. Finally, on the basis of above, The empirical research model is established, and the economic significance of the empirical model is analyzed. The innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the following aspects: based on the existing relevant research results, this paper assumes that the company managers have equity incentives and private interests of control rights, taking the state-owned holding listed companies as the background. Under the condition of equity financing and bank debt financing choice in project financing decision, the mathematical model and empirical research model are established to study equity incentive theoretically and empirically. The influence mechanism of bank debt restraint and private interest of control right on overinvestment behavior of managers of state-owned listed companies in China. The theoretical results of this paper show that the excessive investment behavior of the company tends to be serious with the increase of the private interests of the control rights of the company managers, and weakens with the increase of the proportion of the managers' shareholding and the increase of the bank debts. The empirical results show that the control rights owned by the company managers affect the overinvestment behavior of the company managers, the equity incentive has a restraining effect on the over-investment behavior of the company managers, but it is not significant. But the bank debt intensifies the overinvestment behavior of the company manager.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F276.6;F832.4;F224

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