会计稳健性与上市公司非效率投资行为实证研究
发布时间：2018-08-31 11:12
【摘要】：由于股东与管理层之间的代理冲突、股东与债权人之间的信息不对称以及管理层自身特质的影响,使得上市公司的投资决策并非完全有效,具体表现为过度投资和投资不足,会计稳健性由于能够及时地确认投资损失,促使上市公司采用稳健的会计信息,同时也能通过降低股东与债权人之间的契约成本来缓解投资不足,因而有助于改善投资效率。但是,近年来,以FASB为首的会计学界开始质疑会计稳健性的积极作用,认为会计稳健性低估了企业净资产,从而导致投资者放弃一些本该投资的项目,进而加剧投资不足的发生,国内也有学者表明,我国上市公司的会计稳健性其实只是上市公司“洗大澡”、进行盈余管理造成的。本文以此为背景,采用2007—2010年我国A股上市公司的数据作为样本观测值,验证会计稳健性对我国上市公司非效率投资行为的影响。 研究结果表明,2007—2010年间,我国上市公司的会计政策总体上是稳健的,并且有助于改善投资效率。从全样本分析的结果来看,会计稳健性能够缓解上市公司的非效率投资行为,进一步将非效率投资分为过度投资组和投资不足组的结果表明,我国上市公司的会计稳健性有助于抑制过度投资和投资不足行为的发生,但是从结果的显著性来看,只有投资不足组的结果是显著的,其抑制过度投资的作用并不显著,而从实际控制人的性质来看,实际控制人为国有的上市公司,会计稳健性的投资效用相对较弱,具体表现为,实际控制人为国有的上市公司,其会计稳健性抑制过度投资的效果不如非国有上市公司,且其会计稳健性缓解投资不足的效果也不如非国有的上市公司,但这一结论并不显著。稳健性测试没有支持本文提出的有关会计稳健性有助于抑制过度投资的假设,究其原因,可能是由于我国上市公司的高管权力过大,影响了会计稳健性作用的发挥。
[Abstract]:Due to the agency conflict between shareholders and management, the information asymmetry between shareholders and creditors and the influence of management's own characteristics, the investment decision of listed companies is not completely effective, which is manifested by overinvestment and underinvestment. Accounting conservatism not only can confirm the investment loss in time, but also can reduce the contract cost between shareholders and creditors to alleviate the underinvestment, which will help to improve the investment efficiency. However, in recent years, the accounting profession, led by FASB, has begun to question the positive role of accounting conservatism, believing that accounting conservatism undervalues the net assets of an enterprise, thus leading investors to give up some projects that they should have invested in. Some domestic scholars also show that the accounting conservatism of listed companies in our country is actually caused by "taking a big bath" and carrying out earnings management. Based on this background, this paper uses the data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2010 as sample observations to verify the influence of accounting conservatism on the non-efficient investment behavior of listed companies in China. The results show that the accounting policies of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2010 are generally sound and contribute to the improvement of investment efficiency. According to the results of the whole sample analysis, accounting conservatism can alleviate the inefficient investment behavior of listed companies, and further divide the inefficient investment into overinvestment group and underinvestment group. The accounting conservatism of listed companies in China is helpful to restrain the occurrence of overinvestment and underinvestment, but from the significance of the results, only the results of underinvestment group are significant, and the effect of restraining overinvestment is not significant. In view of the nature of the actual controller, the investment utility of accounting conservatism is relatively weak for the listed company with actual control being state-owned. The concrete manifestation is that the listed company with actual control is state-owned. The effectiveness of accounting conservatism in restraining excessive investment is not as good as that of non-state-owned listed companies, and the effect of accounting conservatism in alleviating underinvestment is not as good as that of non-state-owned listed companies, but this conclusion is not significant. The conservatism test does not support the hypothesis that accounting conservatism helps to curb excessive investment. The reason may be that the executive power of listed companies in our country is too large, which affects the exertion of accounting conservatism.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F233;F832.51
本文编号：2214806
[Abstract]:Due to the agency conflict between shareholders and management, the information asymmetry between shareholders and creditors and the influence of management's own characteristics, the investment decision of listed companies is not completely effective, which is manifested by overinvestment and underinvestment. Accounting conservatism not only can confirm the investment loss in time, but also can reduce the contract cost between shareholders and creditors to alleviate the underinvestment, which will help to improve the investment efficiency. However, in recent years, the accounting profession, led by FASB, has begun to question the positive role of accounting conservatism, believing that accounting conservatism undervalues the net assets of an enterprise, thus leading investors to give up some projects that they should have invested in. Some domestic scholars also show that the accounting conservatism of listed companies in our country is actually caused by "taking a big bath" and carrying out earnings management. Based on this background, this paper uses the data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2010 as sample observations to verify the influence of accounting conservatism on the non-efficient investment behavior of listed companies in China. The results show that the accounting policies of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2010 are generally sound and contribute to the improvement of investment efficiency. According to the results of the whole sample analysis, accounting conservatism can alleviate the inefficient investment behavior of listed companies, and further divide the inefficient investment into overinvestment group and underinvestment group. The accounting conservatism of listed companies in China is helpful to restrain the occurrence of overinvestment and underinvestment, but from the significance of the results, only the results of underinvestment group are significant, and the effect of restraining overinvestment is not significant. In view of the nature of the actual controller, the investment utility of accounting conservatism is relatively weak for the listed company with actual control being state-owned. The concrete manifestation is that the listed company with actual control is state-owned. The effectiveness of accounting conservatism in restraining excessive investment is not as good as that of non-state-owned listed companies, and the effect of accounting conservatism in alleviating underinvestment is not as good as that of non-state-owned listed companies, but this conclusion is not significant. The conservatism test does not support the hypothesis that accounting conservatism helps to curb excessive investment. The reason may be that the executive power of listed companies in our country is too large, which affects the exertion of accounting conservatism.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F233;F832.51
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