金融公司治理问题研究

发布时间：2018-10-10 11:56

【摘要】：金融机构的特殊性源于金融体系的特殊性，金融机构的公司治理与金融监管休戚相关。本文将金融监管作为公司外部治理的一部分，着力分析金融机构公司治理的特殊性。本文同时以中国上市商业银行为例，研究中国金融机构公司治理的相关特点。文中所提出的金融监管内生化概念，当且仅当金融机构的外部监管与内部监督相匹配时才能达成。达到金融监管内生化的途径有两个：1.完善的全球化监管体系（由上而下）。2.金融机构公司治理层面的风险监控体系（由下而上）。由于第一途径实施的现实困难，本文侧重说明的正是第二种途径。在金融监管层面，本文分析了国际国内监管逻辑的演变以及监管手段的变迁，厘清了金融监管策略的源流与发展。在金融机构治理层面，通过构建数理模型，分析了国有股权控股下职业经理人行为模式以及双重委托导致的“所有人缺位”问题。本文发现国有控股商业银行职业经理人有优先实现政策目标而非经济目标的倾向；由于双重委托问题导致的“所有人缺位”，这使得委托代理链条过于复杂化。综合国有股权的这两个特点，本文认为：当前国有股权对匹配外部监管与内部监督可以发挥积极的意义。针对委托双重委托的复杂性，及政策目标强激励，，国有股权通过特定的激励安排，能够更快的将政策目标落实到企业层面，保证金融体系的稳定性。国有股权不啻是金融监管内生化一个潜在的匹配主体。为了研究金融内生化对公司绩效的影响，本文构建了金融机构治理的指标体系，试图将外部金融监管、内部监督，外部监管与内部匹配的路径纳入到统一的框架下进行探讨，以期在现有机制中找到金融内生化的工具。研究发现，银行业监事会的监督能力要强于独立董事；现存监管指标如资本充足率（CAR）、不良贷款率（NPL）对商业银行绩效影响极为有限；高管薪酬激励效果远不如股权激励，因此未来类似于股权激励的“或有资产”激励机制会成为一个很好的金融内生化工具；规模效应在银行业中的优势凸显，董事会规模对企业业绩的影响尚不明显。本文最终展望了金融监管指标内生化的图景，试图讨论金融监管结构纳入公司治理结构的可能性。本文认为：通过构建新的治理系统，潜在的系统性风险将变得可控。只有完善的实时金融机构监控，辅之以金融机构业务的清晰界定，才能更好的应对当前“金融危机”规模的系统失败。
[Abstract]:The particularity of financial institutions originates from the particularity of financial system. Corporate governance of financial institutions is closely related to financial supervision. This paper regards financial supervision as a part of corporate external governance and analyzes the particularity of corporate governance of financial institutions. At the same time, this paper takes listed commercial banks in China as an example to study the relevant characteristics of corporate governance of Chinese financial institutions. The endogenous concept of financial supervision can only be achieved if and only if the external supervision of financial institutions is matched with internal supervision. There are two ways to achieve endogenous financial regulation: 1. A sound global regulatory system (from top to bottom). 2. Financial institutions corporate governance level of risk monitoring system (from the bottom up). Because of the practical difficulties of the first approach, the second approach is emphasized in this paper. In the aspect of financial supervision, this paper analyzes the evolution of international and domestic regulatory logic and the change of regulatory means, and clarifies the origin and development of financial supervision strategy. At the level of financial institution governance, this paper analyzes the behavior pattern of professional managers under the state equity holding and the "owner absence" problem caused by double entrustment through the construction of mathematical model. This paper finds that the professional managers of state-owned holding commercial banks have the tendency of giving priority to the realization of policy objectives rather than economic objectives, and that the chain of principal-agent is too complicated because of the "absence of all" caused by the double entrustment problem. Based on these two characteristics of state-owned equity, this paper holds that the current state-owned equity can play a positive role in matching external and internal supervision. In view of the complexity of entrustment and the strong incentive of the policy goal, the state-owned equity can implement the policy goal to the enterprise level more quickly through the specific incentive arrangement, and ensure the stability of the financial system. State-owned equity is a potential matching subject in financial regulation. In order to study the impact of financial internalization on corporate performance, this paper constructs an index system of financial institution governance, and attempts to bring the path of external financial supervision, internal supervision, external supervision and internal matching into a unified framework. In order to find financial endogenous tools in the existing mechanisms. The study found that the supervisory ability of the banking supervisory board is stronger than that of the independent directors; the existing regulatory indicators such as capital adequacy ratio (CAR), non-performing loan ratio (NPL) have very limited impact on the performance of commercial banks; the incentive effect of executive compensation is far less effective than equity incentive. Therefore, the "contingent assets" incentive mechanism similar to equity incentive will become a good financial endogenous tool in the future. The advantage of scale effect in banking industry is prominent, and the influence of board size on enterprise performance is not obvious. This paper finally looks forward to the endogenetic prospect of the financial supervision index and tries to discuss the possibility of the financial supervision structure being brought into the corporate governance structure. This paper argues that the potential systemic risk will become manageable by building a new governance system. Only a perfect real-time financial institution monitoring, supplemented by a clear definition of the financial institutions' business, can better deal with the current "financial crisis" scale of the system failure.
【学位授予单位】：中国社会科学院研究生院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F224;F832.3

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