政府干预、政府目标与国有上市公司的过度投资

发布时间：2018-10-16 10:46

【摘要】：对于国内企业过度投资的研究,目前均是从经理私人利益、管理者过度自信、管理者背景等角度展开的,这些研究没有考虑我国特有的制度背景对上市公司投资决策的影响。一些研究表明,政府控制的上市公司更可能从事过度投资行为。遗憾的是,这些文献并没有表明政府控制的上市公司过度投资的原因,可能的解释是国有上市公司的代理问题更严重。本文认为,国有企业过度投资并不一定是由代理问题引起的,政府控制的上市公司过度投资能够帮助政府实现一些目标,如就业、税收等。基于我国国有上市公司数据,本文研究表明,国有上市公司的过度投资是由政府将其公共目标,如就业、税收等内部化到其控制的企业的结果。另外,回归结果也显示,国有企业的过度投资并没有表现出自由现金流假说的投资—现金流的敏感性,债务也没有起到约束过度投资行为的作用,这也从侧面说明了国有上市公司的过度投资不一定因为代理问题引起的。
[Abstract]:The research on overinvestment of domestic enterprises is carried out from the perspective of private interests of managers, overconfidence of managers, background of managers, and so on. These studies do not consider the influence of the unique institutional background on the investment decisions of listed companies in China. Some studies have shown that government-controlled listed companies are more likely to engage in excessive investment behavior. Unfortunately, these documents do not show the reason for the overinvestment of government-controlled listed companies, which may be explained by the fact that the agency problem of state-owned listed companies is more serious. This paper argues that excessive investment in state-owned enterprises is not necessarily caused by agency problems, and that overinvestment by government-controlled listed companies can help the government to achieve some goals, such as employment, taxation, and so on. Based on the data of state-owned listed companies in China, this paper shows that the excessive investment of state-owned listed companies is the result of the government internalizing its public objectives, such as employment and taxation, into the enterprises under its control. In addition, the regression results also show that the over-investment of state-owned enterprises does not show the investment-cash flow sensitivity of the free cash flow hypothesis, nor does debt play a role in restraining over-investment behavior. This also shows that the overinvestment of state-owned listed companies is not necessarily caused by agency problems.
【作者单位】：华中科技大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(70872033)资助
【分类号】：F832.51;F276.1;F224

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