基于互动学习的货币政策信息传导机制研究
发布时间：2018-10-20 09:45
【摘要】：论文以互动学习方式为主线,以央行和社会公众之间的高阶信任、信息结构为分析对象,论述学习行为对社会信息结构、货币政策信息传导机制和货币政策调控框架的影响,对我国公众学习行为和通胀预期进行实证分析,提出相关建议。 引言部分说明了选题背景、研究的问题、论文结构与研究方法、主要结论与创新点。 第二章对与选题相关的国内外文献进行了梳理。关于预期与预期形成、公众与央行学习行为、货币政策透明度、社会信息结构、货币政策传导机制的文献非常丰富,国内外学者从不同视角、以不同国家为分析对象进行研究,学术成果既反映了宏观调控理论与实践随时间演变的情况,也揭示了公众行为对宏观调控的主动性影响增强。对于央行和公众之间的互动关系的研究成果相对较少。 第三章围绕公众和央行学习行为、学习机制、预期形成等方面的内容展开论述。最常见的学习方式是理性学习与适应性学习。在互动学习方式下,公众和央行之间存在信息和预期互相依赖、互相影响的动态过程。央行被认为具有信息优势,在公众预期形成过程中的影响权重高。公众预期也通过央行的决策表现出来,反映在央行学习、决策行为的调整过程中,否则,则说明信息传导的无效率。但是,高阶信任有一定的负面作用,公众依赖央行预测结果,降低了自身进行预测的动机,预期调整速度降低,对经济冲击真实的反应情况难以体现出来。公众学习存在一个从PLM到ALM的不断调整的过程,对央行的高阶信任决定了学习的速度和对央行预测结果的接受程度。互动学习机制说明信息双向传导的重要性。 第四章首先分析了货币政策透明度“悖论”问题,即央行和公众预测的准确程度并没有随之提高。央行具有信息优势,提高了高阶信任的权重,产生了对私人信息的“挤出效应”。中央银行需要选择一个合适的信息披露程度。互动学习使得央行和公众有扭曲政策反应的动机。私人信息和公开信息之间产生的相互“挤出效应”导致有价值的信息量减少,信息准确程度下降。公众和央行之间是信息替代时,没有增加社会信息量。微观主体的信息准确程度影响到央行的信息来源,在信息分散的情况下,央行和公众之间是信息互补的关系,社会信息总量增加。因此,保持信息的分散对于微观主体和央行都有重要意义。 第五章论述货币政策信息传导机制。货币政策信息传导机制将信息与预期联系在一起,中央银行向社会发布公开信息,发挥高阶信任协调预期的作用,包括信息发布与信息反馈两个过程。信息传导机制具有双向信息传导、动态互动、前瞻性的特点,说明央行和公众在信息传导过程中的互动关系,学习速度、公开信息、高阶信任等都具有双刃剑的特点。信息传导机制的有效性取决于央行和公众对学习行为、公开信息和高阶信任正反两方面作用的均衡。信息传导机制影响货币政策调控框架相关内容。基于前瞻性操作与管理预期的要求,中央银行需要对货币政策规则、中介目标、工具、信息沟通内容等进行相应的调整。 第六章分析我国货币政策信息传导机制的主要内容、特点、存在的问题以及造成问题的原因。由于受到缺少量化的最终目标、央行独立性较弱和货币政策透明度不高等因素的制约,我国货币政策信息传导机制没有体现双向信息流动、互动动态的特点,难以起到稳定公众预期的作用。央行与市场沟通互动少,不提供前瞻性的信息,没有弥补名义锚缺失的有效措施。 第七章针对我国货币政策的信号作用与公众学习行为进行实证分析。对于学习能力相对较高的人群,由于对信息的反应灵敏,增加的信息披露并没有降低预期的不稳定性。公众的学习能力对于央行稳定预期的意图是一把“双刃剑”。在缺乏明确的调控目标、公众采取适应性学习的情况下,信心指数自身和CPI水平对预期形成的影响程度高且持续,名义GDP增速的影响小于预期,公众存在一定程度的通胀恐慌。有约束力的调控目标所释放出的信号、可靠明确的价格信息对居民通胀预期有直接且持续的影响,通胀预期与经济增长目标之间互为格兰杰原因的关系说明了管理预期对实现调控目标的重要性。 第八章首先分析了美国、通胀目标制国家和欧洲央行的成功经验,他们都注重提高货币政策决策透明度,及时宣布央行会议的决定,公布详细的决策过程,加强说明与宣传,减少对决策的误读与不解。我国央行可以采取基于规则的调控方式,既不受单一目标限制,又可以弥补名义锚缺失和决策透明度不高的问题,为公众评价央行行为提供一个标准。量化物价稳定指标,设置一个合理波动区间,赋予物价稳定和经济增长目标不同的权重。央行应增加前瞻性信息的披露,提高公众对这部分信息的学习能力。中介目标的设置应关注公众预期的变化。增强央行和金融监管部门分支机构在信息收集和决策中的作用。增加信息沟通方式,加强货币政策委员会与市场沟通。 第九章是全文总结。
[Abstract]:The paper mainly discusses the influence of learning behavior on social information structure, monetary policy information transmission mechanism and monetary policy regulation framework based on the high-order trust between the central bank and the public, and the information structure as the main line. An empirical analysis of China's public learning behavior and inflation expectations is made, and relevant suggestions are put forward. The introduction part illustrates the background of the topic, the problems of the research, the structure of the paper and the research methods, the main conclusions and the creation New point. Chapter II is the domestic and international literature related to the subject. It has been sorted out. The literature about the expected and expected formation, the study behavior of the public and the central bank, the transparency of monetary policy, the information structure of the society and the mechanism of monetary policy transmission are very abundant. The academic achievement reflects both macro-control theory and practice over time, and also reveals the initiative of public behavior to macro-control. A study of the interaction between the central bank and the public. The third chapter centers on the public and the central bank's learning behavior, the learning mechanism, the expected formation, etc. The content of the face is discussed. The most common way of learning is rational Learning and adaptive learning. There is information and expected interdependence among the public and the central bank in a self-learning approach. A dynamic process of influence. The central bank is considered to have the advantage of information and is expected to be formed in the public The impact weight in the process is high. Public expectations are also reflected in the central bank's decision-making, reflected in the adjustment of the central bank's learning and decision-making practices, otherwise, Information transmission has no efficiency. However, higher-order trust has a certain negative effect, the public relies on the central bank forecast results, reduces the motivation of self-prediction, the expected adjustment speed is reduced, and the real reaction to the economic impact is expected. The situation is difficult to manifest. The public study has a continuous process from PLM to ALM, which determines the speed of learning and the central bank's advance Description of the results of the test: information on the learning mechanism of the students The fourth chapter analyzes the 鈥減aradox鈥，
本文编号：2282774
[Abstract]:The paper mainly discusses the influence of learning behavior on social information structure, monetary policy information transmission mechanism and monetary policy regulation framework based on the high-order trust between the central bank and the public, and the information structure as the main line. An empirical analysis of China's public learning behavior and inflation expectations is made, and relevant suggestions are put forward. The introduction part illustrates the background of the topic, the problems of the research, the structure of the paper and the research methods, the main conclusions and the creation New point. Chapter II is the domestic and international literature related to the subject. It has been sorted out. The literature about the expected and expected formation, the study behavior of the public and the central bank, the transparency of monetary policy, the information structure of the society and the mechanism of monetary policy transmission are very abundant. The academic achievement reflects both macro-control theory and practice over time, and also reveals the initiative of public behavior to macro-control. A study of the interaction between the central bank and the public. The third chapter centers on the public and the central bank's learning behavior, the learning mechanism, the expected formation, etc. The content of the face is discussed. The most common way of learning is rational Learning and adaptive learning. There is information and expected interdependence among the public and the central bank in a self-learning approach. A dynamic process of influence. The central bank is considered to have the advantage of information and is expected to be formed in the public The impact weight in the process is high. Public expectations are also reflected in the central bank's decision-making, reflected in the adjustment of the central bank's learning and decision-making practices, otherwise, Information transmission has no efficiency. However, higher-order trust has a certain negative effect, the public relies on the central bank forecast results, reduces the motivation of self-prediction, the expected adjustment speed is reduced, and the real reaction to the economic impact is expected. The situation is difficult to manifest. The public study has a continuous process from PLM to ALM, which determines the speed of learning and the central bank's advance Description of the results of the test: information on the learning mechanism of the students The fourth chapter analyzes the 鈥減aradox鈥，
本文编号：2282774
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