正向反馈申购者、市盈率管制与新股发行定价

发布时间：2018-11-21 18:42

【摘要】：传统的新股发行定价偏低观点受到了一些定价偏高实证现象的质疑,且难以解释我国长期实行的发行市盈率管制政策。本文在原有信息不对称理论的基础上,从正向反馈的非理性角度研究发行定价,进而分析市盈率管制政策的作用,并实证检验。研究认为,新股发行市场中存在着大量的正向反馈申购者,他们受近期新股上市表现激发而参与申购,这种噪声需求的存在使得新股即使被高估也仍然能够成功发行。发行人和承销商意识到这种噪声需求的存在,为了使其利润最大化,他们会抬高发行定价,而机构投资者在近期新股上市表现较好的情况下也易于高估新股,因此也能接受较高的询价价格。实证结果验证了正向反馈申购者对发行定价的这一正向影响,并且发现市盈率管制政策能够对此起到一定的抑制作用。
[Abstract]:The traditional view of underpricing of new stock issuance is questioned by some empirical phenomena of high pricing, and it is difficult to explain the long-implemented price-earnings ratio control policy in China. Based on the original information asymmetry theory, this paper studies the issue pricing from the irrational perspective of positive feedback, and then analyzes the role of price-earnings ratio control policy, and empirical test. The research shows that there are a large number of positive feedback purchasers in the IPO market who are motivated by the recent IPO performance and participate in the requisition. This kind of noise demand makes the new stock can be issued successfully even if it is overestimated. Issuers and underwriters are aware of this noise demand and, in order to maximize their profits, raise the issue price, while institutional investors tend to overestimate new shares when they perform better in recent IPOs. Therefore also can accept the higher inquiry price. The empirical results verify the positive effect of positive feedback buyers on the pricing of the issue, and find that the price-earnings ratio control policy can restrain it to some extent.
【作者单位】：河南大学工商管理研究所;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“噪声交易者参与下的IPO溢价研究”(70572031)
【分类号】：F224;F275;F832.51

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