基于风险视角的动态银行监管规则
发布时间：2018-11-22 14:16
【摘要】：本文提出了动态银行监管的"风险调整"规则,认为银行愿意承担的风险水平的变化,是银行与储蓄者、银行与借款人、银行与银行、银行与政府之间的博弈,以及宏观经济周期的影响所共同决定的。通过分析,构建一个基于风险视角的动态有效银行监管理论分析框架。
[Abstract]:This paper puts forward the "risk adjustment" rule of dynamic banking supervision, and holds that the change of risk level that banks are willing to undertake is a game between banks and savers, banks and borrowers, banks and banks, banks and governments. And the impact of the macroeconomic cycle is determined by the common. Through analysis, a dynamic and effective theoretical analysis framework of bank supervision based on risk perspective is constructed.
【作者单位】： 东北大学工商管理学院;
【分类号】：F832.1
[Abstract]:This paper puts forward the "risk adjustment" rule of dynamic banking supervision, and holds that the change of risk level that banks are willing to undertake is a game between banks and savers, banks and borrowers, banks and banks, banks and governments. And the impact of the macroeconomic cycle is determined by the common. Through analysis, a dynamic and effective theoretical analysis framework of bank supervision based on risk perspective is constructed.
【作者单位】： 东北大学工商管理学院;
【分类号】：F832.1
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