基于权力范式的汇率决定研究

发布时间：2019-02-10 19:09

【摘要】：经典汇率理论往往只能部分解释现实汇率变动,其原因在于这些理论或者忽视汇率问题中的国家决定过程,认为汇率单纯被市场决定;或者没有正确反映国家的目标。事实上特定的汇率制度安排必然会影响到各方的具体利益,汇率变动将产生国际经济利益的再分配效应。鉴于此,本文通过描述国家经济权力、设定国家效用函数,建立了国家间汇率博弈模型,并分析各种策略下双方的效用改变情况。模型表明:基于经济权力的博弈决定了汇率的变动,真实汇率对相关利益方的影响状态与各方经济权力对比状态同构,即经济权力越大的国家主体,在汇率变动中越能够争取到有利于自身的结果,进而获得更大的国家经济利益,据此可以较好地解释为什么汇率会在中长期出现趋势性的变动。
[Abstract]:The classical exchange rate theory can only partly explain the real exchange rate change, the reason is that these theories either ignore the national decision process in the exchange rate problem, think that the exchange rate is simply determined by the market, or do not reflect the country's goal correctly. In fact, the specific arrangement of exchange rate regime will inevitably affect the specific interests of all parties, and the change of exchange rate will produce the redistribution effect of international economic benefits. In view of this, this paper describes the national economic power, sets up the national utility function, establishes a game model of the exchange rate between countries, and analyzes the change of the utility between the two countries under various strategies. The model shows that the game based on economic power determines the change of exchange rate, and the influence of real exchange rate on relevant stakeholders is isomorphic to the state of economic power contrast, that is, the state subject with greater economic power. The more the exchange rate changes, the more favorable results can be obtained, and then the greater national economic benefits can be obtained, which can better explain why the exchange rate has a trend change in the medium and long term.
【作者单位】：吉林大学数量经济研究中心;吉林大学商学院;吉林建筑工程学院基础科学部;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大研究项目“博弈论与经济权力范式研究”(项目批准号:2009JJD790017) 吉林建筑工程学院青年科技发展基金项目“基于博弈视角的金融产品交易价格决定——数学模型和实证检验”(项目编号:J20091049)的资助
【分类号】：F830.7

【参考文献】