终极控股股东控制权与全流通背景下的大股东减持

发布时间：2019-04-11 21:07

【摘要】：股权分置改革完成后,随着大批限售股解禁,大小非减持已成为当前理论界和实务界共同面临的关键问题。文章在理论上首次通过动态模型研究大股东减持,结果发现控股股东最优减持与其现金流权及公司治理水平正相关,而与控制权私利、外部市场回报负相关,且减持并非其必然选择。同时,由于调整成本的存在,控股股东减持是一个持续的动态过程。基于第一大股东减持数据,实证研究结果基本验证了理论发现。文章揭示了大股东减持的内在机制,为股权分置改革后大股东持股结构调整提供了理论依据,同时也在一定程度上解释了当前市场上的减持现象。
[Abstract]:After the reform of split share structure is completed, with the release of a large number of restricted shares, non-reduction of large and small shares has become a key issue for both theoretical and practical circles. In this paper, for the first time, a dynamic model is used to study the reduction of large shareholders. The results show that the optimal reduction of controlling shareholders is positively related to their cash flow rights and corporate governance level, but negatively related to the private interest of control and the return of the external market. And the reduction of holdings is not an inevitable choice. At the same time, due to the existence of the adjustment cost, the holding reduction of controlling shareholders is a continuous dynamic process. Based on the data of the largest shareholder reduction, the empirical results basically verify the theoretical findings. This paper reveals the internal mechanism of the reduction of the majority shareholders' holding, which provides the theoretical basis for the structural adjustment of the large shareholders' shareholding after the reform of the split share structure, and also explains the phenomenon of the reduction of the shareholding in the current market to a certain extent.
【作者单位】：上海财经大学金融学院;上海财经大学财经研究所;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(70673056,70803027,70873080) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-07-0533) 上海市哲学社会科学规划项目(2008BJB003)
【分类号】：F832.51

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