我国商业银行薪酬激励机制问题研究

发布时间：2019-04-13 08:14

【摘要】：薪酬激励机制是商业银行激励机制的重要构成部分，也是有效的公司治理的重要手段。合理的薪酬激励制度能有效激发银行员工的主动性、创造性、积极性，充分发挥员工的潜能，为银行的长期稳健发展而奋斗。因此研究分析我国商业银行薪酬激励的影响因素，致力于建立科学、合理、高效的薪酬激励机制具有重要的理论和现实意义。本文在前人研究的基础上，通过定性和定量分析研究了我国商业银行薪酬水平的影响因素，剖析了我国银行业薪酬激励机制现存的问题并提出了建立高效薪酬机制的思路和建议。本文第一部分对国内外薪酬激励的相关理论进行了综述，主要介绍了薪酬和薪酬激励的相关概念、类型。介绍了薪酬激励的相关理论，，分为薪酬理论和激励理论。薪酬理论包括均衡价格工资理论、最低工资理论、工资差别理论、分享经济理论、边际生产力工资理论、凯恩斯理论。激励理论包括需求层次理论、ERG理论、双因素理论、强化理论、公平理论、期望理论、委托代理理论等。第二部分通过数据表格、数据图的使用，对我国商业银行薪酬激励机制的现状进行了分析，并指出现行商业银行薪酬激励存在的问题，主要包括：薪酬与银行业绩未能完全有效挂钩，薪酬形式单一、结构不合理，高管与员工薪酬差距大，隐含激励不足等。第三部分是对我国商业银行薪酬激励机制进行的实证研究。通过有关数据的搜集和整理，相关变量、模型的设定，就我国商业银行薪酬制度的影响因素进行回归分析，研究表明，银行员工平均薪酬基本上是与银行业绩相联系，员工激励显著受到银行规模的影响，但与银行风险无明显联系；高管人员的薪酬没有与银行业绩和风险水平呈现出明显关系。第四部分从我国商业银行薪酬激励的现状出发，从商业银行不同的岗位（决策类、管理类、专业技术类、营销类、经办类）角度提出了薪酬激励机制设计的要点和思路。最后，从以岗定薪、业绩考核、公开薪酬收入、调整结构、重视长期激励等方面提出了优化银行内部薪酬激励机制的建议；从政府管理模式和法律制度方面提出了改善薪酬激励外部环境的建议。
[Abstract]:Salary incentive mechanism is an important part of the incentive mechanism of commercial banks, and it is also an important means of effective corporate governance. A reasonable salary incentive system can effectively stimulate the initiative, creativity and enthusiasm of the bank staff, give full play to their potential, and strive for the long-term steady development of the bank. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study and analyze the influencing factors of salary incentive of commercial banks in China, and to set up a scientific, reasonable and efficient salary incentive mechanism. On the basis of previous research, this paper studies the influencing factors of salary level of commercial banks in China through qualitative and quantitative analysis. This paper analyzes on the existing problems of the salary incentive mechanism in China's banking industry and puts forward some ideas and suggestions for the establishment of an efficient compensation mechanism. The first part of this paper summarizes the related theories of compensation incentives at home and abroad, mainly introduces the related concepts and types of compensation and compensation incentives. This paper introduces the related theory of salary incentive, which is divided into two parts: compensation theory and incentive theory. Salary theory includes equilibrium price wage theory, minimum wage theory, wage difference theory, sharing economy theory, marginal productivity wage theory, Keynesian theory. Incentive theory includes demand hierarchy theory, ERG theory, two-factor theory, reinforcement theory, equity theory, expectation theory, principal-agent theory and so on. The second part analyzes the current situation of the salary incentive mechanism of commercial banks in China through the use of data tables and data charts, and points out the problems existing in the current salary incentives of commercial banks. It mainly includes: pay and bank performance is not fully linked, pay form is single, structure is unreasonable, executive and employee pay gap is large, implicit incentive is insufficient and so on. The third part is the empirical study on the compensation incentive mechanism of commercial banks in China. Through the collection and arrangement of relevant data, relevant variables and model setting, this paper makes a regression analysis on the influencing factors of the compensation system of commercial banks in China. The research shows that the average salary of bank employees is basically related to the performance of banks. Employee incentive is significantly affected by the size of the bank, but has no obvious relationship with bank risk; Executive pay is not significantly related to bank performance and risk levels. In the fourth part, the main points and ideas of salary incentive mechanism design are put forward from the angle of different positions (decision-making, management, professional and technical, marketing and management) of commercial banks in view of the status quo of salary incentive of commercial banks in our country. Finally, from the aspects of fixed salary by post, performance assessment, open salary income, adjusting structure and attaching importance to long-term incentive, this paper puts forward some suggestions to optimize the internal salary incentive mechanism of the bank. This paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the external environment of salary incentive from the aspects of government management mode and legal system.
【学位授予单位】：天津商业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.33

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