控制权转移、投资者保护和股权集中度——基于控制权转移的新证据

发布时间：2019-06-13 11:01

【摘要】：投资者保护和股权集中度之间的关系一直是学术界和实务界极为关注的问题之一。以往国内外大量研究发现投资者保护程度同股权集中度呈负相关关系,但他们都无法避免可能存在的内生性问题对研究结果的影响。而在本研究,我们利用我国证券市场中存在的控制权转移事件作为研究样本,克服了内生性问题,并对投资者保护程度与股权集中度之间的关系进行了再检验。实证结果与LLSV(1998)截然相反。我们分析认为,这一结果与之前理论并不矛盾,在我国特殊制度背景下,投资者保护和股权集中度也可能会存在正向的相关关系。研究结果意味着,提高投资者保护程度、加强对上市公司的监管是提升我国上市公司治理水平、确保我国证券市场健康有序发展的有力保障。
[Abstract]:The relationship between investor protection and equity concentration has always been one of the most concerned issues in academia and practice. In the past, a large number of studies at home and abroad have found that the degree of investor protection is negatively correlated with the degree of equity concentration, but they can not avoid the impact of possible endophytic problems on the results of the study. In this study, we use the transfer of control events in China's securities market as a research sample to overcome the intrinsic problems, and re-test the relationship between the degree of investor protection and equity concentration. The empirical results are contrary to LLSV (1998). We believe that this result is not contradictory to the previous theory, and there may also be a positive correlation between investor protection and equity concentration in the context of our special system. The results show that improving the degree of investor protection and strengthening the supervision of listed companies is a powerful guarantee to improve the governance level of listed companies and ensure the healthy and orderly development of China's securities market.
【作者单位】：清华大学经济管理学院;中央财经大学会计学院;
【基金】：中央财经大学“211工程”三期重点学科建设项目资助
【分类号】：F224;F271;F832.51

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